

Sufferer's Market

Sufferation and Economic Ethics in Jamaica

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Declaration

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Abstract

In Jamaica the economic environment is characterized by abiding foreign dependence, stagnant growth, and deficient development. This thesis, based on fifteen months of fieldwork in Montego Bay is concerned with the everyday understanding and management of Jamaica's adverse economy. This is explored through an ethnographic analysis of economic practice among five groups variously involved in Montego Bay's tourist sector. These groups include Sindhi merchants, local craft vendors, an artisan cooperative, a Rastafarian tour village, and local lottery scammers. Their dynamic case studies illustrate a diverse set of responses to the constricted political, economic, and social structures of the Jamaican economy, depicted as one of comprehensive and inescapable precariousness, or as a state of sufferation. This thesis examines these groups' everyday strategies and ethics of survival in sufferation, which include articulations of market failure, production, commercial skill, cultural property, and capital seizure. From these strategies emerges an understanding of how notions of history, citizenship, race, and cooperation structure the formation of economic practice, and bear upon constructions of the market.

This thesis is dedicated to the love of my life Zavier, and the love of our lives, our baby boy Rhys.

You both sustain me.

In memory of Marvie.

We love you.

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all went above and beyond to help me understand your experiences and your eloquence in articulating those experiences made this thesis what it is. Particular thanks go to Baldwin at JAMIA, and First Man and Arlene from RIV.

List of Acronyms

DCFS: Department of Cooperative and Friendly Societies
EADUMC: Ethio-Africa Diaspora Union Millennium Council
JAMIA: Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Cooperative
JAMPRO: Jamaica Promotions Company
JIPO: Jamaica Intellectual Property Office
JLP: Jamaica Labour Party
JSIF: Jamaica Social Investment Fund
JTB: Jamaica Tourist Board
PNP: People's National Party
RIV: Rastafari Indigenous Village
SDC: Social Development Commission
TPDCo.: Tourism Product Development Company
WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization

If we must die—let it not be like hogs
Hunted and penned in an inglorious spot,
While round us bark the mad and hungry dogs,
Making their mock at our accursed lot.
If we must die—oh, let us nobly die,
So that our precious blood may not be shed
In vain; then even the monsters we defy
Shall be constrained to honor us though dead!
Oh, Kinsmen! We must meet the common foe;
Though far outnumbered, let us show us brave,
And for their thousand blows deal one deathblow!
What though before us lies the open grave?
Like men we'll face the murderous, cowardly pack,
Pressed to the wall, dying, but fighting back!

Claude McKay, "If We Must Die"

Sufferer's Market

Huh, leaders listen to these words I'm utterin'
Firmly, I ain't stutterin'
Look around can't you see my people sufferin'
The future is weak and it's gutterin', well!
-Bounty Killa, "Sufferer"; 2006

This thesis is concerned with how culturally and historically influenced ethics are embedded into the economic processes and everyday lives of Jamaicans. To this end I spent fifteen months with craft vendors; an artisan cooperative, the Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Co-op (JAMIA); Sindhi merchants; a Rastafarian tour village—the Rastafari Indigenous Village; and local lottery scammers, who variously participate in the tourist economy of Montego Bay. The ethics and strategies of these groups represent a diverse set of responses to the constricted political, economic, and social structures of the Jamaican economy. That economy can be characterized as one of comprehensive and inescapable precariousness, or as a state of *sufferation*. Despite the broader potential implications of such a term, such as in physical suffering, everyday claims of sufferation are predominantly made in response to adverse economic circumstances. Like in other accounts of social suffering, sufferation "results from what political, economic, and

institutional power does to people and, reciprocally, from how these forms of power themselves influence responses to social problems" (Kleinman, Das, and Lock 2007:ix).

Sufferation is a descriptive public discourse used in Jamaican society to denote a condition of being existentially and economically stuck. It is the desire for progress, while lacking the traction and momentum for its accomplishment, and is perhaps more specifically characterized by "...the will to consume outstrip[ping] the opportunity to earn" (Commaroff and Commaroff 2001:27). This latter description highlights the context in which claims of sufferation are most commonly expressed, such as instances of not having the money for a child's school fees, to pay one's utilities, or to buy food. While these examples provide insight into the moments in which sufferation is expressed, it is not understood as discrete occurrences of financial insufficiency. Rather, sufferation is viewed as a *state*, a *condition*, and a *position* in which one economically struggles. It is thus commonly expressed as such in daily conversation. So a reply to a benign "Wha' gwaan [What's going on]?" might likely be "Boy, mi *deh yah* a suffer [I'm here suffering]," or "Man a suffer still."

Sufferation is not just poverty, but also the incapacitating process of impoverishment. It is an arrested self-determination and self-realization couched in structural inequality. Therefore, sufferation is not only definitive of the lives of struggling Jamaicans, but reflects similarly on the Jamaican state. This study primarily offers sufferation as an analysis of the precariousness sensed in the everyday experience of Jamaican economic life. However, when this concept is applied to the level of the state, evidence is found in Jamaica's abiding foreign dependence, stagnant

growth, and deficient development. Sufferation is thus a means by which the Jamaican economy is understood, both in the minutia of everyday life, and in Jamaica's larger fiscal circuits.

Sufferation is perhaps closest to what Obika Gray (2004) has identified as the "urban exilic space" occupied by poor Jamaicans. This space serves as both "a site of repression" but also "a place where forms of social autonomy could be generated" (Gray 2004:102). This thesis picks up on this dialectic and aims to provide a sociology of sufferation in the repressiveness of the tourist market, but also in the ways Jamaicans generate strategies of coping. By examining the economic circumstances that shape the lives of this market's participants I seek an anthropological understanding of the particular strategies enacted in relation to the public discourse of sufferation. In particular I explore how the different groups I worked with used concepts and practices of cooperation, the claiming of rights, and the act of seizure to navigate the adverse space of the Jamaican economy. By examining these specific responses I reveal how notions of history, citizenship and race structure economic practice and forms of the market.

Sufferation and its Counter-ethics

Sufferation has been, to my mind, the underlying conceptual ground for analysis in anthropological studies of Caribbean life, and especially those concerned with the forms of political economy that emerged out of the plantation system. Sufferation, as I have defined it, is a means of identifying adversity in the economy, and also a framework for reconciling that adversity. In this thesis I make explicit the concept of sufferation in order to foreground ethics that I assert serve as responses to inequality. The various ethics discussed in this thesis are

examples of reconciliatory strategies employed by the groups herein. Each ethic, as it were, takes the form of particular modes of activity, such as cooperation, the claiming of rights, market capitulation, and the act of seizure. However, despite their different approaches, and their reasons, each of these are derived from ethical frames, which developed out of Jamaica's histories of slavery, emancipation, independence, and modernity. As Lambek asserts, "Ethics must be grounded in previous acts" (2010:18). Therefore, in order to appreciate how suffering economically employs these ethics, we must first examine the components of its make up, especially as they will appear throughout this thesis embedded in the varied ethics employed.

The market ethics that this thesis examines are indelibly shaped, in part, by the history of markets in the region. Therefore, there is a link between time and practices, which permit them both to be understood through suffering. Throughout early Caribbean anthropology much attention was paid to the working of contemporary food markets and the history of slave plots and the "Sunday market" at which their produce was vended. These plots and early markets were the product of food supply crises facing plantations. Land, which was ill fit for cash crop cultivation was thus allocated to slaves as provision grounds. The surplus from these grounds went on to be sold in the Sunday markets (Besson 2002: 86). This practice has been noted as a form of "protopeasantry" established within the plantation system (Mintz 1979, 1985). While access to land was central to this particular practice of the market, the ethics discussed here are products its historical development, and generate the same ethical forms "associated with autonomy from, and resistance to, political economic and physical control and manipulation" (Mantz 2007: 29).

Resistance in Jamaican history is most popularly envisioned through narratives of slave revolts, marronage, and later acts of anti-colonialism, all denoted and commemorated by one or another member of Jamaica's ensemble of national heroes. It has been shown that resistance also came in much smaller everyday acts of defiance on the plantation (Burton 1997). Taking inspiration from de Certeau's differentiation between resistance and opposition, Burton additionally argued that many of these acts should be considered forms of opposition rather than resistance. Resistance required "an 'elsewhere' from which the system may be perceived and grasped as a whole and from which a coherent strategy of resistance may be elaborated, " while opposition occurred from within the system (Burton 1997:50). And so some of the greatest displays of resistance were undergirded by a sense, whether real or imagined, of separation from the system. The "socially separate worlds" of the estate and free settlements post emancipation allowed for an "elsewhere" from which great resistance leaders, like Paul Bogle, could not only judge, but act against the injustices of the British Crown (Holt 1992:290; see Austin-Brooks 1997:38; Heuman 1994). In an ideological sense, the Rastafarian "idealization of Africa," which created a notion of distance among Rastafarians between Babylonian Jamaica and their true African homeland, likewise provided an elsewhere from which to agitate against the wickedness of the Babylonian system (Chevannes 1994:34). This idea is epitomized by Rastafarian pioneer Claudius Henry, who asked his congregation "...[S]hall we sacrifice the continent of Africa for the island of Jamaica?" (Bogues 2003:167). Additionally, resistance, Burton argued, was a product of a sentiment of hope, but *opposition* belonged to "periods of pessimism when all outlets seem blocked" (1997:51).

There is a congruency between the pessimism Burton mentions and sufferation as I have defined it. I would venture that the small acts of opposition ultimately functioned as methods of coping with this pessimism. If so, then their coping can help situate the ideological inheritance of the economic ethics I discuss. Afro-Jamaicans have long developed a complex spiritual repertoire for coping, rooted in multiple encounters of Christian ideology and Africanist cosmology. These two influences coalesced to create a particular notion of the present. On the one hand there was the Christian belief in the "kingdom come" shared among the dominant European Baptist, Methodist and Pentecostal faiths. On the other there was an extant West African notion of the eudemonic present (Austin-Broos 1997:35). Austin-Broos explains more fully:

At the outset, Europe brought a sense of sin located in the person and addressed through moral discipline that allowed transcendence only in death. West Africa brought a more nuanced experience of good and evil as companions in the world, controlled by rite and a sense of the trick. Able to transform good into evil and evil into good, African ontology allowed a present though inconstant joy in life (1997:233-234).

So, central to European Christianity was the transcendence of "a flawed human present," which would always be flawed, but in "felicitous" West African belief, life required no transcendence (Austin-Broos 1997:35). This contradiction was reconciled, Austin-Broos argues, by "sin becoming experienced as bodily malaise to be healed by embodied transformation..." (1997:234). I would argue that hardship becomes similarly embodied, and thus reconciled as a kind of present that is difficult, and like the flawed human present, always difficult, but not absent of joy. There is, thus, an underlying acceptance that the conditions of sufferation, like Burton's

pessimism, aren't expected to change, or at least not by much. And so it is through the notion of a eudemonic present that one copes and seeks a way of navigating and enduring the system.

This thesis presents the strategies of groups attempting to endure and overcome a system of suffering. Those strategies are influenced by the ethics of cooperation, rights and seizure. However, those ethics have their bases in three major ideological thrusts that have shaped the political, religious, and social formations of, and responses to, life in Jamaica from emancipation to the present day:

The ethic of cooperation in Jamaica has its basis in what Huon Wardle identified as "the syncretism of Christianity with [the] post-emancipation experience... converted into an egalitarian view of other individuals as brethren and sistren (brothers and sisters) under God" (2000:7). The Baptist free village community system, created by Baptist missionaries in the 1830s was the absolute embodiment of this notion. Out of this system emerged a new subjectivity for the newly emancipated, identified as "Christian Black" (Austin-Broos 1997; Bogue 2002; Thomas 2004). For this new subject, redemption would come through "sober and industrious" living, that saw to the "cultivation" of education, family, and land (Austin-Broos 1997:38; Thomas 2004:39; see Besson 2002:98-107). These values were identified as the criteria for western respectability, which went on to constitute Jamaican cultural and political ideals of "progress" and "development" "institutionalized through the initiation of social welfare work and democratic political nationalism in the late 1930s..." (Thomas 2004:5-6). As we will see in this thesis, the idea of cooperation stemming from this moment makes its way not only into the formal spaces of

state development ideology, but into public discourses and cultural expectations of social and commercial interaction.

As noted by Anthony Bogues, the Creole leadership of Jamaica's independence movement would carry this belief into their formula for nation building "on the silences of the lived experiences of the Afro-Caribbean" (2002:15, 26). The counterculture of Rastafari would be most visible and vocal at giving voice to those silences. However, Rastafari was a latter formation of "millenarian outbursts" (Wardle 2000:6) that did so beginning in the 1860s with Afro-Christian (Native Baptists) movements responding to Baptist missionaries' "refusal to recognize...existing black culture" (Thomas 2004:40). Austin-Broos tells of the endeavors to "supersede the persona of the Christian black" and its "rigorous ethical program that inevitably stanching the eudemonic of freedom" (1997:39).

What occurred was a radical, subaltern shift, by which Afro- Jamaicans, as Bogues explains,

[S]taked out their humanity on the terrain of cultural-religious practices. As the rulership practices of "colonial governmentality" in the post-emancipation period consolidated itself, Afro-Jamaican subjects engaged in a process of symbolic construction in which texts, signs and myths were intentionally reordered. This made the symbolic universe of colonial rule the site of everyday struggle for the subaltern subject (2002:17)

This era saw the arrival of the religious movements of Revival, Bedwardism, Pocomania, Convince, and Kumina, all seeking for the "African substrate" to break through the fluctuating mix that was Afro-Christianity (Burton 1997:97). The "radical potential" of these forms of Afro-

Christianity would eventually be "neutralized by the spread of Pentecostalism..." and their radical sensibilities taken up in Rastafarianism (Burton 1997:98). In this thesis I will show how the radical, and to an extent separatist, ideology that sprang from the racial and political imperatives of Rastafari culture, has found a novel space for development and deployment in the rhetoric of economic rights and cultural sovereignty.

Seminally, Deborah Thomas has argued for an iteration of Jamaican subjectivity, coined "Modern Blackness," which diverges from the cultural and religious schemas of respectability, radicalism, and their respective "blacknesses" (2004:241). It does so by subverting both Rastafarian emphases on African identity and its accompanying politics, and middle class influences as "cultural, political, and economic brokers in the lives of working people" (Thomas 2004:242, 245). This notion has brought about a cultural, social, and ideological autonomy for the poor to engage in local and global circuits of cultural creation and consumption on their own terms. This thesis will demonstrate how this framing is taken to its extreme through an ethic of seizure in which the local exploits its long engagement with the global. In the following section, a brief overview of the history of Jamaica's political economy provides further contextualization for the creation of these ethics.

A Brief History of Jamaican Political Economy

Even as the nineteenth century saw the outlawing of slavery in 1838, the plantation model remained in place and emancipation was little more than a "modification" to the region's long dominant economic model (Best 2009). With the advent of post-emancipation waged labor, the

only significant change was the creation of a "protopeasantry" in the "residential sector" (Mintz 1979, 1985; Best and Levitt 2009:14). This residential sector produced for domestic and export markets in the agricultural industry, which remained the dominant economic sector well into the start of the twentieth century.

Beginning in the 1950s and continuing through the 1960s increasing industrialization brought about creating employment to accommodate a growing population that the agricultural sector was unable to support. The move to industrialization saw steady growth and the creation of a stable economic environment that characterized the promise of the ascendant independence era. With the realization that traditional agricultural exports could not sustainably maintain the economic development of Jamaica, the discovery of bauxite, the primary component of aluminum, on the island, and Jamaica's maturation into a popular holiday destination saw the rise of Jamaica's two largest industries— tourism and mining. The next phase of Jamaica's economic development was thus based on a multipoint strategy of tourism, bauxite, and import-substitution-industrialization (ISI). The latter of which, was highly promoted by Caribbean economist and Nobel Prize winner, Sir W. Arthur Lewis as a viable means of economic development. On the backs of the development of these two industries, the construction sector experienced great expansion. The adopted model, dubbed "industrialisation by invitation" saw the investment of foreign companies in Jamaica, however, on the bases of cheap labor and tax incentives. The "industrialisation by invitation" policies of the 1950s-1960s eventually failed to produce the projected industrial growth in the country, as the reach of economic prosperity was limited. Ultimately, a large portion of the population remained marginalized from the process of

economic development. This was at least partly due to the dualistic nature of the urban labor market and to the inability of the agricultural sector, based on preferential treatment of its export products and on an inefficient domestic/subsistence sector, to provide much prosperity for the rural population (Bulmer-Thomas 2012:378-379).

The period from the 1930s through the end of the 1960s would be dominated with working towards, and ultimately achieving Jamaican independence. As Obika Gray tells it those decades,

...[S]aw a reform agenda of liquidating colonial rule, achieving sovereignty and inaugurating national development. Despite important improvements, this phase collapsed. It broke up because it was embedded in Euro-American racist notions of cultural difference, it was grounded in liberalism's arrested understanding of democratic rule and it was wedded to catch-up models of developmental economics (2004:355).

As an attempt at course correction, the 1970s saw increased state intervention from newly elected Prime Minister Michael Manley's People's National Party (PNP) administration, as it forwarded a populist and redistributionist economic agenda, under the political ideology of democratic socialism. PNP social policies increased public expenditure on health, education, housing, and public works programs. The government also oversaw the nationalization of some of Jamaica's most profitable industries in the banking, public utilities, and mining sectors. Notably, this was the era of much improved social equality, and the expanded public sector catalyzed the creation of a newly mobile black middle class as poor and rural Jamaicans were economically and culturally brought in from the margins. The international oil crisis of 1973-1974 coupled with the state expenditure costs of the PNP government's social reforms,

however, had detrimental effects on the Jamaican economy. Despite the increase in social mobility, the decade of Manley's first administration was also associated with an increased inflation rate, currency depreciation, an overall increase in poverty, and the stalling of the economy. Policies, which led to market restrictions, resulted in a restrained international trade initiated through increased tariffs, and licensing requirements for all imported consumer goods. However, these restrictions meant an increase in market productivity for small-scale traders, such as higglers, within the country.

By the end of 1980, the opposition, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), came to power offering a change in economic strategy. Prime Minister Edward Seaga's government, through foreign investment and market capitalism, ushered a return to the positive direction of growth that existed before the PNP came to power. Over the decade of this administration from 1980 to 1989 there was a modest fiscal balancing and reduction in inflation as a result of compliance with IMF and World Bank structural adjustment policies that began under Michael Manley. More pragmatic and less ideologically inclined, Seaga ended many of Manley's social programs. Manufacturing and construction revived, while agriculture returned to a state of decline. There was a massive reversal of the nationalization project of the 1970s, as by 1981 an extensive privatization program was introduced in sectors of tourism, banking, manufacturing, agriculture, media and telecommunications. Much of the privatization was undertaken at the behest of World Bank structural adjustment loan agreements. Many of the social gains achieved in the previous decade had been largely undone, as many on the ascendant path to the middle class experienced a reversal of their mobility. This period, which started in 1970 and ending with the 1989 elections

that resulted in the return to power of the PNP with Manley again as Prime Minister is considered by Jamaican political scientists to have been the most tumultuous socially and economically (Gray 2004:356).

Manley's second administration, which underwent a radical departure from his first by acceding ideological room for private enterprise, was elected on a more moderate campaign platform with a much-softened rhetoric of state populism. Manley retired after three years in office after which his protégé P.J. Patterson succeeded to the premiership. Patterson would remain in power for an unprecedented 14 years. Portia Simpson-Miller, Jamaica's first female Prime Minister, who held office for one year during her first administration, followed him. This chain of succession resulted in nearly twenty consecutive years of PNP rule. Under the PNP, during the 1990s there was a continuation of privatization initiatives, economic reforms, and structural adjustments undertaken in compliance with IMF recommendations. Although the PNP rejected IMF agreements late in the decade, they nonetheless continued adhering to their earlier policy prescriptions in order to be included in the North American Free Trade Agreement, which required IMF-type economic policies to be in place (Carrier 2004:129). Despite these measures, the Jamaican economy nonetheless suffered resulting in currency depreciation and cost inflation.

At the turn of the millennium the Jamaican economy finally experienced a return to growth. However, it was not enough to offset the debt accrued to mitigate the consequences of the 1997 Jamaican banking crisis caused by poor financial sector governance, government economic policies, and bank regulation and management. By 2002 the country's debt was 133% of GDP.

The 2008 economic downturn caused an already struggling Jamaican economy to suffer a reduction in tourism, decreased export demand, and critically a stagnation of foreign resident remittances. In an effort to recover from the downturn and from pathological indebtedness, which in 2013 reached 143% of GDP, the country twice restructured local debt in the past three years starting with the Jamaican Debt Exchange (JDX) in 2010. The second adjustment in 2013 was undertaken to secure a nearly US\$ 2 billion joint bailout from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.

From the brief history provided above, the economic growth and reform process in Jamaica has been plagued by an inconsistency of economic policy and political ideology. Development assistance from international banking agencies, it has been argued, replicates some of the features of the old mercantilist corporate relations in the region (Girvan 2009). As the New World Group thinkers postulated, for the Caribbean the conditions at decolonization and now are little more than the continuations of the plantation model of old, as the relationships between Caribbean countries and MNCs and development banks, are just variants of "the hinterland tied, by its nature, to the metropole" (Best and Levitt 2009:15). The traditional export model continues to dominate the economies of the Caribbean, despite variances in the circumstances and strategies of individual countries. Rapid development has come to those countries rich in energy resources, such as Trinidad and Tobago, and service-based economies have also done comparatively well. But those countries in which the economies rely on natural resources have seen the worst rates of growth since their respective independences. Tourism and remittances are

now largely the bases on which the majority of Caribbean citizens survive, as the agricultural industries of many countries have seen sharp declines.

Structural adjustments have done little more than "prop up" the Jamaican economy, which has failed to move beyond foreign dependence and ineffective export-oriented and service models (Best and Levitt 2009). Norman Girvan asserts that economic progress rests upon Jamaica's ability to move "from 'passive' to 'active' incorporation into the international economy" (Best and Levitt 2009:xxi). His prescription is the discontinued dependence on foreign initiative and externally determined demand and a transition to "local entrepreneurship organizing production, accessing technology and capital..." (ibid.) Interestingly, through their respective strategies, JAMIA, the Rastafari Indigenous Village, Sindhia, and the scammers, are enacting the requirements laid out by Girvan, however, dependence on foreign initiative remains as will be demonstrated. Throughout the oscillating periods of economic policy and political ideology between parties over the decades, tourism has remained Jamaica's most promising industry. The following is a brief history of the industry's development and current performance.

Tourism, the Lifeblood of the Economy

The passing of the Jamaica Hotels Law in 1890 began the development of Jamaica's formal tourism industry. The Jamaica Tourist Association formed in 1910 "to enhance the claims of the colony as a health and pleasure resort at home and abroad and to give 'reliable' information to both prospective visitors and those already holidaying in the island" (Taylor 1993:124). Only a few short years after this energetic start, the First World War impeded progress. In the early

1920s, however, the Tourist Trade Development Board (TTDB) was founded, which would later become the Jamaica Tourist Board (JTB) of today. It was around this time that Montego Bay began its ascent as a tourist destination with the opening of several hotels, and the growing renown of the healing waters of Doctor's Cave Beach. To generate revenue for the TTDB, the government passed a duty tax for tourist arrivals in 1935 (Taylor 1993:142). The interwar period saw a steady increase in tourism for the country; however, war would again stunt the progress of the island's burgeoning tourist sector with the start of World War II (Taylor 1993).

Taylor notes that the 1950s and 1960s were "a veritable golden age" of tourism, and Jamaica's north coast was its "gold coast, pulsating with tourism development" (1993:159). A great deal of this success was due to the reorganization of the TTDB into the Jamaica Tourist Board in 1955. The postwar years saw tourism grow so significantly that it came second only to Jamaica's revenue in sugar export. During the 1960s, Jamaica, like elsewhere in the then "Third World," "embraced mass tourism as the policy for development to bring in foreign currency, counteract negative balance of payments, diversify the economy, and generate employment" (Kingsbury 2005:115). Up to this point Jamaica almost exclusively served wealthy clientele. Pan-American Airlines brought the arrival of middle class tourism to the country. Restructuring the holiday season schedule into a "low" and "peak" season split did this. Pan-American Airline's "Clipper routes" departed from Miami and serviced the several Caribbean islands and a few South American countries (Taylor 1993: 156). Visitor numbers began to climb— from 202,000 in 1963 to 300,000 in 1965 and nearly 400,000 in 1968. It was in 1968, on the back of this growth, that Air Jamaica would be founded, initially serving Kingston and Montego Bay to Miami and New

York. The 1970s would see an expansion of the airline's routes to Canada, other countries in the Caribbean, and Europe by the middle of the decade.

The effects of tourism on the ground in Montego Bay resulted in a sense of isolation and marginalization among local residents. Exclusion from hotels, the US Dollar becoming the de facto local currency of trade to accommodate American tourists, and land speculation, were just a few of the practices that led to this sentiment. Taylor notes that the tourist industry had become a "neoplantation enterprise" (1993:175), where "Montegonians [residents of Montego Bay]...were left with little more than an intense feeling of claustrophobia and a sense of being less and less the masters of their own land" (1993:176). These inequalities would be addressed by the PNP government in the 1970s through broader economic and social policies that would see greater integration of locals into the industry. "To ensure this," Taylor explains, "small businessmen and craftsmen...were brought into the mainstream of tourism through the establishment of more craft markets, craft stalls, and craft production centers in the principal tourist areas" (1993:181).

However, despite this increased integration of locals and the expansion of Air Jamaica's routes, the decade experienced a number of external and internal problems for Jamaica and its tourism. Principal among the internal problems were those associated with the overall economic, social, and foreign policies of the Manley administration. Externally, the 1973 oil crisis brought a dramatic decrease in airline travel due to the increase in fuel prices. Taylor also notes two interesting coincidences in the US and Canada, Jamaica's two largest markets. The first is that in the mid 1970s, the American population was strongly encouraged to keep spending at home,

through promotions such as the "See American First" program, which coincided with the bi-centennial celebration of US independence. The second in Canada saw the 1976 Olympics held in Montreal direct many Canadians' attentions homewards (Taylor 1993:183)

Tourism recovered in the 1980s reaching the goal of one million stopover visitors in 1987. The industry grew steadily through the 1990s and through the first decade of the millennium, significantly contributing to Jamaica's GDP (World Travel and Tourism Council 2013). Despite a slight dip in 2010 as a result of the global economic downturn the recovery was signaled by the number of stopover visitors reaching the two million-marker milestone at the end of 2012 and on course to achieve US\$ 2 billion in revenue. This success has been due in large part to increases in activity among international airlines, the cruise industry and investment in hotel development.

Twenty years ago Taylor recognized the tourist industry as "the lifeblood of the Jamaican economic system" (1993:187). Since then it has remained the dominant sector in the economy with a contribution to the country's GDP of 27.4% during the period of fieldwork in 2012 with an estimated increase of 3.4% in 2013. Nowhere is the salience of tourism felt than Montego Bay. In the most recent national census in 2011, Montego Bay's population stood at 110,115 (Statistical Institute of Jamaica 2011:32), of which the Jamaica Tourist Board estimates 12,203 hold jobs directly and formally related to tourism. Although that figure only represents just over 11% of the population, it accounts for 34.7% of all person employed in tourism in the country (Jamaica Tourist Board 2012). Throughout the Jamaican economy, tourism accounted for 311,000 direct, *indirect*, and *induced* jobs, and is responsible for more employment than the

financial services, banking, communication services, education, mining and manufacturing sectors (World Tourism and Travel Council 2013). The only industry that comes close to that level of labor involvement is business process outsourcing (BPO), which is also highly concentrated in Montego Bay, and employs around 9,000 individuals in various capacities (Heart Trust-NTA 2014).¹ While no exact figures could be found, the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat 2012) estimates that over 80 % of St. James Parish is dependent on tourism in one form or another. Thus the tourism industry, broadly construed to include its indirect, or informal sectors, is "the only game in town" in which the broadest selection of the population can make a living given that it on average requires a lower threshold of formally acquired skill and education (Thomas 2011:217). Also, of any industry in the country tourism epitomizes Jamaica's dependency on external, and relatively uncontrollable, sources of trade, thereby embodying the tenuousness of everyday sufferation.

With numerous all-inclusive hotels and the three major cruise ports in Montego Bay, Falmouth, and Ocho Rios, Jamaica's north coast remains the country's premier tourist region, at which Montego Bay sits at the center. Home to Sangster International Airport, which serves 72% of the country's annual visitors, Montego Bay stands as the most active of Jamaica's tourist cities. This fact is evidenced by the diversity of the groups involved who vary in age, gender, and occupation. The respective economic activities of these groups fall outside of the dominant "closed" formal service sectors, of which the local tourism industry is comprised. The local economy is also significantly occupied by the business process outsourcing (BPO) industry. Despite the tourist and BPO sectors being major employers in the Caribbean, those that work

within them, whether in hotels or call centers, still face precarious circumstances caused by fluctuations in job opportunity and security and also make claims of sufferation (Gmelch 2003, Freeman 2000). However, in this project I have chosen to direct attention outside of these more formally structured sites of employment to the more entrepreneurial activities of locals. These activities, I argue, reveal most clearly the strategies Jamaicans employ in their response to sufferation. In the following section I will briefly outline the history of Jamaica's political economy in order to provide a sense of the context in which a public ethic of sufferation arose.

However, despite tourism's high contribution to the country's GDP, very little benefit is shared across classes in Jamaica. This is perhaps due to the dominance in Jamaica of the "all-inclusive," or "gated" model of tourism, in which over 30% of revenue is leaked out of the economy (World Travel and Tourism Council 2013). This model is characterized by an emphasis on full-service hotels and cruise ships. Issa and Jayawardena (2003) have noted how an Organisation of American States survey on the Jamaican tourism industry discovered that while all-inclusives generate the largest amount of revenue of any form of accommodation, their contribution to the economy per dollar is the least. Also, as cruise ship holidays gain popularity, the companies themselves extend the all-inclusive experience of the ship on shore with the creation of "tourism villages" where "passengers swim, eat and play in an artificial environment not knowing whether they are in Haiti or another Caribbean nation" (Becker 2013:154). With this model, cruise ports themselves are seen as destinations (ibid.). This has been evidenced with the Royal Caribbean cruise company's renovation of the port in Falmouth. According to one informant in this thesis,

the creation of this port is responsible for the decimation of the local tourism economy of nearby city Ocho Rios (see chapter 3).

So the context of tourism in Montego Bay is a highly appropriate microcosm for the examination of sufferation. The industry gives the appearance of opportunity, with little chance of attaining any. Therefore, the strategies employed by the groups discussed in this thesis, become of critical importance in understanding the potential means of navigating such an economy and the market(s) which it creates. In the following section, I will turn to a discussion of current analytical debates about what makes a market and how its participants engage with it. Through my account the theoretical significance of my project will become clear.

The Market as a Place of Suffering

The Performative Market

The notion of "performativity" has become an influential analytic frame for thinking through the market and market practice (Callon et. al 1998; LiPuma and Lee 2004; Mackenzie et al. 2008). The idea is that markets are performatively and reflexively composed by the mechanisms used in understanding, control, and navigation. Callon, Millo, and Muniesa defined these mechanisms as "market devices," a reference to "the material and discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets" (2007:2). Such devices range from "analytical techniques to pricing models, from purchase settings to merchandising tools, from trading protocols to aggregate indicators..." and are critical to the performance of the market because they articulate actions by acting themselves or by making others act (ibid.).

The arrangement of, or relationship between, economic actors and these devices are defined as socio-technical "agencements," a term which aims to militate against the bifurcation of agency between the two. An agencement then is a collective hybrid, which wholly composes an economic actor and renders behaviors and processes economic. Being or becoming "economic", however, is not an arbitrary process, as Callon et.al argue, but rather is "included in the agencement, through the presence of instruments..." (Callon et. al. 2007:4). These instruments are the devices that these authors argue animate the market by "abstracting," which is to say that they transport market transactions into "a formal, calculative space" (ibid.)

Lambek argues that in everyday ethics "performance establishes the criteria ...that recalibrate the criteria [for] and shift the ethical context" (2010:56). So, departing from presentations of market devices and the technological and industry specific orientation of their agencements, I argue that race, history, politics, and culture are similarly utilized in the performative ideation of the market. These categories are brought to bear on the market ethics and the market strategies devised by the groups in this thesis and become types of agencements. Therefore, the Jamaicans in this study place themselves in the market in a somewhat different manner than those predicted and indicated by Callon, et.al. Though unquestionably concerned with profit and loss, the groups discussed in this thesis employ ethical attributions and accounts of community that can tell us about various historical and contemporary forms of the market (Bear: forthcoming).

Callon argues for a framing of the market, which demarcates relations and considerations that are taken into a calculative account, and those, which are not. The latter are deemed externalities, a term Callon borrows from the economics discipline. The framing process does much, Callon asserts, to demonstrate how markets are "constructed" (1998:17). However, Callon acknowledges that a total framing is impossible, as framing or reframing enables the continued production of externalities, which lead to externality "overflows." These overflows threaten the frame and thus the transaction, which must be stabilized through "leakage" points, the permissible passing through of some externality content or component.

Anthropologist Daniel Miller (2002) took issue with Callon's ideas of framing and externalities. Miller admits that he and Callon "both write in terms of frames, and externalities" (2002:238). Therefore, the point of contention was not the presence of frames or externalities, but rather what exists inside and outside the frame. Miller explains:

For Callon, what lies within the frame is the market system, indeed it is the frame that helps define and preserve it as a market system. In my case — by direct contrast — what lies inside the frame is a ritual system, which is supported and defined by its opposition to that which lies outside the frame, which is the market system.... [In] capitalist society also, what lies within the frame is not the market system as an actual practice, but on the contrary a ritualized expression of an ideology of the market...The confusion is that this ritual and ideological system in the case of capitalism is actually called the market. To understand this we have to do what Callon set out to do but does not achieve, which is to radically separate out the market as a ritual and ideological system...In short, the frame of the market studied by Callon is a moral and ideological system whose intention is to

create the normative conditions for exchange rather than a description of practice (2002: 224-225).

I agree with Miller. However, with the notion of sufferation, I would argue for an ever-increasing scale of the frame, so much so, that for many Jamaicans it would appear as if no such frame exists. If framing is concerned with the overflow of externalities, then sufferation is a tsunami by which externalities overtake all framing: the conditions that some would consider being limited to the market, comprise a large part of these people's lives. Perhaps this can illuminate why Miller acknowledges "anthropologists have had an astonishingly hard time finding anything that bears much relation to a framed and isolated market" (2002:228). Sufferation therefore is a way of understanding not only one's economic circumstances but also the significant bearing that economics have on one's life. This is in line, though perhaps peculiarly, with Callon's assertion of the increased marketization of areas outside of the market, as he notes that the "Market seems triumphant everywhere and its laws progressively and ineluctably impose themselves worldwide..." (1998:1). Also, Miller (2002) notes this influence in the transformation in political economy. He argues that economists are increasingly capable of transforming the world to fit their theories through the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and World Bank Miller, as noted in the previous section (2002:229). This is in fact the main argument in Miller and Carrier's edited volume *Virtualism* (Carrier and Miller 1998; Miller 1998). Sufferation thus supports Miller's notion that the orientation of the market frame that Callon purports is the wrong way round (2002).

The experience and history of colonialism and post-colonialism, as Miller notes in the citing of his early work on the Indian *Jajmani* system, "frame market principles in such a way that decisions were taken according to ideological determinants that were cut off from actual commercial imperatives" (2002:229). Cultural meaning and history likewise play a critical role in Jamaican economic practice, which is often viewed and interpreted through them. Just as in Miller's findings in the *Jajmani* system, the Jamaican understanding of the market is brought about by Jamaicans' moral bearings. While I believe that Miller correctly argues for that which comprises both the "inside" and "outside" of the market frame, I will try to argue that sufferation is an all-encompassing phenomenon that does much to blur that distinction for most.

Market Ethics

Discussing the market activity of poor and struggling Jamaicans might seem anachronistic in this post-crash economic context, especially when "the market" has come to be so identified with financial instrumentation, abstracted commodities, and the overall practice of digital trade (Callon 1998, Ho 2009, Miyazaki 2003, Zaloom 2006). The term's increased use in this context, and its implications in particular, have lead Miller to argue against "the market" as being seen as "a given, natural phenomena that simply exists in the world and that must be allowed to manifest its own inherent logic" (1997:10). Outside of this limited application, I believe that Miller would agree that for the world's poor there is a market that is a natural, or at least naturalized, phenomenon intrinsic to the everyday economic and social negotiations necessary to their survival. I would argue that the "market" that gets to the heart of the economic practice of this thesis' subjects is defined through the experience of sufferation.

To be sure, there is a market in Jamaica not so directly tied to narratives of suffering. This market can be found in the economic activity of the more privileged and minority classes throughout the Caribbean. Miller's *Capitalism* (1997) is notable for illustrating that market in Trinidad, which is found among "white collar professionals in areas such as media and shopping malls" and larger consumer brands (1997:17). However, as *Capitalism* shows, problematic macroeconomic circumstances and policies, which Jamaica and the region nonetheless face, provide for these "up market" individuals an awareness of the daily precariousness of poorer Jamaicans.

With that being said, perhaps it is useful to take up the position forwarded by Julia Elyachar who suggests that instead of thinking of just "the market," consideration needs to be given over to "a multiplicity of markets" that are the products of particular labors and cultural modes (2005:24). She demonstrates this with her work among Cairene merchants in Egypt who underwent a process of free-market expansion by the reconstitution of the social networks and cultural practices of the poor into the free-market (Elyachar 2005:5). What she shows is that the market was always there for these merchants and was contextually and multiply situated and constituted, and thus the merchants already had means to understand, form, and navigate variable market circumstances. This is what Miller posits as "organic capitalism" (1997) and also what Gudeman (2001) advances as his "community"— simply put, economic practices are always locally contextualized, irrespective of the levels at which they are performed. These all support Carrier, who warned against the hegemony of the "western Market" by arguing against it as a unitary

"idealization of economic activities" simply contextualized "in particular times and places" that doesn't even exist in the 'west' (1997:13).

Whether in the tedium of waiting for profits that may never come, or in the dizzying speed of electronic trade where profits are made and lost over and over again in minutes, engagement with the market is never done without an ethical or affective result. As noted in Zaloom's work with speculators in Chicago and London, traders through the practice of discipline make themselves deserving of their profit by becoming "embodied instruments for sensing the market and reacting to its every twitch" (2006:127, 125). Or, as shown by Japanese arbitrageurs, who by more fully "knowing" and "acting" in the market negotiate temporal incongruities "inherent in the *Japanese* self-location of being behind" (Miyazaki 2003:261; emphasis added). I am not arguing here for a "Jamaican" market model, but rather, like these examples, seek to illustrate how Jamaicans see themselves within market arrangements in Jamaica.

Zaloom makes an interesting note of how speculators have a technique allowing the "flexibility to move in and out of the market in an instant, taking advantage of every rise and fall of a commodity's price" (2006:129). Through such mechanisms, these traders construct the market as something permeable. A market defined as sufferation, however, is opaque at best, and absolutely impenetrable at worst. There is no "moving in and out" but what we see are means by which this thesis' subjects move "around." Such movement results from what Janet Roitman has identified as "the history of incorporation and exclusion [which has] structured both the organization of the economy and economic practice" (2003:220). As Roitman (2003) shows in her Cameroonian

ethnography, market transactions are shored up by ethical and social expectations and serve as the bases of multiple social relations. She demonstrates this with the example of the *baaba saare* who "becomes indebted through advances and yet receives credit due to his social position and responsibilities within the community" (2003:219). The market in this context is structured by an ethic of social hierarchy and obligation. Within this market ethic, "money" can be "captured" and "price" becomes "a way of discussing a social relation" (Roitman 2003:220-221).

As the above-mentioned references have demonstrated the market is always moral, which is to say displayed through an ethic of the market (Bear 2015). As Lambek (2010) has shown, ethics are encountered as part of the everyday experience of humans, and are therefore discernible in those everyday encounters. However, reconciling those ethics, such as through judgment, are often tacitly located "...in the dialectical movement between the spoken and unspoken...between words, rules, and objects and...bodily disposition, comportment, affect, and character" (2010:6). For some of the groups discussed in this thesis that is presented as an ethic of Christianity and cooperation, as understood by both craft vendors and the artisan cooperative; and as indigeneity, as well as one of anti-capitalism, as fashioned by the Rastafari Village. For scammers, the failure of those ethics in producing success has meant their abandonment, but even in that context the market is nonetheless shaped by an ethical expectation. Those ethics, while determining how these groups go about "doing the market" (Roitman 2003:230), also serve as a means by which they cope with the disappointment of that market. The following section forwards sufferation as the normalized experience of what has been recently and popularly theorized in anthropology as "precarity."

Precarity Normalized: Strategies through Sufferation

In her latest work, *Anti-Crisis*, Janet Roitman asks:

[I]f crisis designates something more than a historical conjuncture, what is the status of that term? How did crisis, once a signifier for a critical, decisive moment, come to be construed as a protracted historical and experiential condition? The very idea of crisis as a condition suggests an ongoing state of affairs. But can one speak of a state of enduring crisis? Is this not an oxymoron? (2014:2).

I believe that Roitman's questions can be answered with an examination of sufferation. And in particular from the vantage point of Jamaican sufferation, as it has been time and again noted for its crises (Bogues 2002; Gray 2004; Meeks 1996; Scott 2014; Thomas 2004). As Anthony Bogues expresses,

Politics and the Anglophone Caribbean nation-states are in acute crisis, from which there seems no easy exit...I suggest that the present crisis in politics and the nation is one in which the economic relations, political ideas, and old patterns of domination and power are undergoing wrenching convulsions. To put it another way the crisis is one of "language, life and labor" (Bogues 2002:2).

Again, I have defined sufferation as an inescapable precariousness, which is not dissimilar to Roitman's positing of crisis as "an epistemological impasse" (2014:4). This impasse, she asserts, has led the term to develop omnipresence in the many narratives of contemporary life. The "accession to crisis" following on the 2007-2009 financial collapse gave rise to a "frenzy of academic analyses...all attempting to explain 'the crisis'" (Roitman 2014:5). What emerged from, or at least alongside, that analysis was the concentration of pervasive precariousness that the

crisis may have brought into focus. "Precarity" became a shorthand for academics "documenting the multiple forms of nightmarish dispossession and injury that our age entails" (Muehlebach 2013:298).

Most recently, and arguably most illustrative of the ethnographies depicting the rise of precariousness is Allison's, *Precarious Japan* (2013). She tells of "the collapse of mundane everydayness – of lives at once obsessed with and then left unfulfilled by food, human connection, home" (2013:2). "Precarity," Allison argues, is a "word of the times" (2013:6) and is evidenced in the global, yet everyday pervasiveness in which "human time energy and relationships" strain to "fit into the calculus of capitalist value" and where "[w]hat doesn't fit gets strained or dumped out" (2013:16). "The social and human garbage pit is precarity," she continues, "And as the sensory nature of precarious living, it is pain and unease. Life doesn't measure up: the future, and everydayness, as secure as a black box" (ibid.). Life lived in precarity is bleak. It is a bleakness, however, that many in both the developed and developing world have known for a great length of time. Such bleakness stands at the center of the cultures formed from in the dispossession of African slave descendants. However, in what Allison calls "the soul on strike" she notes a glimmer in attempts to survive, located in "different alliances and attachments, new forms of togetherness, DIY ways of (social) living and revaluing life" (2013:18). It is "an unwillingness to die, a demand to live (better), and insistence that society must change..." (2013:129). That noted glimmer, in the Jamaican context, has matured into the normalization of sufferation, in which the bareness of life is complemented by a "eudemonic hope in the present and millennial expectation for the future," which has been

cultivated through repeated hardship (Austin-Broos 1997:19). It is, therefore, not an experience exclusive to Jamaica or the Caribbean. But the region, born out of violence and exploitation for the sake of capitalist endeavor, can be considered to be an early site where the conditions that inspire the charge of sufferation were not only enacted but also institutionalized.

While the financial crisis may have broadened precarity's reach, as well as further entrenched it for those already with its grasp, for many within the latter category defensive techniques for coping with such conditions had long been created. The strategies employed by these groups might qualify as what Povinelli has termed "techniques of persistence" (2011:95). Many of these techniques have been documented in ethnographies that predate the increased interest in precarity: among Brazilian *catadores*, or garbage pickers creating novel forms of economic and social relations (Millar 2008); or selling Avon to alleviate poverty and foster empowerment in South Africa (Dolan and Scott 2009). In addition to understanding the market ethics of this thesis' subjects, I am concerned with their strategies, or techniques, with coping with sufferation. Each group has a particular approach that is specific to their experiences and to their place in the Jamaican economy.

These techniques and their wielders, however, according to Povinelli are "allowed to continue to persist in the seams of neoliberalism and late liberalism until they exhaust themselves" (2011:95). There is a lesson to be learned from Jamaican techniques in this regard: sufferation is not only a framing of the market, but also a framework of tempered expectations that attenuate its "letting die" effects capacitated in the "structural space[s] no longer valued by

the market and its cultural forces" (Povinelli 2011:22, 95). And so, Jamaicans have created strategies to prevent, or at least postpone, this exhaustion. What has resulted is an overall analytic of sufferation generated from individual ethics and experiences of coping with sufferation.

These strategies have been developed over centuries bracketed by the inception of slavery and the provision of independence, as I have discussed above. And so when accounts of emergent "precarity" are made from newer spaces of disaster, whether in post-Fukushima Japan (Allison 2013) or post-Katrina New Orleans (Adams 2013), it is hard to not see their victims eventually creating similar methods of coping formed in a much earlier moment of disaster in the Caribbean. Indeed the lessons learned from understanding sufferation can be applied to the many other areas in which social inequality and social and economic dysfunction occurs. There would be nothing novel about such a contribution coming from the region as the Caribbean has long been a productive site that has provided early and rich insight into issues that would have global impact. Slocum and Thomas note how because of "the particularities of the region's historical development," the Caribbean has always been influential in "developing several methodological and conceptual tools that are critical within contemporary anthropology" (2007:2).

My argument here is that the particularity of the local market context in the Caribbean creates a kind of ontological "being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, Macquarrie et al. 1962), in which economic concerns are overwhelmingly hegemonic. The market framed as sufferation is seen as "generating both wealth and misery, movement and immobility" (Biehl 2005:49). Sufferation is

in the absence of wealth and movement, both remaining perpetually elusive, thus furnishing the conditions for misery and immobility. Sufferation thus renders cognatic the relationship between hope and despair. As a space of sufferation, the local economy becomes occupied by "...those incapable of living up to the new requirements of market competitiveness and profitability and related concepts of normalcy..." (Biehl 2005:50). Through the strategies of "making life" (Horst and Miller 2006) in the outer zones of the free market, we can grasp what makes up citizenship through interpretations of the market.

Sufferation here is presented as a historical and cultural concept. It serves as a particular site of entry into Jamaican history and the cultural products of that history, but it also reveals a broader experience of everyday senses of lived contingency. Therefore, sufferation provides a counterpoint to the political urgency and academic impulses following the financial crisis—that protracted denouement of the last decade. If that crisis can be regarded as a flash point brought about by "irrational speculation, corrupt culture, erroneous policy, faulty regulation, defective models, missed fore-casting, or systemic failure and underlying contradictions" (Roitman 2014:12), sufferation does more than provide anthropological insight into presentations of suffering as normalcy. Sufferation should be seen as the fallout from crisis, and so the ethics noted in this thesis are not merely rationalizations of current experiences, but an archeology of past moments of crisis.

And so this thesis contributes a means of identifying recovery processes, perhaps even incognizant ones, where crises, not entirely overcome, linger in small and great everyday failures

and resistances. It does so by examining the conceptual and even cosmological ways of understanding economic life and how those resistances are legitimated and the failures consoled. These processes are not limited to Jamaica, however, they are presented here as particular to the black, postcolonial experience and the project of understanding responses to structural inequality, and especially how the comparative history and experience of blackness throughout the diaspora informs those response

Methodology

Remaining in "the Market"

In this project I have intentionally chosen to keep my research circumscribed to the market place, and forgo the conventional (but admittedly effective) ethnographic tradition of investigating the project's themes in the neighborhoods and home lives of my informants. In doing so I am following the ethnographic model of Zaloom and Ho by focusing on the ethics of the market. The reason why I believe this to be a valid approach is not because the realm of the market contains specific ethics that do not extend to other areas of life (although Zaloom (2006:117) makes this assertion regarding the competitiveness of traders). In fact, the market and experiences of it are always internal to the social, and, as I have argued above, represent to this thesis' informants an existential state that goes beyond the market.

However, I believe, in all the alternative spaces of the family and of neighborhoods, the ethics and strategies surrounding sufferation— which I argue is a socio-economic phenomenon— get obscured. The market space then is where the ambition, desires, and the histories behind the

activity of those spaces can be most clearly observed. This is my assertion because it is in the market that these groups reflect most explicitly on the inequality and disenfranchisement that make up suffering than I believe they would in their accounts of kinship, family, religion etc.

Field Site and Methodology

This project began during a trip back home to Montego Bay in 2008. Walking to Doctor's Cave Beach I walked into one of the tourist gift shops along Gloucester Avenue, or what is more popularly known as the "Hip Strip" for the first time. Welcomed in by the Jamaican woman who sat outside the shop soliciting tourists passing by to come in, I was immediately struck by an Indian clerk standing behind the register. He did not seem like any other Indo-Jamaican I knew: his style of dress and his manner were both quite foreign. Walking around browsing with the assistance of the Jamaican worker, I surreptitiously asked her if he was in fact Jamaican. "No mi dear, him come *straight* from India," she replied. My response was, "Just come [recently arrived]?" to which she responded with an affirmative "mmhmm". I didn't buy anything, but I left with an intriguing new piece of information, new at least to me. These "Indians" I would learn have been in Jamaica for well over eighty years, though only on the Hip Strip for the past twenty. As I continued my walk to the beach I popped in and out of the shops and every single one would have an Indian clerk manning the till or giving direction to a member of staff. Their presence was no longer intriguing, but fascinating. For one, because how had I never noticed? But more so, how could I have not noticed? They ran nearly every gift shop on the strip (with the exception of two).

My fascination with these Indians, who over the course of preliminary fieldwork I would learn are Sindhis, and have a brilliant history of mercantilism, brought me to the LSE for PhD research. The idea was that as far as Caribbean anthropology was concerned, to study East Indians you went to Trinidad and Tobago, or perhaps Guyana. And even then one would likely study East Indian descendants of indentured workers, who had long become a part of the nation—though not without a bit of racial contestation, which of course would figure largely in the ethnography. With these Sindhis, on this little strip of tourist road, I hoped to demonstrate a new form of interaction of Indian nationals with the Caribbean— which I hope I have done to some useful extent herein. However, after arriving in the field in late 2011 I quickly learned that this study could not solely focus on the Sindhis. They were an extremely important part of a much larger network of activity surrounding the local tourist trade in souvenirs and craft goods.

The Sindhis, to speak of them collectively, if inaccurately, not only dominated the retailing of souvenir goods, but also their manufacture. I immediately realized that their involvement most affected the work of local craft vendors, and thus they were the first group to be added into the research profile. From time with the craft vendors I was made aware of the artisan co-op, JAMIA, who had begun recruiting craft vendors to train them in craft skills as a means to offset vendor reliance on Sindhi made souvenirs. From JAMIA, I was told about the Rastafari Indigenous Village, who were successfully accomplishing that which JAMIA was working toward, namely becoming a valuable and effective social organization that provided opportunities for everyday Jamaicans to participate in tourism. The last group to join this growing collective of research participants was that of local lottery scammers, whose

participation was the result of pure luck, if you will. For ethical reasons I will say no more of how I came to know them beyond that I knew someone who put me in touch. They did not participate in tourism, at least not conventionally. Through their Internet telephone-based scam, the scammers were targeting the ideal market of Jamaican tourism— middle class and middle-aged and upwards white Americans. I realized that each group was doing more than merely participating in the local tourist economy, they were in fact trying to "make a way" through it. Their economic practices were actually strategies for surviving an environment of sufferation, which I have described as that of economic will without infrastructural support and traction. This notion was not superimposed a priori onto these groups, but rather emerged through my work with them.

Though the methods whereby these groups engage in the economy prove quite disparate, they are nonetheless located in rather close proximity. The various nodes of the field site were found within less than a 4-kilometer (2.3 mile) radius. The craft market was located in a quite busy commercial district, in which the neighboring banks, offices and shops contrasted strongly with the heavy bamboo and rustic motif of the markets exterior. The Sindhi merchants had come to dominate Gloucester Avenue, renamed the "Hip Strip" by an area restaurant association in the mid 1990s. The strip, also known as "bottom road," was the main artery for tourist activity in the city, and along its half mile stretch of road operated over forty Sindhi gift shops anchored on one end by the famous Doctor's Cave Beach Club, and by Jimmy Buffet's Margaritaville Bar on the other. The artisan cooperative, JAMIA, which again stands for the Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Co-op, was located on Queen's Drive, or "top road" named so for its relative position to

"bottom road." They rented out several open areas on the ground floor of the long abandoned "Casablanca Hotel." At the periphery of this radius is the Rastafari Indigenous Village. Located across town, the village site sits in an expanse of mostly undeveloped private property that straddles the Montego River, and nestled between three residential areas. In between all of these other locations live the scammers. The residential area was home to mostly poorer Jamaicans, but at its founding the housing development was meant to become an aspirant middle class enclave. The proximity of these groups to each other made moving between them easy. With the exception of the Rastafari Village I was able to walk to each group's respective site.


Access to all groups but the Sindhis was rather direct. My being Jamaican, I believe made that so. But also after I explained that I was interested in understanding the tourist industry from their perspective they were all rather keen to take part. This was indeed very fortunate as it helped to better facilitate conducting the research among so many groups. I gave the same explanation for research to the Sindhis, but they took significantly more time to warm to the idea of talking about business, which in the competitive area of souvenirs is often not done. I was able to break the ice with many of them with my knowledge of Sindhi culture, and especially religion, which surprised them. Also, and quite importantly, through family contacts I was able to personally meet some of the most prominent Sindhis from the older generation— who were happy to talk. But when a particular Sindhi shop owner on the Hip Strip was especially reticent, mentioning that I discussed a particular matter with one of these older Sindhis worked to open dialogue.

Despite the relative ease of access, working with each group took a specific form and required a different strategy. The Sindhi shops required a great deal of patience and a willingness to hang around and wait for them to tend to customers. Ultimately, I concentrated on visiting them in the late evening when things quieted down. However, I would always visit during one of the "ship days" of Monday, Wednesday, and some Fridays, when the cruise ships were in both Montego Bay and Falmouth ports. This gave me a good sense of Sindhi customer service and pace of business. Conversely, I typically had ample time to visit with vendors at Bay Fort craft market, as things were usually slow, only really picking up on ship days. I would also visit them on these days, which provided a great deal of insight to the trouble that they have in their business.

While at the market I would also visit with specific members of JAMIA who had stalls there. As I will explain later most of JAMIA's members came from the two larger craft markets in Montego Bay. However, my real time with JAMIA would come during their meetings every other Wednesday. The meetings themselves lasted two hours, but there was often time for chatting afterwards. Also, I would give rides back to the market or to other destinations to members, which offered more opportunity to talk. To better understand the "vision" of JAMIA, I would have separate meetings with JAMIA's leader, Baldwin Dulston and the executive board. My visits to the Rastafari Indigenous Village would become increasingly regular over the period of fieldwork and I would spend most Saturday mornings and afternoons on the grounds, helping with preparations for tours and with the tours themselves. I would also spend evenings with the leaders of the Village at one of their private residences, like with JAMIA's executive board, to get a sense of the macro and long-term view of the organization. I would spend mostly late

nights speaking with the scammers in their homes and around their neighborhoods. I would on occasion take a trip with one to the store, which was often to the mobile phone shop to pay a bill. Despite working with several groups over only fifteen months, I never got the sense by conducting essentially what was multi-sited ethnography that I was ever in any danger of spreading myself too thin (Wogan 2004).

Map of Field Site Area



Thesis Outline

This main body of the thesis contains five chapters. Each chapter serves as a particular vantage point into the respective ethics and practices of the market of Bay For craft vendors, JAMIA, Sindhi merchants, the members of the Rastafari Indigenous Village, and local lottery scammers. The chapters therefore function as ethnographic group "portraits" (Miller 2011), where the concerns of several members of each are brought to the fore to try and "get at" how market ethics are employed to navigate sufferation.

The first two chapters demonstrate how the market in Jamaica is related to the notion of cooperation. In the first chapter, *A So Black People Stay*, craft vendors interpret the competitive strategies of fellow vendors as acts of animosity understood through the trope "bad-mind." Despite facing a marketplace increasingly constricted by foreign made souvenirs imported by emigrant Sindhi Indian wholesalers, vendors attribute their economic failings and the conditions which create them to a chronic black Jamaican disunity inherited from slavery. What emerges is an ethic of the market that is framed by an expectation for cooperation. However, when that expectation is not met, an ethnicized rationale of disunity is employed as a strategy to cope with the failures of the market, which become understood as failures of community.

The second chapter, *Putting Able Hands to Work*, introduces The Jamaican Indigenous Artisan Cooperative Society (JAMIA). This is an artisan cooperative whose membership is mostly comprised of unskilled craft vendors, who have joined in the hope of learning a craft skill. Their

motto, "Putting able hands to work," speaks to their market ethic of economic collectivism and cooperation, not dissimilar to that of the craft vendors. They assert that these are all resources that they see necessary to compete in the souvenir industry, and thus make a way out of sufferation. Many members of JAMIA believe that craft is paramount in both representing and economically developing the country, though overlooked by government. They seek to accomplish their capacity to compete through strategies of organization and production, as informed by Jamaica's Department of Friendly and Cooperative Societies.

In the third chapter, *Enter Through the Gift Shop*, I show how Sindhis dominate the sale of Jamaican tourist goods, an act that is described by vendors and artisans in Montego Bay as being to the detriment of local Jamaican traders and artisans. Sindhis make the moral claim that without the business acumen and industry of their community, the local trade in souvenirs would inevitably fail. However, the cost of Sindhi business success, their alienation from fellow Jamaicans and forms of bonded labor suggests that they too encounter sufferation. In fact, I show, that they too use this ethical framing at times.

The fourth chapter, *Babylon Makes the Rules*, presents the Rastafari Indigenous Village (RIV). The group uses their participation in the tourism market to challenge what they believe are infringed Rastafarian cultural property rights. They do this through positioning Rastafari as an indigenous Jamaican culture. Therefore, their participation in the market is guided by an ethic of rights. As a means of commercially defending these rights the group employ a discourse of indigeneity. In this process, RIV have gained partial recognition from the World Intellectual

Property Organization of the United Nations, and increasing acknowledgement from the Jamaican government. While the basis of indigeneity strongly supports the case of intellectual and cultural property rights, this recognition ultimately further identifies the group, and Rastafari in general, with Jamaica. This association with Jamaica is problematic, as Rastafari perceive themselves as "exiles" in the West, "alienated from their African homeland" (Edmonds 2012:40).

The fifth chapter *Seizing Life* introduces a group of scammers who have opted out of the tourist market of Montego Bay. Facing increasingly limited social and economic opportunity, lottery scamming in St. James, Jamaica has become a highly controversial means by which poor young men, through the use of communication technology, redress the restricted social mobility inherent in sufferation to create opportunities for wealth. This chapter explores how scammers try to exploit the market through acts of seizure. I discuss how the practice of the scam and the specific communication technologies utilized enable a novel encounter between scammers and the U.S., disrupting long-standing relations of power. The acquired wealth engenders a reinterpretation of scammers' place in Jamaican society, obviating popular models of success and social mobility tied to migration, as the value of "foreign" is diminished and Jamaica is re-imagined as a locus of opportunity and possibility.

Craft Vendors of Bay Fort Market

No white man no fuss nor fight
 No Chiney no fuss nor fight
 No Indian no fuss nor fight
 No Syrian no fuss nor fight
 Only we black man fussing and fighting

-Barrington Levy, "Don't Fuss Nor Fight" ; 1979

With a prolonged kissing of her teeth, Hazel, a vendor at Bay Fort craft market,² made it clear that my question of how things were in the market was a silly one. Stretching out her hands toward the market stalls behind us in an invitation to survey that which was obvious, she answered, "Nuttin' no gwaan fi we!" The phrase fully conveyed a sense of anxiety. Nothing really was going on for these women in the market, or at least not anything much. Horst and Miller (2006:125) working on cell phone communication in Jamaica several years earlier encountered the same phrase among young men stuck in their bored, communal loneliness—symptoms, they proffered, of poor economic prospects. Then and now, the phrase communicates an epidemic sense of precariousness in Jamaica, locally recognized as a state of *sufferation*.

Craft vendors in Bay Fort conduct their business from a position of defeated competition and discontented citizenship. This was evident among the over two hundred vendor stalls at Bay Fort, the city's largest craft market, where there is a paradoxical amount of inactivity. On most days the slow pace of business leaves vendors dependent upon the intermittent mercies of JUTA (Jamaican Union of Travelers Association) bus drivers to bring hotel guests, and cruise passengers on ship days, to the market to shop. This dependency is a product of the closed-loop all-inclusive, "gated tourism,"³ that dominates much of the Caribbean, in which tourists are shuttled between the airport, hotels, cruises, and approved attractions. For vendors at Bay Fort, the already limited business they see is further restricted by the uniformity of goods sold among them. Selling the same, or similar, merchandise makes it difficult for each stall to be distinct and vendors often resort to assertive sales tactics to gain a competitive edge. These tactics and the conditions that generate them create a market of sufferation which as a "...cultured structure that organizes everyday life and labor..." produces historicized narratives of race and disunity (Zaloom 2006:117).

The accounts of market vendors draw on wider discourses of Jamaican life, cooperative structures, and blackness to construct an ethical account of *bad-mind*. Bad-mind is a trope used to identify the act, or intention of another undertaken as a form of envy. This chapter appropriates the term as a market concept related to acts of competition, and responses to acts of competition in particular. It, therefore, examines how vendors use the concepts of bad-mind and sufferation to frame and reconcile the continued lack of social and economic progress they experience in the market. The chapter also seeks to understand "the measures of failure, [and]

the arts of failure" in the market so as to understand failure not as "an ideal form floating outside social space [but] instead a socially mediated term for assessing the social world" (Povinelli 2011: 23).

Bay Fort and Its Vendors

Bay Fort sits along three blocks near Montego Bay's downtown area. The market currently has 245 largely adjacent stalls with roughly two hundred in operation. The vendors at Bay Fort are almost all women, most of whom are middle-aged, though a small minority are in their mid-thirties. The few male vendors either work with their mothers or partners, or are artisans who sell their carved goods directly (though at the time of fieldwork I could only count one such stall). The female vendors who are in the majority are women who are the characteristic backbone of poor and rural Jamaican society, as noted in the numerous ethnographic accounts of Jamaican and Caribbean kinship (see Barrow 1999; Besson 2002; Chevannes 2001; Clarke 1999 [1957]; Henriques 1968; Smith 1962; R. Smith 1995; and Quinlan 2006).⁴

Many of the vendors work to support themselves, their children, and in many cases, their grandchildren. Indeed quite a few older women I spoke with were directly responsible for the payment of school fees and basic maintenance for their grandchildren. This was achieved through forms of direct financial support to their parents or by boarding the grandchildren at home with them. Some of these grandchildren were often present in the market. A constant was vendor Big Mama's granddaughter, Shanice, who often sat beading bracelets with Big Mama during slow periods. Some of the younger vendors would bring their young babies in to work

with them. These women told me that the Parish Council particularly discouraged the practice of bringing their kids to the market. However, there was little other option for most of them.

Usually vendors came to the trade from a previous career in vending, whether in produce markets, or higglering—the informal trade of home and other goods in public spaces. Others came from a variety of backgrounds, but were united by their entry into craft vending as a seemingly viable, but mostly accessible means of earning a living. There were a good portion of vendors who themselves once were, or continued to be, involved in making handicrafts of mostly straw or crocheted goods and thus opened their stalls for their sale. But these crafts, rather than taking prime space within the stalls, now largely supplemented other goods purchased from local wholesalers.

Unanimously Christian, the vendors variably belong to Pentecostal, Baptist, and Seventh Day Adventist denominations, all maintaining deep religious devotion and commitment to their churches. Their Christianity plays a critical role in their market practice and in my analysis of that practice. As stated in the introduction, sufferation is a socio-economic condition characterized by an inability for economic progress. Sufferation is also a way coping with that lack of progress. For these vendors it functions as a Protestant framework that partly mitigates their experiences of economic adversity. Sufferation, therefore, is an affective ethical term that gets to the heart of the vendor's economic concerns. Vendors assuage those concerns by framing their experiences with religious and ethical idioms and practice economic strategies related to them.

Competition and Bad-mind

I met Doris at stall number one chatting with her neighbor from stall number two. I asked Doris about her work as a vendor and the operation of Bay Fort craft market. She explained that the market was divided into two zones. These were designed so that tour buses could come to either end on specific days, so that one half functioned as a veritable "downtown" while the other, more visibly maintained, the "uptown." Doris happened to work downtown. This distinction was due to an uneven allocation of renovation funding the market received in 2009 facilitated by the Tourism Product and Development Company (TPDCo). The renovation enabled the repair of derelict stalls and a bright repainting of their facades. But only the first phase of the renovation took place with the enhancement of 127 shops in the market nearest the main entrance.⁵ Doris attributed the disparity to favoritism and bias in the leadership of the craft market and in the St. James Parish Council who were responsible for the market's overall operation.

For Doris, the Parish Council did not care about the vendors, and only wanted to collect the stall rent. The truth was, however, that she could barely make her stall's JAM\$ 3000 a month rent as business was so poor. Although the amount was not exorbitant, Doris claimed that some weeks she barely made more than JAM\$ 500 (just over US\$ 5). In fact the rent proved a financial quandary for most of the vendors. The rent for many vendors was in arrears, and as a result their shops had been closed by the Parish Council for non-payment.⁶

Whether one worked uptown or downtown, business was still tough and opportunity often only came with the arrival of the JUTA bus. So, vendors eager to make their first, if not only,

impression often immediately approached tour buses entering Bay Fort market. It is prohibited for vendors to solicit tourists in this way, and is an act penalized by a fine. This was faulty logic put into practice according to Doris and many other vendors who attested that however verboten, it was necessary. Throughout the market tourists are persistently met with solicitations by vendors such as, "Shopping today, sir? What are you looking for?" "Hello pretty lady! We have some nice things here, just have a look!" They obligatorily reply with a smile, a cursory glance, and then reliably utter the hope-shattering phrase, "We'll come back around later," which of course they seldom do.

Although tourists are put off by the vendors' approach, intense petitions such as theirs are hallmarks of almost any market. In some contexts such solicitations can be viewed as the "bedazzling quality...[of] market patter..." that Webb Keane considers to be "iconic" of the market's "allure" (2008:34). However, at Bay Fort the solicitations make it a decidedly unenjoyable place to shop. There is a singular reason for this: vendors' clamorous appeals are made against the background of a uniform assortment of goods. These items are featured in nearly every vendor's tiny 40 square foot stall.

"It's all the same stuff," one tourist admitted to me, echoing common tourist impressions. "Once you go to one stall, there's no reason to go to another," asserted her companion. A market can be made into "a utopic space" through the "exploitation of choice," but the lack of choice within Bay Fort stifles tourists' interest (Causey 2003:186; Miller 1998:154). This is further frustrated

by vendor sales tactics. One tourist's account clearly articulates the annoyance with the lack of variety and the sales approach:

Our hotel put [us] on a free shuttle to the craft market...which we thought would be great place to pick up some presents as well ensure some of our spending went outside of the hotel resort. Sadly though we found the market very disappointing. We were hassled non-stop as we tried to look around the market. In the end we gave up, had a drink and got the shuttle back to the hotel. The market is poorly designed-there are a lot of traders mostly selling the same thing from their individual stalls-they try and get you to come into their stall and then hassle you to buy and look at things. There is little variety in what is being offered and there was not very much that took my fancy. Why don't they sell a broader range of Jamaican goods? Such a shame— they could do with some help in how to serve customers and to find out what tourists actually want to buy. If we had not been hassled so much then we would have probably bought something but as it was, we only bought a few drinks at the bar.⁷

The lack of selection makes the vendors' aggressive approach unbearable. The tourist himself made the connection when stating that, *"They could do with some help in how to serve customers and to find out what tourists actually want to buy."* Former Tourism Minister Francis Tulloch at the University of Technology's tourism forum held at the Montego Bay Convention Centre in October 2012 even commented on current state of the city's markets:

I am disappointed that our craft vendors after so many years still don't have a proper craft market... Anybody, once you can afford it, can come from overseas, get the permit and open any little gift shop; not that I do not want foreigners here, I welcome them... [but] if you go to the craft market... Bay Fort Street and Old Street Craft markets, look at the products. We see everybody selling the same

things. We need for these people to diversify. All these people sell the same thing.
That cannot work...

In his disappointment with the lack of selection, the former tourism minister picks up on an important issue. When each vendor is offering the same product selection at relatively the same price, it is a difficult task to make one's stall distinct and attractive.

The cited lack of variety in the craft market can be attributed to a constricted product range that is determined by emigrant Sindhi Indian wholesalers who import "Jamaican" souvenirs from Indonesia, China, and India. Sindhi wholesalers and retailers in the souvenir trade were once contract workers recruited from India to staff in-bond, duty-free luxury shops run by previously arrived generations of Sindhi merchants. Unable to open their own luxury goods businesses, and reluctant to return to India at the end of their contracts, Sindhi workers began opening gift shops and starting wholesale businesses in the early 90s. The low cost of their imports edged local producers out the market, which decreased local output and limited vendors' supply sources to Sindhi goods. This eventually led to the homogenization of the selection at the market.

The circumscription of available goods creates circuits of competition not only among Bay Fort vendors, but also between the few markets in Montego Bay. These as a category compete against numerous local Sindhi-owned gift shops. Circumstances demanded that Bay Fort vendors employ assertive sales strategies, like the "aggressive" solicitation of tourists mentioned earlier. Bay Fort vendor, "Big Mama," similarly commented on the practice in a discussion with me that indicated vendor awareness of the problem:

You see what make us lose business more time? Them [other vendors] go a [to] the bus and don't wait. Sometime you fi 'low them [should allow tourists space] and make we do business. Let me tell you something...a we run [turn off] tourist you know? You no haffi [have to] call tourists, you fi let them walk. You haffi attract the tourist them. One time me foot sprain and me couldn't walk so me just sit down and unpack two something and the people them just come right over and them make me day. You no haffi call tourist, some of them [vendors] nuh [don't] too understand. Me travel you know and when you go a one store inna America, you walk round till [for an extended period], you no even see nobody come talk to you, you must pick up what you want and take it, and you haffi go ask them for help. So most of us no really understand business.

Though fully aware that their aggressive forms of solicitation are problematic and that inventory factors contributed to them, vendors view each other's actions as *competitive* sales strategies. It has been noted that in the Caribbean, culture "is virtually synonymous with that of competition," whether evidenced in strictly commercial realms or in the demonstrations of competing carnival bands (Miller 1997: 314, also see Burton 1997).⁸ Competition among market women has also been discussed as being integral to the trade (Besson 1993; Wilson 1974: 234). To vendors, the competitive strategies of others were taken as a personal affront and as the manifestation of bad-mind.

Bad-mind, as defined at the start of the chapter is a form of envy. Envy can be generalized as a culturally informed response to competition, in which the act of another is viewed as antagonistic. Bad-mind, as I will show, is also viewed as a product of an inherent disunity among blacks. The notion invokes Peter Wilson's seminal work, *Crab Antics*, which examined the

"ingrained...covetousness and contentiousness" that he proposed defined the social life (with special regard to land inheritance) of (black) Providencia islanders through a dialectical relationship between the values of "respectability" and "reputation" (1973:58, 9). That dialectic and especially its inference of gender relations has been adequately debated (Barrow 1996; Besson 1993, 2002; Freeman 2000, 2007; Olwig 1993; Thomas 2004; Yelvington 1995). It, nonetheless, remains particularly salient to this discussion, as it has been to many previous studies of Caribbean market women and female vendors, their femininity, and social position (see Besson 1993; Brown-Glaude 2011; Burton 1997; Ulysse 2007). Carelessly considered, the working of disunity as bad-mind among Bay Fort vendors could be seen as confirming the stereotype of market women as being of "invasive physical presence...demeanor and language..." (Burton 1997:164). Instead it should be considered as a cultured and historicized contextualization of the economic precariousness faced in the Caribbean, and disproportionately by women.

A comparative, yet alternatively gendered, account of competitive discord similar to bad-mind is the claim of the evil eye among male Cairene merchants in Egypt (Elyachar 2005). Claims of both bad-mind and the evil eye are commonly made in response to a lack of business success and the proximity of competitors (Elyachar 2005:159). The evil eye, like bad-mind, is a means by which merchants manage the instability of the market. Elyachar interestingly notes how when things went poorly for the merchants, they placed blame on acts of self-interest, which create negative value in the market that ultimately brings on the evil eye (2005:158). For these merchants the evil eye was brought onto one's self, often in the form of mystical misfortune. This

is similar to the working of "red eye" in China where envy operates against those who fail to conceal their "desirable possessions or attributes" (Zhang 2013:115). Evil eye and red eye demonstrate a social disinclination toward acts of self-interest, and work to assert the values of equality and cooperation over market produced inequality.

Similarly, bad-mind suggests an expectation of equitability in the market, and is a response to displays of inequality. The difference between them is that unlike bad-mind, red eye and the evil eye are identified by being met with misfortune, which then prompts one to become more equitable through a change of behavior (Elyachar 2005:161-2). They both, therefore, have a balancing quality which helps to generate public-spiritedness and over all equality. Bad-mind, however, is only identified in the claiming of ill intention in others, without any resulting misfortune to serve as an intervention for the act and effect of bad-mind. Therefore, no balance is achieved and the only result is a reproduction of ill will. Admittedly, this brought to my mind social psychologist Madeline Kerr's findings of Jamaicans' "deep-set defensive mechanisms and tendencies to shift blame or responsibility for any lapse or misfortune to other persons or external circumstances..." (Clarke 1999 [1957]:xxiv). Though as a generalization, Kerr's blame-shifting thesis is clearly very problematic, it nonetheless speaks to a trait that is evident in the function of bad-mind, and perhaps its employment.

Understanding bad-mind, thus, provides insight into the working of self-interest as an economic motivator. It also demonstrates how charges of self-interest operate as a mechanism of morality that works as a constraint on, rather than a facilitator of, the market, especially one already

hindered by the characteristics of sufferation. As Webb Keane has argued, markets "cannot be wholly free of some kinds of moral claim, and thus cannot achieve full social disembedding" (2008:28). Market vending in the Caribbean has been noted to "capitalize" on the "moral accounting of economic practices" (Mantz 2007:28), and so bad-mind is a means by which economic acts are evaluated on a moral basis and by which vendors making the claim seek to impede others' advancement. Such is the potentially reproductive effect of bad-mind: in claiming bad-mind, one enacts a process, which itself can be identified as such.

Disunity and Bad-mind

Through bad-mind, vendors participate in a reflexive critique whereby problems in the market are located within themselves and their community. In a similar vein, Andrew Causey, working among Toba Batak woodcarvers in Sumatra, shows how despite their souvenir ideas were being copied by competitors, which thereby decreased demand of a particular style, these carvers ascribed their failures in the tourist market to their own inability to "know" what tourists wanted, or to communicate with them (1999:41-42). While Causey did not fully unpack the reasons for this sentiment among the woodcarvers, I was able to determine an interesting reason for it among Bay Fort's vendors. To vendors, bad-mind was evidence that black Jamaicans are incapable of commercial cooperation. "Business," I was told, was one of the areas where black people "just *cyaan* [can't] agree." Bad-mind as an expression of "black" disunity is a fact for vendors that is made real in its blackness, and taking this position seriously is critical for examining this proposed narrative of race and its implications. It is important to note that what follows are *claims* of bad mind and not necessarily accounts of the *acts* of bad mind.

Bad-mind is a particular ethic of the everyday, and as Lambek (2010) noted regarding these ethics, they are often tacitly identified. Therefore, the first account of bad-mind in the craft market I heard came from outside the market, and was the testimony of Stacey, the Jamaican owner of a small local wholesale operation. Stacey's claim was that craft vendors "don't want to see other black people do well." This was her assertion because the vendors seldom bought from her because, as she insisted, they did not want to "build" her up. She further expressed that "they rather go to the Indians [Sindhis]."

Stacey's shop was just across from Bay Fort craft market, so it was perplexing that the market's vendors were overlooking it. A few craft vendors admitted that they did in fact not shop at Stacey's, but not for her stated reasons. They noted the lack of selection and the high cost of Stacey's offerings compared to her main area competitor, Dinesh, a Sindhi wholesaler whose shop was also located nearby. Why then would Stacey maintain that race drove the vendors' decision?

I asked the vendors about Stacey's assertion, and was assured that racial bias was not their motive. However, they admitted that they, too, believed that black Jamaicans did not like to "build up" one another, and it was demonstrated through acts of bad-mind everyday in the market. Their noted examples included the price reduction of an item under consideration at a neighboring stall, the direct solicitation of customers in another vendor's area, and the copying of specific merchandise successfully sold by a neighboring vendor. I witnessed the latter one day in

Dinesh's shop. One vendor had bought a particular set of ashtrays, and another vendor waiting behind her to check out said to Dinesh, "Give me two of them too." The request resulted in a quick, silent expression of displeasure on the first vendor's face. But this kind of thing happened a lot during my time in Dinesh's shop. Vendors often bought similar items to each other, whether knowingly or inadvertently, because despite Dinesh's vast selection, there were a finite number of category choices.

When those same items ended up on sale at two adjacent stalls, whispered charges of bad-mind were cast as racial imputations of others' competitive strategies. However, criticisms were met with repudiations of prejudicial economic practice. This occurred in a circumstantial interchange where free market practices were willfully employed, but problematically received and replaced with ethical, and ethnic, market values. When such values were not fulfilled, it was perceived of as acts of disloyalty and black disunity, or, simply put, bad-mind. In other words, it was okay to copy, but deeply problematic to be copied. Admittedly, this brought to mind social psychologist Madeline Kerr's 1952 findings of Jamaicans' "deep-set defensive mechanisms and tendencies to shift blame or responsibility for any lapse or misfortune to other persons or external circumstances..." (Clarke 1999 [1957]:xxiv).⁹ Though as a generalization, Kerr's blame-shifting thesis is clearly very problematic, it nonetheless speaks to an explicit ethic of bad-mind rather than an internal psychological state of distrust.

As much as bad-mind and "black disunity" illustrate self-perceptions of blackness, I would argue that they tell us just as much about blackness as a feature of comparison. In fact for female

vendors all comparison within the broader market is carried out through categories of race. While black disunity is determined by an assessment of black-black interaction, it is confirmed by external comparison. For Bay Fort vendors, unity is found around them, just not among them. The comparative assessment of unity was often accomplished by evaluating black Jamaicans' economic success and cooperation against that of Jamaica's communities of Chinese, whites, Indians, and "Syrians"—a classificatory proxy for the island's population of Lebanese and Sephardic Jewish descent.¹⁰ Despite the Jamaican nationality of these groups, "Terms of reference and signification such as Indian, Chinese, and Syrian," Charles Carnegie (2002: 31) notes, "denote immutable characteristics that permanently marked the person as different, no matter how integrated she is, or feels herself to be, in the national culture" (also see Maurer 1997: 138). Through a reductive determination of their perceived collective success, these groups were regarded as necessarily united. Commonly cited examples of this assertion include the near exclusive Sindhi Indian ownership of souvenir wholesale centers and retail shops, the prevalence of Chinese-owned groceries, and the long standing dominance of whites and Syrians in a variety of commercial areas (see Brown-Glaude 2011:42).¹¹ The ostensible unity and accord exhibited in the business practice of these other groups contributed to the skewed self-evaluation of black Jamaican commercial behavior.

To vendors, Sindhis, or "Indians" as they are categorically referred were paragons of unity in business. In circulation among the craft vendors was a particular *ex hypothesi* construction, in which Sindhis pooled their resources to purchase and distribute large volumes of merchandise among themselves, which explained their lower prices. This was the only conceivable way that

Sindhi retailers were able to multiple price t-shirts "3 for [US] \$10" while vendors were by necessity selling only one of the exact same t-shirts for that price. Collective bulk purchase best symbolized the economic and social accord the vendors believed lacking among blacks. The notion occupied much of the craft vendor imagination as evidenced in this account from Bay Fort vendor, Kerry:

I remember about 10 years ago people were complaining how the Indian are selling so cheap and I told them that the reason they can do that is because they pool their money and buy in bulk. But we can do the same thing and pool our money. So why we don't do that so that we can compete? And everyone had a little reason why them don't want to do that...and that is our problem. Unite together? We have some little petty things that stop we a [us from] unite together. And when we can get over that...we gone clear.

Commercial collectivism among Sindhis proved to only be a vendor fiction. Sindhi retailers' low prices were due to the inventory credit terms they received from Sindhi wholesalers. Inventory credit facilitates a more successful and productive, but most importantly, flexible, trade. The credit interval provides necessary time for Sindhi retailers to make their profit. The thirty or sixty days Sindhi retailers have to make their inventory payment could qualify as cooperative activity. However, wholesalers assured me that these arrangements were determined by credit-worthiness—a metric that is intrinsically problematic, to be sure.

Access to inventory on credit would enable vendors to become more flexible in their trade, and might perhaps lead to greater variation in their offerings. As Janet Roitman has shown credit is advanced to people who are socially sanctioned, as credit relations stand "at the heart of

productive associations" (2003: 212). Vendors lack the requisite social position deemed necessary for credit worthiness as determined by the "logics of inclusion and exclusion, and hence socioeconomic differentiation" of both Sindhis and formal lending institutions in Jamaica (Roitman 2003: 219,220).

Vendors, as well as many average Jamaicans, are unable to secure credit from the formal financial sector, whose lending terms have become ever more stringent and prohibitive as a result of policies arising from structural adjustment programs (Handa and Kirton 1999:174). The response to the alienation from formal access to credit is the prevalent participation in "partners," or the Jamaican variant of a rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCA). Due to their "relative efficiency over formal savings institutions in terms of access, transaction costs, and investor confidence," partners are ubiquitous in Jamaica (Handa and Kirton 1999:193). However, receiving a "draw," the term for a partner payout, cannot always facilitate the increased purchase of inventory goods, as there are inherent limitations in partner participation. This primarily includes the time it takes to receive one's turn— depending on the size of the partner, it may take several weeks to receive a payout. Partner as a form of ROSCA does not typically have the borrowing benefit of credit-granting savings clubs. Access to borrowing has shown to be quite beneficial with the increased success of programs such as an Accumulating Savings and Credit Association (ASCA), as demonstrated by Deborah James' account of their use in South Africa in local forms known as *stokvel* or *sesebesebe* (2012:26).

Using partner draws to finance their businesses is also complicated by the commitment to paying in, or "throwing" one's regular "hand," the term for the contribution to the partner, as often profits made from vendors stall must go toward the partner pay-in. Finally the draw may not always exceed one's contribution, such as in cases where other participants withdraw from the program thereby decreasing the pot and the draw. In the worst case, there is the chance that the "banker," or manager of the partner, might run off with the fund. Ultimately, vendors are deprived of the necessary catalysts to bolster their business. Without the liberty to construct their own possibilities vendors are economically interned by the circumscribed sources of inventory and the craft market itself.

The belief in Sindhi collective purchasing indicated that to vendors commercial success was predicated on cooperation and unity, as evidenced in their participation in the partner. However, despite the regular success of partners, vendors believed the supposed cooperative facilities of Sindhis somehow managed to evade the black community. Many vendors reasoned, as noted in Kerry's account, that given the over two-hundred stalls at Bay Fort, all of which sold similar, if not the same, items, they could buy their merchandise in bulk and easily demand lower prices from wholesalers. While vendors agreed in principle, they ultimately acknowledged the lack of necessary cooperation to do so. I was confused by the juxtaposition of an evidenced cooperation in throwing partner with the disbelief in wider cooperative action. This fact seemed to add to the questions about cooperation that have been asked by scholars in recent years (Heinrich & Heinrich 2007, Tomasello 2009, West, et.al 2010, Tomasello, et. al 2012). What I realized was taking place was an interesting take on Maurice Bloch and Johnny Parry's often-cited idea of

transactional order discussed in the introduction to *Money and the Morality of Exchange* (1989). For vendors, throwing partner, and its relatively limited commitment, was in fact what Bloch and Parry termed a "short term" exchange cycle— a domain that is both acquisitive, and importantly individual (1989:2). However, unifying to collectively demand lower prices from Sindhis would qualify as a "long-term" cycle of commitment, which being concerned with morality, serves to enable "the reproduction of the social and cosmic order" (ibid.). What vendor disbelief in long term cooperative action demonstrated was that the social and cosmic order in Jamaica, as gleaned from their accounts, is shrouded in an ethos of pessimism.

One vendor, Iona, who was frustrated by many vendors' non-payment of rent, articulated this sense:

Most of the vendors in here, they are parasites. They do not want to pay parish council rent and no association dues. When it comes to money, they do not want to put it back into the system so we can all benefit collectively. So for those of us vendors who pay, it is not fair to sit back and watch them feeding off our money.¹²

In Iona's estimation as to why vendors do not pay their rent, none of the aforementioned difficulties are described. For her the reason is that non-paying vendors, as *parasites*, would rather "feed off" other vendors rather than pay the rent and association fees so the market can benefit *collectively*. Iona's charge is one that identifies bad-mind in the act of vendors' non-payment. It also directly suggests a lack of cooperation, while interestingly reinforcing its expectation. This is similar to "the tragedy of *Ubuntu*" among black women in South Africa identified by Katrina Greene (2010). The "tragedy" that Greene identifies is the individualizing

effect of the market and how it threatens the collective ethos of *Ubuntu* or "humanness," "that mandates expressions of charitableness, sensitivity, and consideration..." (2010:195). The decision to not pay the rent goes against the collective ethos of a market in which each vendor's rent sustains the market overall. However, non-payment is a strategic choice for surviving in the broader market. It allows for the reallocation of resources, whether to purchase more merchandise, or contribute to their partner. Therefore, the demands of the market are that, which undermines the cooperation deemed necessary for success and "ubuntu" gives way to bad-mind. However, it may be more fruitful to consider not the demands of the market as responsible for producing bad-mind, but rather its constraints and inequalities.

An instructive foil to the relations generated by the conditions Bay Fort craft vendors face is provided by looking at another category of Jamaican vendor, Informal Commercial Importers, or ICIs. ICIs are more commonly referred to as higglers,¹³ though use of the term is contested (Brown-Glaude 2011). ICI's travel abroad, mostly to the US, but recently as far as China, to purchase much in-demand goods, such as trendy apparel and accessories, but also household and school related items. Ethnographic accounts of Kingston-based ICIs detail their demonstrated displays of collegiality and cooperation "...band[ing] together as black females...historically limited by capitalism" (Ulysse 2007: 214). How then do ICI's manage to escape producing the racial narratives of their craft-vending counterparts? Like Sindhi retailers, the autonomy inherent in ICI commercial practice grants the necessary flexibility to structure the trade as seen fit, permitting changes to inventory, or even venue, thereby obviating circumstances that might encourage discourses of bad-mind. The desire for autonomy has been noted to be the thrust

behind everyday economic choices in the Caribbean since the practice of personal garden cultivation among African slaves (Browne 2004:122). The means to achieving this autonomy has often come through a practice of flexibility (Carnegie 1987; Harrison 1998; Mintz 1989; Trouillot 1992), or "occupational multiplicity," which Lambros Comitas (1973:157) identified as being "systematically engaged in a number of gainful activities, which...form an integrated economic complex."

Mantz writing on hucksters in Dominica notes how flexibility has always been a necessary component to the trade (2007:29). He further asserts that flexibility as a form of economic practice is historically "associated with autonomy from, and resistance to, political, economic, and physical control ..." (Mantz 2007:28). Flexibility in the market provides the necessary lateral space to more productively and satisfyingly participate. The given structure of markets, such as bazaars, which engenders individualism and competition already makes accumulation impossible (Hann & Hart 2011:113). When this is added to the constrictive commercial environment of the craft market is a condition of sufferation that engenders discourses of bad-mind as a form of market regulation. While not the emphasis of her study, a close examination of Brown-Glaude's (2011) work among higglers trading in Kingston's Coronation Market, reveals the working of assertive competition, similar to Bay Fort vendors. As competition increases, claims and sentiments of bad-mind appear and gain interpretive purchase over the state of the market. This leads to a further disinclination to invest, whether financially or emotionally, in the collective success of the market. Moored to these seemingly immutable circumstances, their resorting to intense competitiveness creates conditions for discord. This ultimately reproduces

notions of disunity that further embeds the working of bad-mind and the assertion of the market as a site of sufferation.

Bad-mind as Blackness

Interestingly, the conception of bad-mind did not necessarily manifest itself in *overt* displays of resentment. Most vendors remained reticent over their dissatisfaction, as exemplified by the vendor's brief look of displeasure at being copied in Dinesh's shop. Also, actual charges of bad-mind were seldom directly, or publicly raised against an offender, and were instead discussed furtively, almost as a form of gossip. In fact, I only confirmed that competitive strategies were viewed as bad-mind, through my interviews with vendors that quickly become opportunities for them to "*su-su*," or gossip. Bad-mind, I learned was an accepted fact that defined the normative, black practice of business. "A so black people stay [that's how black people are]," casually proclaimed one vendor, when I asked about the practice of bad-mind.

The pervasiveness of the sentiment is evident in the lyrical archive of reggae music, and particularly in the canon of "roots" reggae beginning in the 1970s, where song verses decried black discord and choruses were often repeated supplications for unity.¹⁴ The emphasis on disunity expressed in these songs was likely an acute response to the political tumult of the era, which stemming from bitterly divisive party politics witnessed the increasingly violent politicization of area gangs (Sives 2010). Partisan politics in Jamaica has historically been one of the most pronounced examples of disunity at work. Thankfully politically induced violence has seen a dramatic decrease over the past forty years, although overall violence remains epidemic.

However, the inherent combativeness of politics, to my mind, discounts it as an example of the particularly everyday form of black disunity underlying the issue of bad-mind with which this discussion is concerned. Nonetheless, whether in commerce or politics, there is at question a functioning narrative in which black Jamaicans were bequeathed a contentious constitution.

According to craft vendors, slavery was the unquestioned provenance of black disunity though no specific explanation was ever provided as to *how* exactly it was formed in, or from the practice. Although I would not imagine that black disunity would qualify as "important African antecedents" that Sidney Mintz many years ago felt characterized the market system in Jamaica, but, locating vendor contention within mythic accounts of plantation slavery, or even Africa, whether real or imagined, is worth considering (1955:96). This is especially so if one accepts M'Charek's proposition, as I do, that race and narratives of race are "simultaneously factual and fictional," and the fiction, therefore, should be taken "more seriously as an inherent part of fact making" (2013:437). In examining then what is posited as a slavery-based social inheritance we must trace the perpetuation of the narrative.

Slavery ended one hundred and twenty-four years before Jamaica gained independence in 1962. Given the subsequent one and a quarter centuries under colonial rule, there are perhaps vestigial social and cultural effects of the extinct practice, which are not entirely imperceptible. The remnants need not be real, but only a configuring of slavery as a construct of social memory kept alive by referential practices. Writing on the importance of memory in contemporary culture Antze and Lambek (1996: vii-viii) suggest that individuals, "articulate, legitimate, and even

constitute their selfhood..." through "memories [which] are never simply records of the past, but are interpretive reconstructions that bear the imprint of local narrative conventions, cultural assumptions, discursive formations and practices, and social contexts of recall and commemoration."

Through memorials and commemorations the memory of slavery, although "no longer characterized by a continuous flow or transmission of experiences," becomes "crystallized" (Araujo 2012:1). The national observance of Emancipation Day on August 1, commemorating the abolition of slavery in Jamaica, is a critical communication through which the memory of slavery is crystallized and made publicly available (Thomas 2011:112; see Antze and Lambek 1996:xxii). Coming just days before the celebration of Jamaica's independence on August 6, Emancipation Day is a reminder of the process through which Jamaicans gained their eventual independence and citizenship. As demonstrated by Jamaica's Rastafarians, who, through reggae music, provide a custodial memorialization of slavery "Jamaican popular culture has always chosen to remember the past, memorialising the nation's history of enslavement in many a song and dance" (Paul 2009:70).

Commemorating and memorializing slavery maintains its salience in the contemporary imagination of societies with strong histories of slavery. However, in commemorative practices, slavery remains a memory, which is simply kept alive, and thus only partly explains how vendors can locate their behavior in the practice from which they are generations removed. Understanding how "blackness" and slavery conspire to justify claims of bad-mind requires some

consideration. Carnegie (2002: 29), citing Robotham, locates the unquestioned "conceptual salience of race" and cohesive "blackness," within the "shared subjective experience of oppression..." This blackness formed a "pan-African black ethnicity among Jamaican slaves," and therefore the "black" category for racial identity was founded in slavery (ibid; see Olwig 1993). Contemporary issues of blackness, through a retrospective projection from the present conjuncture, can thus be situated there. In simpler terms, if blackness is problematic now, it must always have been.

It is indeed a peculiar teleology. However, markets "never lie 'outside' a cultural and social context" and so perhaps bad-mind is just one other way that markets are culturally situated (Gudeman 2001:94-95; 2008). But in its telling here, the attendant histories of slavery and colonial race formation provide a background for that position, and imparts an ethnographic insight into how markets are constructed in the postcolonial context. To help clarify this position, it is useful to reference Jacqui Alexander's (2006) argument for the "palimpsestic character of time." In this configuration, the "new" is "structured through the 'old,'" through an "imperfect erasure, [and] hence visibility, of a 'past'...rescrambl[ing] the 'here and now' and 'then and there' to a 'here and there' and 'then and now'" (2006: 190). And so the iterative experience of blackness is a palimpsestic inscribing and re-inscription over former subjectivities of slave and subject "imperfectly erased and remaining therefore still partly visible" (Alexander 2006:190).

In her articulation of "palimpsestic time," Jacqui Alexander evokes the much earlier work of Jack Alexander (1977) and his use of "mythical time" as an expression and experience of race in

middle-class Kingston. Jack Alexander argued that the past was "not just a completed event...", but "events that have taken place in the past and that are yet still in the present, not simply as past causes of present conditions, but actually present" (1977:432). He posited that this sense of time is expressed by race as it "establishes the historical rootedness of the societies and its members' place in it...", by locating this "historical rootedness directly in the experience of persons' bodies..." (Alexander 1977:432). Additionally, Michel-Rolph Trouillot noted, "...the past does not exist independently from the present....[t]he past—or more accurately, pastness—is a position" (1995:15).

"Pastness," "palimpsestic time," and "mythical time" then all enable the logical oscillation of disunity as being both "back" in slavery and in the present. However, what facilitates this recollection without necessitating a directly diachronic and traceable inheritance? Laura Bear suggests that *institutions*, such as the craft market, "*mediate* divergent representations, techniques, and rhythms of human and non-human time," (2014: 6). By its relationship to institutions, time "thickens" with "ethical problems, impossible dilemmas, and difficult orchestrations" such as competition (ibid.). Following this reasoning, locating disunity's origin and perpetuation in institutions—be they slave plantations then or craft markets now—not only articulates a presentation of black people as inherently antipathetic, but perhaps also enables the reproduction of the very institutions that generate inequality. This notion is succinctly expressed in the statement, "A so black people stay." Indeed, the term references something of a persisting state of being that is replicated in the contemporary conditions, *and institutions* of sufferation. Admittedly, the ethnographic and historical unpacking of "black disunity" requires a breadth and

depth of discussion that is simply beyond the limits of a single case. However, the extent to which it is examined in vendors' normalization of bad-mind, and in their perceptions of unity in the market space helps to elucidate the salience of the notion as a racial phenomenon.

The narratives of bad-mind, sufferation, and slavery that emerge from vendors' experience of the market, I would argue, are in large part informed by what Charles Carnegie has noted as a racial myth of "ethnic connectedness" (2002:29). Race is thus used as an idiom to "make sense of social relations and history" (ibid.) This notion of black ethnicity has become a redoubt that idealizes a utopic and prelapsarian fiction of race that is predicated upon unification. However, a unity based upon a mythic "blackness" is potentially quite tenuous. Made up of a pervious cohesion, the moments in which the myth of blackness, are unable to hold together, such as in competition, create opportune spaces for reflexive critiques to give shape to discourses like bad-mind. Unable to witness the commonness of disunity among other commercial groups, especially their Sindhi competitors, vendors' concept of race within the multi-ethnic space of the tourism market induces them to perceive these groups as exemplars of unity.

Slocum and Thomas argue that "race remains a salient and often defining feature of contemporary everyday life in the Caribbean and of the region's political and *economic* formations (2007:4; emphasis added). The apparent failing of black commerce thus becomes the failing of the black project of race, leading to a view in which vendors' understand their practice of the market as deficient, if not aberrant. Deficiency, or aberrance, then, as figured by blackness, both "represents 'the market'" and those "subject to the market," and is the means by which it is

located, localized and embodied by Jamaican craft vendors (Ho 2009:6). Without viable opportunities to meaningfully improve their circumstances vendors continue to mobilize history and race as means by which they explain their persisting lack of progress. Failure, therefore, is not only an individual poor outcome or experience of the market, it is ethically framed and understood as a collective *racial* failure that is essential and persistent.

The Frame(work) of Sufferation

The importation of foreign made products has left many craft vendors with few recourses to improve their position. Presented with no choice but to purchase from Sindhis, there is little that vendors can deploy in their defense. However they do assert periodically that the government is at fault because they allowed the Sindhis to take over local industry. It was the government after all that issued Sindhi Indian shops' licenses and work permits and that allowed their foreign-manufactured items to pass through customs. In this sense, the female market vendors' ethical accounts of sufferation move outside the market space into the broader realm of the state. This is an example of the increasing scale of the market frame that Callon (1998) and Miller (2002) discuss.

Here the experiences of the market are scaled up to the level of the nation-state. Importantly at the center of the claims of bad mind, racial failures and the corruption of the government is a fundamental assumption that if the market were not corrupted by these externalities then it would operate to produce equality or fairness. So while vendors critique the actually existing market place they operate in, they retain a sense that markets, in general, could allow them to prosper.

This notion goes back to the discussion of the myth of race and of unity in race. For the vendors, blackness disrupts what should otherwise be a cooperative market environment as exemplified by the market practice of other racial groups like the Sindhis. The vendors are misled by the "fallacy," rather than the myth, of race. The market for them could be equal if the right measures were taken, perhaps if they weren't Jamaican, or if the government was not corrupt.

A sentiment of "betrayal" is noted by Bay Fort vendors, and Kingston-based higgler alike. In Brown-Glaude's (2011:154) ethnography, she cites higgler's charge that "Jamaica [government] encourage foreign business and not encourage vendors." Exceptions for ethnic minority traders have been noted as Brown-Glaude tells of the "...tendency of Caribbean nations to bestow on immigrant groups better opportunities for economic advancement than long-term residents" (2011: 41-43). In her recounting of the economic histories and social mobility of Chinese and Lebanese migrant groups from their inception into Caribbean society throughout the nineteenth century, Brown-Glaude (2011:43) asserts that the advancement of these groups was not simply the result of an economic aptitude. These ethnic minorities' "historically privileged positions" rather followed from a confluence of economic and racial factors (Carnegie 2002: 37). The latter being these groups' easy integration into the already advantaged position held by the country's "brown" middle class above the black population and below the elite white, which served to "reinforce the racial polarity" between the two (Brown-Glaude 2011: 43).¹⁵ This has put into motion a sequence of interpretations leading vendors to situate themselves as abandoned by the state as a result of much broader applied effect of black disunity. Again, black people did not like to "build up" each other.

The inequality experienced by vendors creates an amplified sense of victimization that resonates through economic practice. Although participation in the market becomes perfunctorily performed as a result, there nonetheless remains an acute sense of indignation over their displacement. When asked about the Sindhi-run souvenir shops in the city, one vendor passionately exclaimed that "Dem [they're] not supposed to sell Jamaican things!" revealing an anxiety concerning Sindhi retailers' potential to undermine the souvenir trade for locals.¹⁶ She explained that they were meant to be limited to the sale of luxury items, such as high-end watches, jewelry, and perfumes, not t-shirts and other standard souvenirs. These items referenced the well-established commercial domain of the earlier generation of Sindhi merchants who have owned many of St. James's luxury in-bond and duty-free shops for decades.¹⁷ For vendors, "Jamaican things" are imbued with culture and should, therefore, be attended to by the cultured.

The Sindhi sale of Jamaican things thus amounted not only to a wholesale usurpation of the local craft and souvenir industry, but of Jamaican culture itself. Although, these souvenir items are not actual products of Jamaica, they seize upon the abstract "auratic, affective, social worth..." of Jamaican culture materialized through words, colors, and symbols (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009: 27). Their monopolization by foreigners thus becomes construed as an infringement of rights. It is this sense of infringement that prompts vendors claim of market immorality.

Through the lens of sufferation experiences, popular narratives, and history coalesce to form a particular definition of the state that reinforces a cosmology of racial discord and suspicion in

which any act of the state is found bereft of genuine intention and, more importantly, effective result. As "sufferers," vendors are fully aware of their limited importance to the state. They, like many Jamaicans, fail to realize the economic justice and social equity envisioned at Jamaica's independence (Thomas 2004:201). Popular political narratives following independence promoted a "common ideal vision of general social equality of a nation in which the black majority would have greater access to state power and education, as well as greater control over economic resources" (Thomas 2004:206). The promise of that vision is what vendors would hope to see reflected in the government's support for them in the market, where they could compete equally and fairly. Sufferation then is the failed delivery of that promise. Contemporary economic circumstances have done much to erode the "sovereignities gained through decolonization and independence" (Slocum and Thomas 2007:3). And so it is unlikely that the independence vision could ever be brought to fruition by a government burdened by debt, and made sclerotic by the rigidity of structural adjustment and other neoliberal mechanisms of sufferation.

The Jamaican government is in fact an "apparent state," that passes off bureaucratic interactions and public cultural presentations as markers of sovereignty to maintain the impression of an "effective state" (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001; Sharma 2006:62). The presentation of independence and sovereignty, Hansen and Stepputat (2001:14) assert, are "mythological dimensions" that give a state's authority "both historical aura and weight." It is that presentation, or rather myth, however, that provides vendors with an inaccurate sense that the state could provide them with assistance, but chooses not to. Unmet expectations lead vendors to place

blame on the Jamaican government for the commercial infiltration of Sindhis. However, by the neoliberal logic of the state, the economy *requires* such infiltration.

Perhaps as "citizens who are deemed...lacking in neoliberal potential..." (Ong 2006:16), free business training was offered to vendors at Bay Fort and other local craft markets. The two-week training was funded by a provision from the government's Tourism and Product Development Company, Ltd., or TPDCo., an agency of the Jamaica Tourist Board (JTB), which has the mandate of developing and improving Jamaica's tourism product. The classes covered sales, profits, and taxes, and also taught how to put together a business plan and determine prices. The training program was the "Business Entrepreneurial Empowerment Programme" (BEEP), facilitated by the Institute for Law and Economics. According to the institute's website BEEP's main objective was "To provide basic entrepreneurial training and related support services for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), to assist them in formalizing their business activities and in achieving minimum business standards as well as preparing them for business risk rating to enhance their access to financing."¹⁸ The training served as an example of what Carla Freeman has noted in Barbados as an effort to cultivate a "more open minded, innovative, creative, [and] entrepreneurial..." culture (2012:87).

Only six vendors in total from the local markets attended the training, according to Minny, a Bay Fort vendor in attendance. "The majority of vendors just ignored it," she attested. Vendors who declined attendance explained that the required two weeks was too long a period to miss any potential profits. More importantly, however, none of them had any faith in the efficacy of the

training. They explained, that much like the TPDCo. training required to obtain their JTB vending licenses, which purportedly only focused on "how to be polite to the tourists," they expected the BEEP training to be equally futile.¹⁹ When suggesting that the BEEP training might have taught them how to create a business plan, vendors retorted by quizzically asking what they would do with a business plan? Would it bring more tourists to the market, or make the Sindhis lower their prices? Their skepticism signaled the invariability of their circumstances. Even with training, there was no supporting infrastructure that would make use of the acquired knowledge and skills. This is the paradox of neoliberal self-making: it produces a tension between entrepreneurial aspiration and the impossibility for advancement, and it is that tension which also contributes to a sense of sufferation.

The limited vendor participation in the BEEP training communicated a fundamental lack of confidence in the government and the market, which they were complicit in creating. The BEEP training might have represented the government's effort to provide an entrepreneurial skill set, and even opportunities for vendors, however, measured against feelings of neglect, vendors hardly felt like "stakeholders in the corporate nation" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:128). With vendors and Sindhi businesses operating within different economic circuits, the BEEP training, with its objective of providing basic entrepreneurial training, was woefully misplaced and overlooked the conditions faced by local vendors in the market. For any such training to be effective the state would first have to regulate the souvenir industry by initiating protective mechanisms for the vendors, provide stricter regulations on the kinds and volumes of goods imported by Sindhis, and support particular industries. Without these initiatives, the state could

never be viewed by vendors as anything but neglectful of their needs, and complicit in the success of Sindhis. The cycle of relations in which the narratives of race and nation, understood through discourses of disunity and abandonment, would therefore continue to be perpetuated and reconciled in sufferation.

From their position in the market, vendors construct and embody a discontented citizenship depicted through varying narratives of pessimism and lethargic displays of surrender to the circumstances of sufferation. Their resignation is epitomized in the Jamaican aphorism "Jackass says the world no level." Observing the determined and unfair hardship of a beast of burden, the phrase concisely captures the framing used by many vendors to locate themselves within Jamaica's political economy. In the phrase, and in its application to the market of sufferation and the working notion of bad-mind, is a spirit of forfeiture. However, that spirit is complemented by an equal spirit of Protestant optimism, or "eudemonic hope" (Austin-Broos 1997:19; Thompson 1999).²⁰ This anticipatory notion, noted by Christian, and Christian-inspired, locutions such as "later will be greater," "watch and pray," or "better must come" eschatologically emphasize waiting out the dreary tedium of one's experience of sufferation. Interestingly, this particular style of Christian optimism is not necessarily an active pursuit to change those circumstances (Austin-Broos 1997:17). Sufferation, therefore, is a condition of prolonged suspension, in which one endures, "persist[ing] in potentiality" (Povinelli 2011:128). It is a kind of patience awaiting an eventual economic and social (if not a preceding religious) rapture. Though not quite working toward "the eschatological moment of market *efficiency*" (Miyazaki 2003:261; emphasis added), there is nonetheless an expectation, however deferred, of an end to sufferation, where justice and

fairness can finally be had both in life and in the market. This is evidenced in Kerry's account of the potential for collective action among the vendors, and in Iona's frustration with the nonpayment of rent. The ethic of bad-mind is not to simply account for the "wickedness" in others, but to assert in every claim the expectation of their goodness, their cooperativeness. The vendors have shown that the market can be shaped through expectations of cooperation, but also through techniques of disunity. In the following chapter, we will see an attempt at ending sufferation through bringing the ethic and vision of cooperation to fruition in the work of the Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Cooperative.

2

Putting Able Hands To Work

Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Cooperation

Don't stand in the gutter
And say you're gonna suffer
'Cause god helps the man who helps himself
So put your shoulder to the wheel
Who god bless, no man curse
By the sweat of your brow you shall eat bread
Keep on working till you reach the top

-Johnny Clarke, "Enter Into His Gates"; 1975

Economic collectivism and cooperation were aspired to as a greater good among female vendors in craft markets. Therefore, they ascribed their problems in the market and in their market practice to a lack of cooperation, construed as an endemic black disunity. Conversely, they credited Sindhi commercial success to an inherent Indian unity. Although vendors demonstrated their capability to cooperate through activities like church membership and involvement in the partner savings scheme, their general assertion was that in the market, meaningful, long-term cooperation was nearly impossible. This lack of cooperation is directly related to the state of sufferation. Sufferation as I have presented it is an existential state of being socially and psychically stuck within immutable economic precariousness. It is a lived anxiety in which vendors face economic uncertainty in a state of perpetual quandary, ontologically positioned as

incapable of progress. As I ended the previous chapter, there is a sense of optimism that oddly accompanies the pessimism of sufferation. It is one in which the hope for betterment and a greater ordering, redeeming principle persists alongside the acceptance that it may never be realized.

This chapter explores how this hope can be mobilized within certain institutions. It focuses on a small group of thirty-five vendors and artisans who have managed to come together as the Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Cooperative, or JAMIA. Through membership and the principles of organization, skill development, and production, JAMIA seeks to help the excluded reclaim a place of importance in the Jamaican economy. They aspire to this ambition through a cooperative ethic that draws on the historical experiences of the independence and democratic socialist periods.

Despite the limited size of the group, they represent a larger ethos of cooperation through cooperatives, which is an intrinsic part of the history of Jamaican civil society, as will be discussed in the following section. Cooperatives, as amply demonstrated (Faulk 2008; Millar 2010; Subramanian 2009), are an effective means of enabling the participation of a marginalized citizenry in the economy. In this context JAMIA serves as a robust example of how a new cooperative faces the challenge of that participation while establishing themselves in the post-crash economy of Jamaica. This chapter explores the themes of production, organization and skill that are central to JAMIA's ethos. It examines how a mode of cooperation can be established and

whether it can generate institutions that can mitigate experiences of suffering and structural forms of inequality.

JAMIA as a "People's Project": Cooperatives in Jamaica

I became aware of the Jamaica Indigenous Artisans Cooperative at the 2011 Montego Bay Chamber of Commerce's "Business Expo." Among all the major and upcoming brands and companies at the event, such as the massive Flow Jamaica communications company and the newest spirits brand on the island, Rum Fire, sat a booth wonderfully decorated and embellished with attractive metal, leather, and wooden craft goods. Across the top of the booth was a banner with the organization's name and its motto "Putting Able Hands To Work" proudly stated. Their hope was to win "best booth," but the group, who were all similarly dressed in bright yellow short sleeve button down shirts with the organization logo over the left breast pocket, were quite satisfied with their "honourable mention." After introductions to the head of the organization and a few members I was invited to their next meeting at JAMIA headquarters the following Wednesday.

Arriving early to the meeting, located in an abandoned two-storey hotel overlooking the Montego Bay Airport, I had the opportunity to chat with JAMIA founder, president, and chairman, Baldwin Dulston. A clearly motivated and charismatic man in his forties, Baldwin explained that the organization emerged in early 2010 after he became inspired to start a skills-training cooperative. An accomplished leather-smith, Baldwin spent time in Canada on an arts training fellowship directed toward commonwealth artists. One of the objectives of the

fellowship was to motivate participants to go back to their countries and "start something." He thus came back to Jamaica and in late 2009 set the foundations for JAMIA. He did this with his wife June and associate Roy, with whom he did some community organizing in his neighborhood of Flankers, an area just outside of Montego Bay, which has had its own recent success with community initiatives.²¹ Baldwin's idea was to provide skill training in craft production for vendors and other locals wanting to learn how to produce crafts. The organization believes that Sindh access to mass-produced goods enables their control over the local souvenir market. Therefore, increased capability to locally produce crafts, would thus improve Jamaicans' place in the market by disintermediating Sindh wholesalers. Increased local production most importantly served, to Baldwin's mind, as a means of national development.

The members of JAMIA believe that they have one critical advantage compared to the Sindhis, which is as an unquestioned claim to authenticity. It was for this reason that JAMIA included the term indigenous in the group's name. The use of the term indigenous was quite curious to me. Its usage was explained by Roy as being,

A strong, political word saying these crafts are Jamaican made by Jamaicans, it is ours, and our intention is to let it remain ours. So our name starts out with 'Jamaica,' getting stronger with 'indigenous,' speaking to the framework of production and that there is a need to establish the reality of our place and that we need to stick to our guns if we are serious about it.

JAMIA apparently deliberated for more than five months on including the term in their name. "Some members thought that indigenous should be left for later," Baldwin recounts, "I said no,

we can't start on the footing that we are not really serious about it. Let's start with what we believe in, then work toward achieving it, eventually everybody then found that this is the way to go."

Early encounters with tourist organizations like the Tourist Product Development Company, and the Jamaican Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO), where founding JAMIA members attended meetings looking for assistance and guidance, were influential in creating the initial framework and mindset for organization. Baldwin recalls, "We [himself, June, and Roy] attended JAMPRO meetings and we used to think that nothing came out of those meetings, but here we are." In those meetings, the seeds for their craft center were being planted. Baldwin recalls, "While we were there in dialogue the framework was being built and the foundation was created and caused what you would consider a mushroom of progress. It no [fully] happen yet, but it is happening."

I would learn at that first meeting visit that JAMIA membership is mostly comprised of current craft vendors from the two main markets in Montego Bay, a good portion of whom hail from Bay Fort. Baldwin sold his leather goods at Bay Fort craft market, where his sister ran a stall. It was from this base that he began recruitment for JAMIA, which he admits "was slow going at first." From his community organizing Baldwin was familiar with the various agencies that supported community based projects and quickly began the process of registering JAMIA with the Department for Cooperative and Friendly Societies (DCFS). JAMIA's organizational model is largely structured by the DCFS guidelines, and by its "Statutory Obligations" in particular.²² These guidelines mandated that JAMIA hold bi-weekly member meetings and the payment of

membership dues. The group agreed upon a dues amount of JAM\$ 500, or roughly US\$ 7 each meeting, which go toward paying the rent for, and renovations of, the facility that they lease. These meetings maintained a strict observance of the DCFS mandated protocols, requiring an official call to order, every considered suggestion to be call to motion, and a seconding for its implementation. And most importantly a fastidious taking of minutes, as they served as evidence of the keeping of meetings for DCFS review. It seldom occurred that anyone spoke without being "given the floor," and if they did, they were reminded of the appropriate procedure.²³ Such parliamentary practice was indicative of how "serious" JAMIA members were by their adherence the DCFS protocols.

Evident in this "seriousness" was an "ethic" of organization as influenced by the Department of Cooperative and Friendly Societies. The statement from the DCFS website of the organization's "role" is illustrative of that point:

Co-operative Societies and Friendly Societies in the island have all come into being with the object of bringing about an improvement in the economic and/or social life of the people who comprise their membership. The role of the Department in this effort is to assist societies to achieve this end by the application of *proper co-operative techniques*. [emphasis added]

By "proper cooperative techniques" the DCFS seeks to improve the economic and social lives of its members. The term "techniques," and its compelling preceding modifier, "proper," I am sure were considered by the DCFS to be no more than anodyne terminology. Though I risk being perhaps unnecessarily pedantic, I would emphasize that the implications of these terms are

significant as they engender particular modes of behavior, which are formed in the members meeting. In the meeting these techniques have been effective at creating for JAMIA members an alternative subjectivity of emphasized organization, whereby they are able to overcome the non-productive influence of bad-mind in the market. By participating in the meeting they become organized and productive "self-managed actors" who are learning to function "according to corporate norms of self-initiative, self-responsibility, and self-engineering" (Ong 2006:222).

Through cooperative membership, JAMIA members are provided with a framework to overcome the complex issues of disunity facing Bay Fort craft vendors discussed at length in the previous chapter. Baldwin noted that their experience of disunity is the product of a failing economic model which he hoped to remedy with JAMIA. He hypothesized that if all the 200 members of Bay Fort craft market had collectively saved over the past several years they could have owned the property, enjoyed greater autonomy, and thus brighter financial prospects. It is a "mind for organization" that the vendors lacked, and it is that which separates them from JAMIA's craft vendor members. Mervie is a vendor at Bay Fort craft market, and one of the few who attended the BEEP training session discussed in the last chapter. She credits her membership in JAMIA for giving her "the vision" to see the training as an opportunity, unlike so many of her fellow vendors who shunned the program:

"Jamaicans like free things fi di [for the] belly, people don't see the money in the business....they see it in a hustling way just do something and come a [to] market and make a money, maybe a food money. But when your work done where you going get pension from? You have to work for today and tomorrow, because when the strength leave you... because one part of your life you work for money and the

next you [have to] make money work for you. I tell my kids if I should pass early they should burn me [cremate] because you spend thousands....let me tell you what Jamaicans value...how could you spend JAM\$ 500 thousand on a coffin....fi [to] please who? When the insurance company calls [I told my kids] take the money and enjoy your life....mi [I] can't enjoy no casket....help mi now when mummy ask you for a cup a tea."

In her explication, Mervie attested to what she saw in her market colleagues as an unwillingness to think and plan beyond the day. This was evidenced by their failure to attend the BEEP training, which would have taught them some very basic, but necessary, business principles and practices that could perhaps work to secure for them a more prosperous future. According to Mervie, they saw their work as a "hustle," which is understood locally as an approach to work with a sense of casualness. But for herself, there was a strategy for creating long-term security for her family. This long-term plan, as noted, even included forgoing the very traditional and standard funerary practice of casket burial.²⁴ This kind of thinking is central to the ethos of JAMIA membership: "We have been pushing to have members understand that only you can free yourself from the bondage and the complexities that affect us," Baldwin explained.

The "JAMIA subjectivity" of organization if you will, could easily be identified as being crafted by a neoliberal practice of corporate efficiency. In fact, one could argue that this neoliberal subjectivity is directly created and maintained by adhering to the protocols of the DCFS. The organization's mission statement reads that the DCFS seeks to facilitate "the establishment and regulation of Co-operatives and Friendly Societies as *viable business alternatives and effective social organizations*..."[emphasis mine]. Vargas-Cetina (2011) notes how cooperatives have

moved toward capitalist business models as they try to compete with larger corporations operating within the same or similar markets. Thus, she contends, cooperatives become a type of corporation as they aim to compete in international markets with very little or no help from the national government (2011:133; 2005:239). What this does, she asserts, is move cooperatives away from the "notion of utopian community," as the "cooperative imaginary" becomes stronger than the notion of community itself (Vargas-Cetina 2005:245).

Though Vargas-Cetina's position is convincing and likely true in many contexts, rather than a neoliberal ethic, I would instead consider JAMIA and the entire notion of cooperatives in Jamaica to be shaped by the aspirations and necessities of Jamaica's independence. Mantz has shown how the Caribbean predilection for flexibility in the market, as evidenced by hucksters, is "historically constituted through a much longer engagement with capitalism" that precedes the post-Fordist era of neoliberalism (2007:35). Slocum and Thomas have also noted that petty trade in the Caribbean has often embodied "cultural values such as independence and self-reliance in the face of extraordinary socio-economic adversity" (2007:6). There is similarly an ethic of organization in the Caribbean that would appear neoliberal, but instead precedes the emergence of its influence in the region—arguably with the start of relations with the IMF— and can be found as noted above in the pre-independence and independence ethic. A quick history of cooperative agencies in Jamaica may help prove that point.

The DCFS (formerly the Co-operative Department) was established in 1950 and influenced by its founder's, E.A. Surridge's experience with cooperatives in India.²⁵ The department's main

purpose was for the regulation of the increasing cooperative societies that emerged beginning in the 1940s with the Jamaica Welfare Society founded by Norman Manley in 1937 (Rao and Ibáñez 2005). This was just before Manley's founding of one of Jamaica's two major political parties, the People's National Party (PNP). Interestingly the funding for Jamaica Welfare came from the United Fruit Company (UFC) who agreed to contribute one US cent per stem of banana exported from Jamaica to fund an organization for "the good and welfare of the people of Jamaica, with emphasis on the rural people," to be led by Norman Manley (Rao and Ibáñez 2005). This arose from a bout of negotiations with UFC headed by Manley on behalf of the Jamaica Banana Producers Association. At its inception Jamaica Welfare invested primarily in the building of community centers but quickly expanded its agenda toward the "cooperation and self-help activities among the rural poor" (Rao and Ibáñez 2005:794). This shift in focus from community centers to community associations saw the emergence of community residents participating collectively for the improvement of neighborhood life through self-help activities, education and the establishment cooperative-structured cottage industries. The ideology of Jamaica Welfare was guided by the philosophy of its early director, Thom Girvan, which was "work together in groups to do those things which we as individuals cannot do" (Rao and Ibáñez 2005:795). By 1949 Jamaica Social Welfare became The Jamaica Social Welfare Commission, a statutory body. In 1965 it then became the Social Development Commission (SDC), continuing the work of Jamaica Welfare in aiding community based organizations develop cooperative and self-sustaining programs.

The 1970s saw an increased interest in cooperative societies by Prime Minister Michael Manley's Democratic Socialist government. His administration promoted and supported numerous cooperative programs which came under the remit of his "People's Projects." These projects aimed to improve the lives of Jamaica's black majority through reforms that saw the increase of the minimum wage, public housing schemes, literacy campaigns and controversial land distribution programs (Manley 1990). The ideology of democratic socialism that guided these social initiatives was a philosophy of self-sufficiency and "ownership" by the people. Manley felt this was necessary for workers to have a personal stake in their country, or as he stated, to "enable the majority of people to secure for themselves and equitable share in the social product of their nation" (Manley 1990:226).

Many of the initiatives could not live up to the ambitions of their models. The era eventually witnessed the failure of many programs alongside the eight-year premiership of Manley's first administration, as noted in the introduction. The general momentum of cooperative societies and their governance survived, nonetheless. In 1996, the Jamaican Social Investment Fund (JSIF) was instituted by Prime Minister P.J. Patterson's PNP government and is also largely modeled on Jamaica Welfare (Rao and Ibáñez 2005). JSIF is a limited liability company incorporated to provide funding for small-scale community-based projects. It is largely funded by the governments of Jamaica, Japan, and the Netherlands; the European Union; the World Bank; the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID); the Inter-American Development Bank; the Caribbean Development Bank, and the Canadian International Development Agency. The SDC partners with JSIF by identifying communities, which have projects eligible for JSIF funding. It

was through complying with the DCFS protocols that JAMIA hoped to become eligible for JSIF funding.

In the above paragraphs I provided a brief history of cooperatives in Jamaica beginning in the early 1940s. However, it is critical to note that the cooperative ethic has much earlier roots in Jamaica's history of values. In fact, the platform on which the early nationalists based their efforts are often considered middle class "Creole" values derived from earlier Baptist missionary sensibilities of "respectability." Nonetheless, from the early iteration of "self-help" in the late 1940s, which gave way to the idea of "giving power to the people" of the Manley era, the ideology of self-management was present. These ideas emerged from the campaign for independence and continued by necessity once it was acquired. The reasons for this are simple: the efforts and energies of a newly formed citizenry are necessary for the development of new, or recently independent nations. The ideology of "self reliance, local mobilization and community-based problem solving" (Thomas 2004:18) characteristic of the period, I would argue, are evidenced in JAMIA's framework of organization, training, and production. Moreover, joined with the organization's social agenda, articulated in the group's motto, "Putting able hands to work," JAMIA in my opinion can be considered a reinterpretation of Manley's "People's Projects."

Although Jamaica is now over fifty years into its independence, the project of nation building continues. Due in large part by the terms of IMF lending agreements to reduce national debt, Caribbean governments have had to reduce spending on public services and other government

expenditures. This mandated deregulation has also seen the removal of measures, which provided market assistance to citizens, such as price controls and subsidies (Miller 1997: 44-45). In such atrophying conditions as these, the independence ethic is as necessary for national advancement today as it was fifty years ago.

Organization at Work: The JAMIA Craft Center

JAMIA members are keen to present themselves as "craft producers who are serious about the thing," and the group's seriousness is evinced in their performance as an organization. As discussed in the previous section, the member meeting is the primary site where the group fully embodies this notion. These meetings were held in the ground floor section of the defunct and deteriorating two-storey Calabash Hotel. Accepting limited interest from the state and its agencies to invest and improve upon the current state of the tourist goods market, the group aims to develop a JAMIA tourist and craft center on the site. The center would reflect their ideals and vision for what the craft industry can become. JAMIA envisages the center, which will house craft and art galleries and an artisan workshop, becoming an access point for creative networking, teaching, and production. They also hope that it will become a sought after commercial alternative to the dissonance of the craft market and, as they claim, the inauthentic experience of Sindhi shops.

The hotel's neglected structure was gradually being renovated with funding from collected member dues. The renovation was planned to occur in phases, with the first project being the main art gallery, whose development was given priority since the area functioned as the

organization's principal meeting space. Also to be developed would be an enclosed area for higher quality and more expensive items, as well as an extra display area. The foremost areas of importance to be developed, however, were the artisan workshop, which would also serve as the training site, and the administrative office. For the ambition of a training program to materialize, it was important to fully realize their sense of being an organization. It was for this reason that the administrative office was so critical. As Baldwin was known for saying, "A business without an administrative office is not strong enough to carry its own weight." These were only the beginning of JAMIA's plans for the hotel. Their hope was to eventually take over the first floor, which was primarily occupied by squatters, many of who were suspected of being lottery scammers.

JAMIA's renovation of the hotel recalls the work of a workers co-operative, BAUEN, in Argentina discussed by Faulk (2008, 2012). The cooperative restored an abandoned hotel to fully functioning status and ran it as a co-operative business. The project was largely in response to the post-crisis unrest in Argentina over workers rights. Through their efforts, the workers were able to demonstrate their value and that of the hotel's infrastructure, thus reclaiming their right to work *through* work. Through the "conversion" of the hotel, Faulk argues that BAUEN sought their own conversion, "from a discarded surplus of labour into workers..." (2012:159). Likewise with the renovation of the Calabash hotel, JAMIA members sought to formally situate themselves into the Jamaican economy, as people who were organized, and as potential producers. The ethos behind JAMIA, and expressed through their motto "putting able hands to work," was a "logic of cooperativism" which asserted their right "to play an active role in the

public sphere, as actors capable of influencing the political and economic direction of the nation as a whole" (Faulk 2008: 589).

The capital required for renovating the multiple areas of the hotel much exceeded the means of dues payments, which despite best efforts were sometimes difficult to collect. JAMIA been approved for application by the Social Development Commission (SDC), again, the agency that identifies groups eligible for funding by the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF). The group was applying for funding from JSIF for the hotel renovation, but their application also sought funds to furnish their workshop with advanced tools. This was a key provision for the many artisans and craft trainees who would otherwise only have access to rudimentary equipment like machetes and handsaws. JAMIA's proposal to JSIF also sought support to create their training program. This program initially sought to train sixty people in three or four areas to meet their objective of increasing awareness of local craft and encouraging product diversity. "What we are seeking to do," Baldwin explained, "is to train as many people as possible in various arts, bringing instructors from abroad to train people, for example, in blown glass, metal symmetry, stone sculpture, and jewelry from metal, silver, gold, and brass." The idea is that the development of varied skills, products, and services begets a concomitant development of opportunity and autonomy. As one member, Cherise, a vendor in Montego Bay's second largest craft market explained, "once we get trained, we as vendors can then say, I don't have to buy the Indian [Sindhi made] dress and hang it up in my store—I can produce my own thing."

JAMIA's craft center is largely inspired by the one time success and popularity of Things Jamaican, Limited. Originally Craffthings Jamaican, Things Jamaican is a company formed by the Social Development Commission in the late 1960s to "promote the craft sector through research, design and marketing of high quality Jamaican hand-made products for both the local and tourist markets" (Social Development Commission 1967:6). At its height Things Jamaican operated a 50,000 square foot training center in Kingston that trained local artisans in areas of wood, pewter, straw, leather, ceramics, and weaving. The facility closed in 1996 and Things Jamaican now operates a few retail outlets featuring locally made crafts and other goods. Despite there being a model such as Things Jamaican, JAMIA struggled to gain support and recognition from DCFS to start their center. "We fought for so long to have something like JAMIA, but when we went to register [with the Department of Cooperative and Friendly Societies] they were hesitant because they've never seen anything like this and said it wouldn't work because how can craft be a cooperative society? 'We know co-op banks and fisherman co-ops...but craft?' they said."

The early struggles JAMIA confronted with the DCFS were a part of the same institutional "failure to empower" craft that their center and their organization were meant to help eradicate. JAMIA would continue to come up upon these failures in their continued challenge to acquiring funding, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Some JAMIA members framed the problem of support similarly to craft vendors, imputing "the system's bad mentality," for not enabling craft to progress, theirs was an argument of sufferation. The member's critique could be considered a fair assessment, as even the IMF has attributed Jamaica's "inhibited growth" to "an

absence of the enablers."²⁶ Toward the general problem of funding craft, Boxman, an artisan named so for the intricate inlaid wooden jewelry boxes he makes, suggested that if the government did not want to support JAMIA specifically, or the craft industry in general, that they should then work with banks in lending to those in the industry, asserting that "the money [is] in the system already." Boxman elaborated upon his vision, "NCB [National Commerce Bank] should put an amount of money aside and say we are going to put it at risk, but they're not really risking, what they are doing is having a talk with individuals who know what they are doing."

Implicit in Boxman's solution were all the traits of JAMIA's independence subjectivity. For good measure, however, Roy, founding JAMIA member and the group's liaison officer, fastidiously interjected, "I'd like to remind my colleague that no organization is going to take money and bring [it to] us in a suitcase!" He continued, "Any donor agency will first ask you what are you doing for yourself, in order to attract anything you have to be organized then the funds out there will overtake us." To which Baldwin added, "There are going to be government agencies hunting us to give us money." With the group nodding in agreement, one member asserted, "We know what we need and where to go!" she continued with a throaty timbre of enthusiasm "if they give us what we need we will just take off like a rocket!" Boxman became animated when considering the potential of JAMIA, "I keep telling everyone," Boxman begins, "that anytime we are promoted in any area they are gonna say 'the *Jamaicans* are coming!'" Vendor-member, Jane, responded with the common Jamaican phrase of optimism "We likkle but we *talawah!*" or,

"although we're small, we're strong!" One member, Michael, a painter, who seldom ever spoke at meetings took the opportunity—and the floor—to express his gratitude for JAMIA :

I'm glad for this organization, really, really glad. I as an individual, I am happy with my work. But you have people who come [to Jamaica] and feel like their not supposed to spend too much money [on souvenirs], like they have some kind of yard sale mentality. But you see me I want to come out of that situation. I want to set up a ting [center], so that when a man come he knows that is somewhere special. He will know him have to spend his money if he wants good work. So with this organization together we are even stronger.

This rousing of enthusiasm and spirits was exactly how JAMIA, especially its leadership, approached the reality of sufferation, which from time to time crept into meeting discussions. As discussed in the previous chapter, for vendors sufferation was ever-present in the market. But with JAMIA, and in the meetings, the hope of a craft center pierced the shroud of sufferation. Every effort of JAMIA was, therefore, put toward developing and maintaining the requisite level of professionalism and organization that would attract donor agencies to fund their center, and ultimately, as Michael articulated, tourist customers to patronize it. In addition to being organized, however, members of JAMIA, in particular the vendors, would have to become skilled in a craft in order for the full vision of the organization and the function of the craft center to materialize. Acquiring a skill, or at least the promise of skill acquisition, would have an equally powerful effect on members' self perception, and their response to sufferation.

"Skilled" as a new subjectivity

The local craft markets have a program that provides vendors with opportunities to vend their wares in a few all-inclusive resort properties throughout Montego Bay and neighboring Negril, and Ocho Rios. Access to these hotels is for many the best chance to interact with tourists in a marketplace of reduced competition. But the selection process, managed, or rather brokered, by each market's president, is so fraught with favoritism that only a few ever get the opportunity. JAMIA offers a similar program to its members. It also guarantees that all will have a chance to participate, which is what initially attracted many of its members to the organization. This was especially true for vendors unable to afford a stall in the craft markets. JAMIA access to the hotel nights was made possible by Sandra, a relative of Baldwin's who is also a JAMIA member, when she became in charge of managing the on site "vendor days" at one of the local all-inclusive hotels. These vendor days occur every Friday night at various hotels and roughly five to seven spaces are available to JAMIA vendors each night. While in the craft markets vendors are assigned by favoritism, in JAMIA places are allotted to vendors on a rotating basis, so each vendor is able to attend at least one event a month. These nights can often yield several weeks worth of equivalent earnings at the markets, but they can also be entirely fruitless. The value is in the opportunity—to have one more venue in which money could be earned.

Access to these hotels is a key feature that helps to grow and retain JAMIA membership while the organization works toward establishing its skill-training program. Though each member in our discussions lauded the collectivist agenda of the cooperative, they all admitted that they came to the organization for its provided access to the hotel nights. Facing increasing difficulty

in generating revenue from their market stalls, vendor access to the hotels was an obvious opportunity. However beneficial, the hotel nights are not a part of the larger envisioning of JAMIA's agenda. For Baldwin, in the all-inclusive hotels "there are more dogs than bones fighting for left overs" and while the site is highly coveted amongst local craft vendors, he considers hotel opportunities to be nothing more than "the crumbs off of the table." Moreover, the regular competitive "puss and dog fight" among vendors who "only want to eat a piece of food [are opportunistic] and to extract everything the tourists have" is not remedied by access to the resorts, as the location is plagued by the same issues caused by product repetition discussed in the previous chapter. Baldwin recognized that to overcome the systemically misguided and ineffective structuring of the market system, the market as it is cannot simply be replicated in an environment with more customers. "After all," he moralized, "you cannot expect to do the same thing and get a different outcome." "Maturity and discipline in the business is required," is what he prescribed. "What you need is a reorganization of the craft markets and a retraining of the people in those markets." The prescription that he lays out for the craft markets is the same that he tries to implement with members at JAMIA. Baldwin elaborates, "When you become a member, you start to look at ways to transform your life. JAMIA is about how to get down to the bottom of what it takes to transform, but first and first most, transform the mind." "Because," Baldwin continued, "there is no other solution than to work on getting ourselves off of our butts and do something for ourselves."

Though the hotel night's were an initial draw for vendors to JAMIA, since joining, many of them have become convinced that actually learning a skill is the best, if not only, way for financial

independence, and have fully taken on board Baldwin's prescription for transformation. One somewhat recent and loyal member, Janice, notes this:

You know [one day] me'd a sit down and think to me self, maybe me shoulda mek two earring, and you know when me mek them, them sell quick, quick? So then me hear of JAMIA from Mervie, and that me could learn other crafts, and so one of the Wednesday that them keep [hold] meeting, I went and listen, and from then me join and don't miss [a meeting]. When me start learn fi mek mi tings dem, dem a go sell off!

The promise of JAMIA intimates a "relationship between knowledge practices, skill acquisition, and the constitution of economic selfhood" that Rebecca Prentice similarly noted among garment workers in Trinidad, and how learning skills "relate[s] to their capacities to forge livelihoods in an unstable and demanding industry" (2012b:401). And like those workers, the craft vendors who join JAMIA do so by learning a skill that enables them to navigate the "changing demands of a neoliberal economic environment in which workers must be opportunistic, flexible, and self-reliant" (Prentice 2012b:410-11).

This was evidenced in the exemplary story of one member, Shaunice, who was independently trained by an artisan member of JAMIA to work with coconut. Shaunice's success was provided during a meeting as a motivational account by Roy who exclaimed, "...She became quite skilled in producing crafts from the material and it gave her a new source of income and in just one year she is doing extraordinarily well and is featured in all the all-inclusive programs." With an anecdote of his own supporting why having a craft skill is so essential, Boxman told of how at one of JAMIA's nights at a major Montego Bay all-inclusive, Secrets, his stall selling inlaid

wood vases and jewelry boxes, fared much better than neighboring vendors selling the conventional array of items found at the craft market. He recounted:

They [vendors] think that you have to have a lot of variation to survive, but when you specialize then you find that you get a chance to excel and in so doing I did very well. I use types of wood that other artisans don't value or they don't know of...the only persons who know more about wood than me would have to work in forestry and be over 40 years old. They must learn a skill so instead of being just an ordinary vendor you are an artisan. Especially when people [tourists] see you at work [on your craft] they are fascinated and ask questions and see a better reason to buy what you have. Because you see down at the craft market once you go to the first five shops you don't need to go anywhere else.

The belief within JAMIA is that acquiring a craft skill is a reflexive process for which one needs to transform the mind, and by which one's mind is transformed. That process, as Boxman promised, makes an "artisan" out of an "ordinary vendor." In possession of a skill a sense of autonomous possibility does much to cut through the anxiety caused by economic precariousness. The skill opens up opportunity and creates the ability to flexibly produce a type of merchandise if others could not be afforded. The few vendors in Bay Fort who could craft straw goods evinced this fact. These ubiquitous items, as it seemed most stalls carried them, were largely supplementary to the other, mostly Sindhi goods sold. However, at least they had something that they could sell on their own terms. Stories like Shaunice's and Boxman's and the security that skilled JAMIA members expressed having, even when faced with what were often penurious circumstances, engendered optimism in members yet to learn a particular skill.

It is clear that the leadership of JAMIA, having long been trained and become expert at their trades, production is doubly understood as a personal vocation, with an emphasis on the artisanal affect of craftsmanship, and also a means of creating a mass manufacturing system. I would argue that production for members of JAMIA, however, is instead a rather interesting take on the DIY movement than that based on conventional factory or artisanal models. The reason for this is vendor-members interest is the idea of self-sufficiency. Being able to move away from goods provided by others sits at the heart of the DIY movement (Spencer 2005). Though DIY has been touted as a "a return to the sort of artisanal labor Karl Marx himself romanticized as the antithesis of capitalist alienation" for JAMIA members DIY enables their access to capitalist opportunity (Luvaas 2013:130).

Returning to Trinidad, Prentice has noted how Trinidadian garments workers who learn to sew "simultaneously learn to adopt an economic disposition of self-reliance, adaptability, and resourcefulness..." (2012b:402). She tells us that "skill is not a technical set of capacities but an embodied project of self-making through the acquisition and performance of expertise" (2012b: 409). Similarly, Michael Herzfeld has suggested, that in the "self-crafting that accompanies artisanal production," "a strong analogy subsists between the production of objects and the crafting of a selfhood..." (2004:25,38). In fact, many anthropologists working on skill have forwarded that the acquisition of skill is at once the cultivation of other tangential values (Argenti 2002; Dilley 1999; Ingold 2001; Prentice 2012b; Simpson 2006; Venkatesan 2009; 2010). This idea is especially central to the work of Venkatesan who asks, "What else is learned alongside the learning of a skill?" (2010:158). She contends that people learn craft skills in a

socially embedded setting (2010:173), and therefore "the acquisition of a skill is embedded in larger social knowledge about the value of the skill based on ideas about the body, gender, identity, politics, and economics" (2010:158).

However, for most JAMIA members they had yet to be trained in any particular craft skill, though most can manage small DIY projects, like Janice's earrings. In fact their membership had been centered on only two activities: attending meetings and vending in locations arranged by the organization. Yet, I wondered if without the skill they were able to fully undergo the transformation that Baldwin set out as being so necessary? What I observed from JAMIA was that as important as learning a skill was the notion that learning a skill was important and that a large part of that belief was created not in the process of learning a skill, but in the practice of JAMIA membership. Through organizing and the principle of skill development, the citizen-subjectivities of JAMIA members are transformed. Through membership and organizational ideologies JAMIA reposition and reclaim a sense of identity through a framework reminiscent of the post independence, democratic socialist period, in which owning a stake in the nation meant merely taking part.

Putting Able Hands to Work

Providing skill training to members is only part of the bigger objective at JAMIA. The plan is that with increased training JAMIA can become a site of mass production. The organization cites the government's "failure to empower" artisans and their industry as having real consequences for the local trade of craft souvenirs. The impact of foreign made crafts has been one where local

artisans are incapable of meaningfully participating in the craft trade due to an inability to produce in competitive volume. In Bay Fort there were a few stalls that sold sculpted crafts. Speaking with those vendors, the price of those sculptures was often prohibitive. They took time and energy to make, which went into the pricing rationale. A good quality Rastafarian mask would run about US\$ 50. Though frequently admired by tourists, I witnessed very few such masks being purchased. "What you're paying for a wood sculpture compared to five years ago is twice the amount!" stated Baldwin. "Some people don't even do sculpting as a business anymore, they do it as a hobby. I know people who don't even bother to carve, and when they do you have to come to his place and pay a high price for it...", he continued.

In JAMIA's estimation, and to their disappointment, the Tourism Product and Development company, TPDCo, whose primary mandate is tourist product diversity, demonstrates little regard for locally made tourist products, focusing rather on how vendors meet expectations of customer service and product presentation than the goods being sold. "The largest aspect of the tourist product is left behind which is the arts and crafts," asserted Roy, "...simply because they can go out there and buy some product, bring it in and serve the tourist." What some JAMIA members overlook is that TPDCo considers the markets themselves, as it does other attraction sites, as the products and not necessarily the saleable goods within. It is for this exact reason why TPDCo does not oversee the operation of goods provided by Sindhi shops, as they are independent businesses not under the aegis of the government. Therefore, little concern is afforded to tourist goods in craft markets beyond that there is an adequate volume of merchandise on offer and that vendors are courteous.

By "failing to empower" the crafts sector, JAMIA members argue that the government has overlooked a significant domain of job creation. As one vendor member, Juicy, zealously asserted, "We have more jobs in Jamaica than the amount of population and they [the government] don't know!" Concurring, Boxman gave an example to the fiscal potential of craft for the nation:

A few years ago Sinbad [the comedian] came down [for his 'Annual Summer Jam' 70's soul music festival]...and he came with so much energy. I didn't have any work to sell, but I had given some work to a lady who hadn't paid me. There was so much energy with the black [American] people dem [who came for the festival], they bought everything. They crave Jamaica...so much that the week after I heard that the [Jamaican] dollar regained its value because of that visit, and locals selling their works. The week after the lady called me and said come for your money and when I went all 50 pieces sold! That is to show you the energy. So to help Jamaica, the government should [encourage] the craft.

While it is quite reasonable to consider that the music event helped bolster the local economy of Montego Bay, and was certainly a boon to local artisans and vendors, it is unlikely that it, or the selling of craft, was responsible for increasing the value of Jamaican currency. What the anecdote shows, however, is that Jamaican craft, if placed in the appropriate context and given the necessary opportunity, can yield remarkable results for local producers and vendors. Interestingly, the telling of the anecdote reveals that among JAMIA's members is a sense that the craft industry can work in aiding the nation. This is a significant and timely notion for the group to have with Jamaica recorded as being the most indebted nation in the Caribbean with its debt at

over 140% of GDP and with the country having recently undergone its second debt restructuring in three years.

JAMIA asserts that Jamaica's economic progress will come by way of increased production. This sentiment is shared by Dr. Gene Leon, IMF Resident Representative to Jamaica. In his 2011 presentation to the Jamaica Exporters' Association, titled "Imagine a New Brand Jamaica! Strategies to achieve economic growth," Dr. Leon addressed some of the obstacles that contributed to Jamaica's low growth rate, which he claimed averaged just 1% over the past two decades (2011:4). One of the identified obstacles was Jamaica's "deficient human capital," a term used to describe the low skill quotient of the population, which along with other factors contributed to low productivity (Leon 2011:4). Regarding production and "deficient human capital" he challenged his audience to,

Imagine Brand Jamaica ranking among the top 25 countries for pay and productivity, rather than the bottom 25 where we are presently. Imagine for a moment if 80% of Jamaica's workforce were in areas of high productivity, using high-end technology, solid secondary or tertiary education, or certified technical skills? (2011: 5).

It is unlikely that the craft industry would represent an "area of high productivity," for Dr. Leon, or the government for that matter, and that the noted deficiency could be satisfied by craft skill. There is nonetheless a striking correspondence between the perspectives of the IMF representative and JAMIA, namely, that training and productivity are necessary for the development of the country.

Production, at its "very basic definition" is "the act or instance of the manufacture of things... from a set of raw materials..." (Dilley 2004:799). The trope of production is one, which has had decreasing scope in the Jamaican public sphere with the gradual decline in sugar production over the past few decades. Additionally, former Prime Minister, Bruce Golding, oversaw the sale of the last state owned sugar industry assets in 2011 to China-based company, COMPLANT, which also has a significant foothold in Jamaica's construction industry.²⁷ The country's two leading industries, tourism and bauxite, contribute very little in the way of production. The tourism industry requires virtually no production, and the bauxite industry has seen consistent declines in production over the past several years (Barclay and Girvan 2013; Berge 2009).²⁸

There is relatively little being "produced" in Jamaica, but are the limited industries in Jamaica the causes or "consequences" of the increasing "invisibility of production" (Dilley 2004: 808)? In trying to work out the perceived shift in economic interest from production to consumption, Dilley (2004:809) asserts that "production has not become invisible because production itself has become unimportant..." but rather has been a result of "the separation of production from consumption..."(ibid.). However, in tourism, the one industry in Jamaica in which the market of consumers comes directly to the product, there is little opportunity for local Jamaicans to produce. The workshop discussed in the previous section, which sits at the heart of JAMIA's production agenda, was described by Baldwin as a site "where people can see you producing, and where you can sit and wait for sandals, bangles with your name etched in, and blown glass made to your liking." It would potentially serve as a site that creates that link between production and consumption. This kind of workshop-cum-demonstration space is common across the

touristed developing world, but is rare in Jamaica, given the declining activity of artisans. Therefore, JAMIA's tourist center is considered to have the potential to transform the local souvenir market in Montego Bay, bringing much needed dynamism, personalization, and character to the industry, but with the production factor it becomes a key site for the local creation of industrial opportunity.

"Until we equip our artists and producers, using the same mechanism [of manufacturing/production]....," began Baldwin, "we will not be able to rub shoulders [compete] with the Indians." The entry of Sindhis into the industry of "Jamaican things" recalls the nineteenth century introduction of indentured East Indian labor into the colonial sugar industry. Contemporary relations between Sindhis and black Jamaicans are not marked by what Verene Shepherd noted as a "mutual contempt held by Creoles and Indians for each other," during the period of indenture (1996:82). However, the Sindhi presence is often seen as a tacit acknowledgement of a deficiency in manufacturing capability and business acumen among the Jamaican population involved in the souvenir industry.²⁹

By training vendors and others "as JAMIA grows," JAMIA estimates that they will, in time, be able to produce enough to compete with Sindhis, and thus, "rub shoulders" with them. Until then, Baldwin reckons that the local souvenir and craft market would continue to "belong to the Indians." He nevertheless saw JAMIA as the best chance for locals to reclaim prominence. The thought made him think back to when Hip Strip gift shops were run by locals, "But there was no leader," he mused aloud, "as a result there was no one to see the need to say we need to own

something for ourselves." It was the lack of leadership then, he charged, which permitted Sindhi entrepreneurs' take over of the strip. The onus was now on Jamaicans to take part in the shaping of their country's tourist market, but he disapproved of any victimized posturing, such as that which many craft vendors employed when criticizing the state of the market. "When you go out there and say the Indians are not supposed to sell this or they're not to do that, you are not speaking my language, my language is to say I want this as a part of what I believe I deserve."

As an example he asked me if I knew of Ms. Bev's shop on the Hip Strip. I did. Ms. Bev, owns "Ms. Bev's Boutique," one of three local black owned shops on the Hip Strip. Ms. Bev's neighbor and competitor is a Sindhi-owned shop called "Jamaican Culture," whose name is an unambiguous remarking of the salability of Jamaican culture. Most Sindhi shops have names, which try to impart a sense of locality, such as the anodyne "Sunshine Gift Shop," or "Reggae City," but none as overt as "Jamaican Culture." The name and the shop owner incensed Ms. Bev, as she would claim that he would pay drivers to avoid her shop and other underhanded tactics. "So you see what Bev do?" Baldwin asked. It was hard not to. As a kind of promotional salvo aimed at "Jamaican Culture," Bev plastered on her shop windows at least 15 signs saying, "100% Jamaican," and "Jamaican Owned." "But even Bev," Baldwin began, "have to buy from the Indian." To Baldwin the signs were no more than hollow promotion. "Such tactics have little impact unless you are producing," he stated as having made his point. The message was clear, anything other than actual production, would be ineffective at promoting genuine change and progress. The advancement toward such change however, would have to start in the minds and hearts of local Jamaicans, and that was the actual challenge of JAMIA.

A Dream Deferred, or Sufferation as Usual?

Promoting the ideal of organization is a far simpler undertaking than its execution. Despite the diligence at meetings put toward assembly protocol and in voting upon motions, few decisions ever came to fruition. One of the first decisions made at the start of my attendance of the meetings was the installation of a JAMIA sign outside of the hotel. However, over the fifteen months I spent in the field, the sign never went up. Of JAMIA's thirty-five members only twenty-four were regularly active, and among those there were rarely more than twelve in attendance at any meeting and they usually comprised mostly the group's artisans and an alternating selection of committed vendors. The reason was simple: the concern among the members with their everyday sales in the craft markets often superseded their attention to the organization; after all, except for Shaunice who was independently trained, JAMIA had yet to officially train any of its non artisan members. Assembling for meetings every fortnight was also a challenge, because these were scheduled for 11am on Monday's, one of the busier ship days of the week. Making it another day of the week to work on any particular task, such as painting the meeting area, was nearly impossible to orchestrate.

Irregular commitment underscored the fundamental challenge JAMIA faced in providing lasting opportunities for its members. Baldwin noted that many members within the organization tended to exhibit a "wait and see mentality," in which they predicated their level of commitment based on estimated opportunities, which could only wane since JAMIA was still in the process of seeking funding to develop its programs. Outside of the rare festival exhibit, there was often little demonstrated enthusiasm. Ironically, the one thing that held up membership was the same access

to the all-inclusive hotels, the same, which Baldwin decried as "crumbs on the table." However, when JAMIA lost vending privileges at one of their main resorts, the organization suffered a massive curtailing of member involvement, though no one left the organization.

Though Baldwin maintained an enduring spirit of optimism, some vendors were vocal about their frustration with the group's progress, "We've been humming and doing all that we can do for well over a year, we registered with JSIF and it's pure going and coming around and people are dead as hungry [are dying of hunger] and you nah get nowhere," a disgruntled member publicly charged, during one meeting. Earlier in the chapter I stated that sometimes sufferation crept in, other times it barged in. Defensively, Baldwin riposted "If you think you're not serious or you've lost seriousness, the door is open, you know what to do. If you want to pull out, you can have what you put in, JAMIA will move on." Then vulnerably he confessed, "Sometimes I stay up thinking about how we can move forward, but I believe in time because time takes care of things." His statement hinted at the Pentecostal optimism witnessed among the vendors. He continued, "There are times when I feel like I can't take it anymore, but I know as the captain of the ship I will be the last man standing. So I say to you members let us bind ourselves together, let us push forward and not lose focus on the ball." Snapping back into his administrative formalism, he admonished the secretaries, "I need you to get serious about the minutes, and I want you to dialogue more with each other, it is very important that we have the records of our meeting for the DCFS we want to the records to show that we're serious."

Though somewhat concerning, the vacillation of member commitment was a secondary concern as the institutionalization of JAMIA and the work required to secure its longevity were paramount. "If the foundation of JAMIA is not built on a solid rock," Baldwin ominously ruminated in a private discussion, "it will become irrelevant pretty soon." It was for this reason that he recently abandoned efforts to increase membership. He was cautious of attracting new members without the means to retain them, a striking reversal on his ambitious initial goal of targeting over two hundred members within a three-year period. "For the moment the priority is to maintain focus on the bedrock of JAMIA and to make a significant mark on society, the tourism industry, and the arts and crafts sector," he explained. "Let it be said," Baldwin propounded, "that whatever amount of time ago that we trained some people in this area and formalized the business of arts and crafts so that people take a different approach to their business and the way they produce and their awareness of the environment, because right now people just do anything..."

JAMIA's challenges are not indicative of organizational shortcomings in the group, but rather demonstrate the emphasized importance of the process of organization. The group's at times unsteady advance toward their ideal vision of JAMIA should not be grounds for finding the ideal untenable or unattainable— although few votes ever amounted to action, and meeting attendance and member participation fluctuated where it did not altogether flounder. It is through maintaining a devotion to procedure, even imperfectly so, and an expectation of progress, by which new subjectivities as "skilled" and "soon-to-be-skilled" are crafted into an empowered citizenship. Most importantly, it is only through this formal infrastructure that JAMIA reason

they will be able to materialize their ambitions and aspirations, thereby making the transformation, real, if not entirely realized.

On a phone call to Baldwin towards the end of my fieldwork I was devastated to learn that their lease for the hotel space had been rescinded. The owner of the hotel had found a buyer and evicted all of the tenants. Also, the JSIF contract that they were so hoping on still hadn't gone through, as JAMIA could not raise its share of the capital contribution that all JSIF funding programs require. To make matters worse, they lost the vendor day contract with one of the larger hotels. All of these poor outcomes made it evident that their vision of local production through the cooperative was a virtually impossible horizon. Lacking a central and steady locale, meetings had become irregular, though they frequently met at the KFC that was located downtown near Bay Fort craft market. Baldwin was of course undeterred. Though a craft day that coincided with the Jamaica Jazz and Blues Festival that was being planned towards the end of my fieldwork was no longer a possibility, there was an art show coming up soon and he was going to get some members to vend some crafts there.

After the call, I thought about Baldwin's optimism and knew that despite his best intentions and efforts, with one less hotel for vendors to visit, and with no place to "meet"—the only activity in which "the cooperation" of the cooperative was enacted—membership wouldn't be sustained for long. JAMIA's circumstances reveal an intrinsic tenuousness to cooperation, and cooperatives, economic or otherwise. Cooperatives, and cooperation it seems, require a basis in already existing resources, whether they are capital, or merely commitment, both of which are often

related as evidenced with JAMIA. The previous chapter demonstrated the frustration that vendors articulated with the lack of cooperation, and the meaning they ascribed to that lack. However, in this chapter, cooperation in the form of a cooperative seemed to accomplish little more than circumvent the discourse of sufferation. Is the lesson, therefore, that economic action and advancement does not function by cooperation in this context? If so, does that then provide another dimension to sufferation: that cooperation is rare, but even when present, it is entirely ineffective? These past two chapters have thus examined how people perceive of and act in an economy where the cooperative ethic is dramatically undermined by an unsupportive environment. In the following chapter, we look at the case of the Sindhi merchants against whom JAMIA and the vendors at Bay Fort have largely positioned themselves. We will interrogate their business model and commercial practice and see if in fact there is hope in the local Jamaican tourist economy, and if JAMIA and the vendors simply lacked know how and will.

The Sindhi Merchant Community

	Sad to say
But, white people ah bawl	
Indian people ah bawl	
Black people ah bawl	
Chinese people ah bawl	
System, design fi set we up	
-Popcaan, "The System"; 2012	

As shown in the accounts of Bay Fort vendors and JAMIA in the last two chapters, Sindhis are seen to trespass against a Jamaican right to commercially benefit from Jamaican cultural commodities. For Sindhis, the market of souvenirs has no ties to nationalism or a sovereign commercial right. The market is free from the specific ethical moorings that define it for craft vendors and the members of JAMIA. Instead, the market is strictly composed of goods that are simply appropriate for the commercial context of Jamaican tourism. The only ethic in the market is that of success—a sentiment Sindhis share with the futures traders discussed by Zaloom (2006) and the Wall Street brokers of Karen Ho's (2009) ethnography. The Sindhi business model reflects this ethic in the extended hours that they operate their shops, which are open for nearly twelve hours a day, seven days a week. Giving oneself over to the market and making the

necessary sacrifices to become great businessmen is the way Sindhis understand becoming successful. "Living" the market in this way has opened up the Sindhi business community to criticisms of immorality by some Jamaicans and by the vendors in this thesis. For Jamaicans the bases of value in the market extends beyond profit, whether as a means of cooperation as a site of realizing certain Christian ethics.

As Falzon (2004) has shown in his multi-sited ethnography of Sindhi business in Malta, London, and Mumbai Sindhi merchants in Montego Bay likewise work to embody success by becoming the consummate "businessman." As such, again like investment bankers (Ho 2009:52) and futures traders (Zaloom 2006:132) Sindhi merchants "live" the market in their constant pursuit of profit. Living the market for them means tenaciously adapting to the trends of tourism, customer preference, and industry cycles—all indices that mark the market's rhythm. This also, and most evidently, requires working longer and selling cheaper. They also seek to seize the market through combining business, kinship, and community through the structure of sindwork contracts and living arrangements. Through that pursuit what has occurred, some locals argue, has been the displacement of Jamaicans in both the production and sale of souvenir goods.

In this chapter, I will explore the Sindhi market ethic and their procedures for employing that ethic in trying to control the market of Jamaican souvenirs. I seek to understand what Sindhi commercial practice looks like from within the shop and in the broad context of the Jamaican economy. I then examine what problems Sindhis face in the Jamaican tourist sector. These efforts are examined against the backdrop the sufferation market in Jamaica as being identified by the

groups in the two previous chapters—although Sindhis do not use the term themselves. However, by examining their business practice we can better assess the tenability of the term as an analytic frame for the market in Jamaica. By doing so, we can determine if, in fact, the problems faced by Bay Fort vendors and JAMIA stem from their ethics and expectations of the market, or from a general hardship experienced by all in the local economy.

Sindhi Merchants in Jamaica

Following the British annexation of Sind in 1843, Hyderabad Sindhi merchants, who up to then vended their wares throughout the region, explored foreign markets for Sindhi crafts and jewelry. This expansion resulted in the inception of the migrant "sindwork," trade around 1860 (Markovits 2000).³⁰ The inflection point of the trade came when traders began making use of expanding British trade routes in an effort to exploit the burgeoning market of travel tourism in Egypt and the Mediterranean (Falzon 2004; Thakur 1959). The British tourist market would come to greatly determine the logistics of Sindhi firms' business locations as efforts were focused toward travel destinations. International consumer tastes were met with a diversification beyond the local products of Sind into curios and oriental fare drawn from throughout India and the Far East. Following tourist pathways and alternative routes of trade led in large part to Sindhi merchants arguably forming one of India's most mobile diaspora groups, relocating to locations from Hong Kong to Panama.

Some scholars consider Sindhi choices of location to be serendipitous as they consistently appeared ahead of, or in step with, the market trend in tourist travel (Markovits 2000: 287; see

also Thakur 1959),. This notion is evidenced by the arrival of two Sindhi families, the Daswanis and Chatanis, in Jamaica from Hyderabad, the former arriving in the late 1920s and the latter during the early 1930s. Their arrival coincided with Jamaica's tourist industry experiencing its first revival since the First World War (Taylor 1993). Other families also came to the country, but left for other islands like Trinidad and Barbados, perhaps comprising the groups Sindhi historian, Claude Markovits, notes as having expanded the Sindhi merchant network throughout the Caribbean region (2000:141).

After becoming established in Jamaica, both families would commence recruiting workers from their networks back home. The first to come were siblings and cousins to help run the early shops in Kingston, but as business expanded broader networks would be tapped. This recruitment was the lifeblood of the Sindhi trade. There seemed to be no shortage of young Sindhi men, deemed "sindworkis," attracted to the opportunity to learn a business trade in which they would eventually become established. The agreement of a three to six-year contract provided passage and accommodation alongside their salaries. In return these young men were expected to be "at the service of their managers round the clock" often working long hours daily (Falzon 2004: 141). The rupture of Partition saw the en masse migration of Hindu Sindhis out of Sind, which became a part of post-Partition Pakistan, and into Indian cities. Nonetheless, Sindhi recruitment and deployment continued as it had previously in Hyderabad as revealed by later recruitment of Sindhis to Jamaica. Recruits were located using broad networks of kinship, most often from within the *Bhaiband jati*—a term used to denote a *jati*, or community, of Sindhi traders, traditionally associated with the Hyderabad area of Sind (Falzon 2004).

The early businesses, like "Daswani's Hindu Bazaar," sold *madras* cloth and shorts, Indian souvenirs, perfume, and jewelry. Interestingly, both families would move to western Jamaica in the mid-1950s opening up branches in Montego Bay as the city became the island's premier tourist destination. In this new location they continued the sale of oriental curios, but in time these early families would come to focus on luxury items, such as watches and jewelry, leading to their ultimate engagement with the duty-free tourist goods business. The Sindhi community in Montego Bay developed in typical fashion with the recruitment of Sindhi workers. This cycle reproduced the duty free business model as recruits often opened their own stores at the end of their contracts. Eventually, entrance into the duty-free luxury goods business was made difficult by increased start up costs and the general saturation of the market. Mr. Daswani and Mr. Chatani, the sons of the two pioneering Sindhi-Jamaican families, explained to me that starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Sindhi entrepreneurs began entering into the local souvenir trade, some into wholesale goods, but most opening retail shops.

Many of the earliest Sindhi gift shops were located adjacent to the duty-free luxury stores in which they used to work, at a shopping center near downtown Montego Bay, known as City Centre. Over time, however, these businesses began to relocate onto Gloucester Avenue, or what is popularly dubbed as the "Hip Strip." Again, this stretch of road, measuring at just over half a mile long, is home to Montego Bay's greatest attractions, which include Jimmy Buffet's Margaritaville, opened in 1995, and the famous Doctor's Cave Beach Club, whose waters have been renowned for their salubrious qualities since the 1920s. Before the arrival of Sindhi shops on the strip, a handful of Jamaican-owned tourist boutiques served the area, as mentioned by

Baldwin in the previous chapter. However, according to accounts of the few remaining local operators, the early Sindhi shop owners offered to pay higher rents to landlords as a means to secure any newly available property. Over time Sindhis would come to dominate the strip, with there now being nearly forty stores in operation.³¹ For some, the souvenir trade was simply a pathway to opening their luxury duty-free shop. For others, it became a legitimately lucrative enterprise in itself. The most successful of these early Sindhi souvenir traders—who once worked for one of the original Sindhi families—eventually moved away from the strip and opened a larger store nearer to the large hotels in Rosehall. However, he earns a share of the profits of three shops run by his former workers still in operation on the strip. In the following section, I give detail of one particularly productive shop on the strip, Reggae City.

Reggae City

With its high concentration of shops, the majority of Sindhi trading activity in souvenirs remains centered on the Hip Strip. Both the retail and wholesale interests of the traders revolve around this tiny commercial node, and so I concentrated my efforts there. What I found was that earning money remained the *raison d'être* for these traders, evidenced by their commitment in both time and resources to their businesses. This was best exemplified by one Sindhi merchant named Ravi, the owner of Reggae City, a long established souvenir shop located almost directly across from Doctor's Cave beach.

Ravi has been in Jamaica for over 20 years. He initially came to the island to work for the Chatanis, who I've noted are one of the two first Sindhi families in Jamaica. For several years he

worked as a salesman, then manager at the Chatanis' luxury duty-free shop. As I have outlined, Ravi, unable to make his way directly into the luxury goods business detoured through souvenirs. Being one of the earliest Sindhi merchants in the trade, he was also one the first to set up his shop on the Hip Strip. However, whether by an inability to make the final transition into the luxury sector, or by virtue of found success, Ravi remained in the souvenir business. Over time, he opened two stores adjacent to each other, the second of which is generically named "Gift Shop."

Lakshan and Krishna, Ravi's two Sindhi employees work between both stores. Lakshan, 28, was well into his second three-year contract, and Krishna, 21, was almost at the end of his first when we met. It was through local relationships back home in Ulhasnagar, an area just outside of Mumbai, that they both came to work for Ravi— Lakshan in 2006 and Krishna in 2009. In addition to Lakshan and Krishna, Ravi has four Jamaican women employed between his two shops, all of whom have worked for him for several years, the most recent having been taken on just before Lakshan's arrival.

Lakshan and Krishna, live and work under typical sindwork conditions. Though they are provided communal accommodation and a salary that is considerably higher than what the two made back home, their work consists of a seven days a week schedule, and they are provided with limited social time. The two share a one bedroom apartment one floor below where Ravi lives with his wife, daughter, and mother. According to Lakshan, his salary runs about US\$ 600 per month, but that money is not paid to him in regular intervals. Instead a portion of his salary is

sent to his family and he is given a weekly allowance for the purchase of lunch or other incidentals. However, the stipend is seldom used for the purchase of food as, in addition to accommodation, he and Krishna receive daily meals cooked by either Ravi's wife or mother. Though not located far from home, Lakshan and Krishna are driven between there and work by Ravi.

Under Sindhi bosses traditionally existed the categories of salaried managers, shop assistants, and a further sub category of "servant" (Markovits 2000). Contractually, the responsibilities of shop assistants and their subordinates differed minimally, with the exception of the obsequious nature of servants' duties and domestic responsibilities (Markovits 2000). In Reggae City, Lakshan as the more senior qualified as a manager, determined more so by responsibility than salary. He regularly demonstrated his superiority over Krishna when Ravi was not in the shop, which was normally after 5pm when he went home to his family.³² Lakshan often commented that he "worked with his head" while Krishna "worked with his body" in that Krishna did the menial evening tasks of packing away and cleaning up. On many occasions I witnessed Lakshan harshly berate Krishna for one minor mistake or another, or criticizing him over general comments made with replies such as "how must you know, you a small boy compared to me!" Also, Krishna's facility with English was not as strong as Lakshan's and therefore made him more deferent to Lakshan in transactions with customers. To his credit though, Krishna was a quick learner of both English and the trade. Skill sets like English determined the differentiating qualities between the categories of worker presenting a skill-based politics (Markovits 2000: 176).

Shop hierarchy is complicated by the presence of locally employed black Jamaican workers. Sindworki responsibilities, regardless of ranking, are concerned with customer service, with limited physical work, such as cleaning and inventory stocking throughout the day. In Reggae City and within most shops on the Hip Strip with adequate staff, that work is left for the Jamaican workers, whose presence is claimed to be mandated by the government at a ratio of two Jamaican workers to one Sindhi. I could not however verify this claim with members of government I spoke with, nor was it referenced in the Foreign Nationals and Commonwealth Citizens Employment Act, 1964, which seeks to ensure that qualified Jamaicans are given first consideration in employment opportunities. Interestingly, these positions appear to be exclusively filled by women, and the racial and gender dynamic of their presence provides an interesting point of inquiry. It appears, however, that the premier task of these Jamaican women is to welcome customers into the shop by standing in or near the shop entrance and solicit their custom. As Rose, one the few black shop owners asserts,

The Indians put a black girl on the front and then they [the Sindhis] stay in the shop. They hire these girls for sales strategy...not for government policy, to catch the tourist them...the tourists will warm to that shop because they see a Jamaican there. Because that's who they've come to see, a Jamaican. Somebody to tell them a little more about the culture...They hire them to make it look like they are hiring Jamaicans, but they don't pay them anything.

By insisting, whether on the basis of fact or not, that the Jamaican workers are mandated into their employ, Sindhi bosses create a means to rationalize the barely decent treatment of those workers. According to Kerri-Ann, whom is the longest serving employee of Reggae City, during her tenure of nearly a decade, she has never once been allowed to ring up customer purchases,

and has been denied pay commensurate with those received by Lakshan and Krishna. The discrepancy of pay is a good point to explore. Recall that Lakshan's salary is US\$ 600 per month. Whereas the workers are paid at or just above Jamaica's national minimum wage of JAM\$ 5000, or US\$ 56 per week. Additionally, there is no job mobility for the Jamaican workers. In both Reggae City and a neighboring shop with a prime location near to the entrance of Doctor's Cave Beach, Beach Shop, the Jamaican workers have time after time been denied promotion over Sindhi employees. At Beach Shop, Lisa, who has been working with the company for more than ten years complained to me that she was in the process of training "one Indian *bwoy* who just reach" and is becoming the shop manager, and thus her boss. She continued, "That likkle bwoy deh so [little boy there], him just 19, and them wouldn't put me as manager because they're Indian and they're not gonna have a Jamaican run their store....I'm overly qualified, but of course I'm Jamaican...but everyday he's asking for my help." Ms. Bev, you will remember from the last chapter, owns a gift shop on the Hip Strip, and protests against the Sindhis with signage that says "100% Jamaican." More than twenty -five years ago, Ms. Bev experienced the same treatment working for one of the first Sindhi families in their in-bond shop. She complained that for years, despite high sales and excellent customer service, she was continuously denied promotion. This eventually prompted her to quit and open a shop in souvenirs, not unlike the strategy of Sindhis working in the luxury business.

While receiving a third of the salary of *sindworkis* would seem egregious on the face of it, when the Jamaican workers go home at 5pm, Lakshan and Krishna, and every other Sindhi worker (though seldom the owners) remain on the job for another several hours. Additionally, although

they are technically paid more, Krishna and Lakshan will not see the bulk of that pay until the end of their contracts. These two facts are central to the model and market ethic of Sindhi business. They are the means by which they seek success, and the bases on which they justify their place in the Jamaican economy, as will be discussed in the following section.

Capital and Cultural (In)Competencies

Sindhi business strategies, whether in retail or wholesale and distribution have caused a great deal of disquiet among many, if not most, local Jamaicans involved in the souvenir goods sector.

Rose succinctly sums up the multiple charges against them:

The Indians come in and they take the best part, which is tourism, and they occupy the retail, the distribution, and the wholesale part of it...because they are the wholesalers, the distributors they are competitive and are just here to make money. When I started in this business there were a lot of black people in the wholesale business, now the Indians get competitive and they've priced black people out of business and take over the distribution, and so I've purchased items from them too because there is nobody else for us to purchase from. And what happened now is that they don't contribute to nothing in Jamaica. They just collect the money and send the money back to India.

As discussed in chapter one, Sindhi merchants are able to competitively price their goods, especially when compared to the vendors, by way of their ability to acquire inventory on credit. However, Therefore, most Sindhi shops also engage outside networks in their competitive strategies. The most popular, and contentious of which is the incentivizing of tour bus drivers. The process is as it sounds, as Sindhi shop owners offer either a percentage of total purchase or a fixed dollar amount per tourist brought into the shop. The percentage usually goes no higher than

10% and the cash incentive remains around JAM\$ 100 - 200 per person. The practice has become pervasive, with many shop owners adding extra incentive in the form of a *lagniappe*, or *brawta*, as it is called in Jamaica. This usually takes the form of a bottle of rum or some extra monetary remuneration.

This practice often means that already successful shops are likely to have the means to guarantee their continued success. This typically results in sentiments that range from resentment on the part of struggling Sindhi shops to outright indignation among the few Jamaican-owned shops and local craft vendors. Rose explains the process:

The Indians buy out the cruise ships. What they do is that they talk to the people who work on the pier and arrange for the buses to be dispatched to their shops and no other shopping stop, and when the bus operators take them to the shops they are given money. So they train them so now the bus drivers are expecting you to pay them when they bring tourists to you...it's like an extortion. So when a bus man carry 8-10 people here to shop, you have to give them...some of them even demand a certain percent of the sale, so that's how the extortion part comes in. One day a driver put his back to my front door and directed the tourists to the Indian shop next door, the Indians taught them how to victimize us.

Although locals like Rose decry their tactics, Sindhi merchants and wholesalers take a different view. To them, their presence in the tourist market, and the strategies they employ, is not only a boon to the Jamaican economy, but a necessity. They argue that without the acumen and industry of their business community the local trade in souvenirs would inevitably fail. Bill Maurer has noted the same sentiment among immigrant "Syrian" [Palestinian] merchants in the British

Virgin Islands (BVI), who claimed that without Syrian shops, Tortola, the largest of the BVI islands, would "[go] back one hundred years" (1997:140).

Dinesh, the Sindhi wholesaler located across from the craft market found his role in the country necessary because, as he saw it, the government was "screwing up." He explained, "[the] government allow these big companies to come in Jamaica and monopolize— hotels, all-inclusives [they] monopolize. The day all-inclusives started in Jamaica everything got screwed up. All of this happened because of all inclusive." Paradoxically, he did not seem to class Sindhi business as also problematically being "allowed" to come in. Nonetheless, for Dinesh, the government's complicity was the result of its corruption. To his understanding, "the root of this country is not right— the politicians, they are together with these big guys and have been bribed well."

The government's corruptibility was just part of a larger issue of Jamaican ineptness that, in equal measure with the government, Dinesh identified among Jamaica's craft vendors and artisans who he claimed lacked both will and ability:

Jamaican people are not capable, poor guy. I understand, fine, but there should be some way. There's not even one Jamaican— the best guy who can get a big piece of land and make a shopping center for all Jamaicans? Nobody wants to cooperate, but everybody wants money, it's only in Jamaica I see people fighting, there's no cooperation, there's no love.

Mr. Chatani, although a first-generation Jamaican, was of the same opinion:

True the negroes were slaves, and they fought for and rebelled for freedom, but after they got freedom, what did they do? They continued the fighting but with each other. Fought with each other, there was no love, and today it is like a part of their genes. Which other country in the world you know have over a thousand murders a year and is not at war? You see this country? This country could be paradise on earth, every single person would be happy with not a care in the world if they could only get together. It won't happen in my lifetime, though.

Mr. Chatani's criticism of Jamaican disunity remarkably resembled the argument made by vendors in the first chapter. However, his criticism was more than anything a statement of Jamaican incompetence. Though vendors desired a collectivity as an expression of their 'blackness' which would honor their shared historical experience of suffering and its future resolution, to Mr. Chatani cooperation was simply a route to economic success. Such a model is the opposite of that of the female vendors, for whom individuals driven by a goal of economic success were morally suspect and generators of dis-unity through bad-mind. Mr. Chatani's assertion was typical of the radical virtue of competitive individualism present within Sindhi business.. Interestingly the Sindhi businessmen and the vendors were in accord on the point that Jamaicans were the architects of their own downfall.

Sindhis were simply making a living as they knew how, and as best as they could. As Mr. Daswani, of the original Sindhi family in Jamaica, clarified, "Sindhis buy something for a dollar, they sell it back at \$2.50 to pay their rent. Their shops are well manicured, well stocked, and that's what the tourists look for. There's a work ethic, that I don't see elsewhere in the industry." He continued, "In a fast moving world, in a free democracy [liberalized] world, money talks and

bullshit walks...when I was 8 or 9, my father would give me the broom to clean under the showcases. We were taught that we had to work...if you want ice cream you have to go do something for it...work ethic." In his opinion, this ethic didn't exist in the craft market in particular or throughout the Jamaican side of the souvenir industry. Ravi also felt similarly: "You think a Jamaican is going to sit in their shop from 8 a.m. until 10:30 p.m. every day? The craft vendors close up shop at 4 or 5 p.m., and other [Jamaican] shops around here close not too long after! Come on!"

In the estimation of these men, the Sindhi work ethic and commitment to capital accumulation stood at the heart of the survival of the souvenir goods industry. Like the investment bankers discussed by Ho (2009:102) Sindhis employed "the culture of overwork" as a site to reinvigorate hierarchies in the market and establish their business superiority. Theirs' were the shops that brought tourist traffic along the Hip Strip and maintained it as a viable attraction. "If we don't do it, who can?" was the question posed by Ravi. The question was striking. It wasn't one of who would do this work, but again, who (else) *could*. For Sindhis their business acumen was based upon a competency that was not simply skill centered, but biological—"Sindhis have business brains," as I was told by Nish, a young, but rather successful Sindhi shop owner. Nish has been in business for the past twelve years after finishing just one three year contract term in one of the most successful and longest operating Sindhi souvenir shops in Montego Bay.³³ Again Sindhi self-perception was similar to that of the investment bankers described by Ho, who possessed "a particular combination of intelligence, ambition, and hard work, which they view as the driving and legitimating forces behind their dominant position in the financial markets" (2009:103).

As described by both Ravi and Mr. Chatani, it would appear that the practices of Sindhi business competency were all about the willingness to work long hours and to poorly remunerate their shop staff, and for their staff to accept those terms. In fact these conditions and the will to endure them were what upheld the entire Sindhi business model. As mentioned earlier, each of the Jamaican staff were paid somewhere around US\$ 56 per week, the cost of two to three quality t-shirts, or the combined cost of a package of coffee and a decent bottle of rum. And the Sindworkis' comparatively higher salaries were not typically paid until the end of their contracts, or were paid in smaller and intermittent sums throughout as needed.

This practice brought a critique from locals that the conditions endured by sindworkis like Lakshan and Krishna were tantamount to indentureship. Markovits has noted how certain labor conditions and relationships in sindwork "smack[ed] of indenture," and he provides accounts of sindworkis who brought claims of indentureship against their bosses to South African authorities in the early 1900s (2000:171-175). There are elements of East Indian indenture that bear a striking resemblance to the existing labor conditions of contemporary sindwork. The most immediate similarity is the contracted labor that binds employee and employer together for a determined length of time. For indentured agricultural workers the period was five years (Tinker 1974:64), whereas for the sindworkis it was and remains three. Provided accommodation is another similarity between both forms. However, of course, Sindhi accommodation could never be as dire as that once provided to indentured workers. Nonetheless, these two points of similarity were not the bases on which contemporary Jamaicans made a comparison between

sindwork and indenture. . They focused on the length of time and the fixed context in which these young men worked, and of course the fact that they are Indian.

I asked Lakshan how he fared with the hours he worked to which he replied, "It's like I am in a prison and all I see are the shops around me." Of similar sentiment, (though perhaps somewhat worse off) was Lam, who claimed to have never been to the beach in his three years in Jamaica, despite being located directly across from it. Conditions varied between shops, as I met some sindworkis who were provided with day passes to all-inclusive hotels, and even Lakshan and I took a day trip to Negril on one of his days off. Sindwork among the young men that I came to know was never seen as a career. The three-to-six years they worked, however difficult, were a means to eventually establish themselves in the trade, to learn the ropes and eventually open up their own business. In the interim however, it was their hardship that served as the basis on which their bosses' shops were profitable. And if they succeeded in starting their own shop it is that economic model of hardship that they would replicate. Within the Sindhi ethic there is an acceptance that business is primarily about current sacrifice in order to achieve a greater prosperity in the future.

As has been noted, Sindhis employ multiple strategies to generate profit, but there was a divergence in the way that Sindhis determined how they and Jamaicans understood profit itself that reinforced their sense of competence. According to Sindhis , Jamaicans sought to extract the maximum profit from each item they sold, inevitably meaning they sold very little. "How can they sell an item that normally costs \$10 for \$50?" exaggeratedly queried one Sindhi retailer,

David. "How do they expect to get customers?" he asked sardonically. Sindhis in contrast were willing to sacrifice profit margins as long as their turnover remained high. This was likewise evidenced in Falzon's work among Sindhi merchant communities in Malta and London (2004:155). Therefore, inherent in the "Jamaican" notion of profit was a myopia, in which long-term viability was sacrificed for immediate gains. If the Sindhis had "business brains," they then also had "business vision," investing in long-term profitability and thus long-term security. The short-term perspective of Jamaicans could be read throughout the society they created. It was in the Sindhi opinion the reason why the country was in such disrepair: no long-term vision, with everyone trying to get what they could for themselves today. It was a harsh critique, but one that as we have seen in previous chapters is also shared by other Jamaicans..

What the Sindhis I spoke with failed to realize, or perhaps simply refused to acknowledge, was that the strategies forming the profit logic of both groups were in large part dictated by the terms under which each acquired inventory. Sindhi retailers received their goods on credit from wholesalers, and were expected to make their payment within 30 to 60 days. Thus, their need to move product necessitated their willingness to lose on profit margins. Nevertheless, by making their payment they were able to borrow again, allowing time for whatever little profit they earned to slowly accumulate in significance. Jamaican craft vendors, by far the second largest market for Sindhi manufactured goods, on the other hand paid for their goods up front, as previously explained. Therefore they required the maximum profit on each item in order to both make a living and acquire further inventory. Regardless of this fact, there remained among my Sindhi informants a superior sense of how they did business. This superiority is perhaps due to sindwork

being informed by the notion of being a "businessman." For sindworkis, the ambition at the root of the concept determines "the nature of his intercourse with other Sindhi businessmen, with his kin, and...employees" (Thapan 2002:38). Therefore being adept at business is viewed as not only an inherent Sindhi quality (business brains), but also a constituent element of self, thereby determining business as a Sindhi's only true vocation (Thapan 2002).³⁴

With over forty shops located within such tight proximity, competition was high, and all communication during business hours was strongly discouraged. The "culture of profit" generated by being businessmen meant that there was little room for "community" among the Sindhi traders in Montego Bay, but this was perceived as a virtuous effort (Brook & Luong 1997:34). This competitiveness between shops is paradoxically the opposite of the community mindedness that the vendors and JAMIA members attributed to Sindhi success. Lakshan told me that there are a few guys along the strip who do get along, but they usually don't own shops near each other. Mr. Chatani also explained that "We are competitors from 9-5 but after 5 we are sitting and having a drink together." From the position of success, there was an "after 5" in which he and his competitors could commune. However, there was little possibility for this for the shops on the strip. All shops were open by 9 am and earlier on days when cruise ships were in port, and would frequently close only after 10 p.m. in the evening. As once stated by Nish, "Our competitors are greedy motherfuckers, but its business. It's a tough business, so store hours are important, even if nothing is happening, just chill, you never know when somebody's gonna walk in."

At the start of fieldwork I heard that there were plans to build a Hindu temple in Montego Bay. I took this as a sign that there might in fact be some community infrastructure that would facilitate such a collective project. However, as I went along the Hip Strip interviewing shop owners and workers, one by one I was told that they knew nothing of such plans. One *sindworki* reckoned that if it were true, then it was likely being done by members of the older generation that was born in Jamaica. However the most telling reply was by Ravi, who declared that he wasn't interested in any temple as whatever time he had would be better spent in his shop, and that he would visit the temple on his next visit back to India.

Competition was a virtue for the Sindhi merchants. This was made clear when Ravi, having spent the past twenty-five years of his life working in Jamaica, told me that he had finally thought it time to leave. His reason, was partly business related as things had slowed much since the recession, but it was mainly that he would rather his young daughter go to school in India. Myself being familiar with the high academic standards of Jamaican private schools, especially at the primary level wondered what he thought was wrong with the Jamaican system. I was surprised when he replied that the class sizes were too small. As a former high school teacher in South Florida, Ravi's view was heresy to me. He patiently waited for me to finish my recitation of advantages of small class size, and when I was done he said, "OK, fine. I understand. But in India, you have class sizes of up to one hundred. I want my daughter to be at the top of *that* class, not a class of just twenty!"

Ravi's aspirations for his daughter made me fully appreciate the fact that Sindhi merchants seemed to prefer to operate in highly competitive commercial circumstances. There were inherent advantages to the number and especially proximity of the shops. In such a constricted environment, only the best businessmen could have success: those who were willing to open earlier, close later, and sell for cheaper. As Mr. Daswani noted about the Sindhis on the Hip Strip, "those people on bottom road sit down from 7 in the morning till 12 at night, they will try and sell their mother for a dollar if they have to, they are taught work ethics second to none..." This was in direct contradiction to the way the vendors felt about the matter of competitor space, although I have argued that their real problem is a lack of flexibility in the market. The welcoming of competition was the reason that promotion within shops was rare and that former workers were permitted, if not encouraged, to open up new businesses. Falzon explains that in this process, former Sindhi bosses provide young upstarts with credit and so in the process of a *sindworki* leaving his boss' employ, the employer "earns himself both a competitor as well as a customer" (2004:144). Mr. Daswani succinctly confirmed that workers leaving to open their own shop was acceptable, if not expected: "Once a few years go by, these guys make a little money and go into business for themselves, no problem" expressed.

The continued entry of Sindhi businesses into the marketplace creates a "culture of instability and competition" (Ho 2009:75), that Sindhi merchants seem to thrive on. Not only welcoming, but largely creating this competition again proves who is the best of businessmen, and who will go furthest to succeed. These are the terms through which Sindhis present themselves as capable agents who maintain the viability of the tourist goods market. This chapter has so far been

concerned with Sindhi retailers. In the following section I will detail some of the ways in which Sindhi wholesalers achieve structural dominance in the market.

Made in the U.S.A.: The Sindhi Wholesale Model

One afternoon, I was getting to know Lam, a sindworki from a shop toward the bottom-end of the Hip Strip. When I asked Lam where he was from and he replied "the U.S.A.," I laughed incredulously. The smirk on his face quickly transformed into a full-tooth smile, when he explained that his "U.S.A" was in fact the Ulhasnagar Sindhi Association. Ulhasnagar is a city located approximately 40 miles northeast of Mumbai, as is the hometown of many Sindhis in Montego Bay, like Ravi, Lakshan and Krishna. Ulhasnagar was converted into a township in 1949 after Partition saw over 100,000 Sindhi refugees flee from the newly created West Pakistan to the area in 1947. The Ulhasnagar Sindhi Association came into being as a merchant guild of the city. It later lent its name to an acronym that led to the term "Made in the USA" being applied to counterfeit goods manufactured in Ulhasnagar by local industries. As Falzon explains, since Indian independence "import restrictions and exorbitant import tariffs meant that 'phoren' (foreign) brands, often smuggled into the country by 'couriers', were highly desirable" (2004:168). Enterprising Sindhis in Ulhasnagar responded with "desi," or counterfeit, versions of the most popular brands. The counterfeit goods ran the gamut from apparel to electronics. Although second-rate in quality, the "USA" industry satisfied the local demand for foreign goods up until the 1990s. The relaxed import tariffs and stringent monopolies legislation associated with Indian economic liberalization resulted in expanded domestic markets for foreign

commercial goods. The increased availability of genuinely branded merchandise diminished, though not entirely, the demand for the Ulhasnagar "Made in USA" labeled products.

At the same time that "USA" goods were in decline in India, Sindhis opening up shops and wholesale outfits in Jamaica created a new market for counterfeit goods. Three forms of counterfeiting took place among Sindhis in Jamaica: that of locally made goods; of large popular brands; and of popular brand motifs. The souvenir industry in Jamaica at that time was dominated by the long-serving staples of local producers: handcrafted products; wooden statuettes; straw basketry and other weaving; embroidered and sewn products; ceramic goods; paintings; t-shirts; and beaded and wooden jewelry. Sindhi wholesalers bought Jamaican-made goods from artisans and local producers and sent them abroad, either back to India or to China as prototypes for items they would have mass manufactured and imported into the country for sale. According to local accounts, as the increasing number of Sindhi retail shops began carrying these foreign items, the local industries suffered significant decreases in demand and profitability.

Early in my fieldwork I met a Rastafarian artisan named "Country" whose long-time specialty was in carving small wooden animals. The afternoon that we met Country stopped in at Bev's Boutique. Country, however, was not selling his wooden animals, but was instead peddling other goods, as some years ago, he explained, he sold "a portion" [a large amount] of his animals to an "Indian" shopping at Bay Fort craft market's producer day. Typically on Friday morning, these are days where producers go the market to do wholesale business with craft vendors. Country claimed to have started seeing animals similar to his all around Montego Bay several months

later. "If you sell to the Indian, next year you won't be able to sell again," began his warning. "They go to crafts people, and offer them nothing for all of it, but the people [producers] do it because they're hungry! But the next time you see it will be from China...the Indians them monopolate [sic] the ting [industry]. At this point Ms. Bev joined in:

Because remember that they bring in things by trailer load from China. They have warehouses in Montego Bay, but mainly in Ochi, and what happened is that they hire their boys [sindworkis]...because you see some Indians are the bigger Indians, you know...so they hire their boys to be sales rep, and they bring their catalogue to you, or you can go out to their warehouse. And we have to buy things from them because they [control] the wholesale and distribution. You see with the local production, it costs you more and not many people do it. When I came into this industry there were a lot of guys that used to come around with their own t-shirts and so on, but the Indians box them out...they are taking over what Jamaican people would be doing.

One example that supported Country and Ms. Bev's charge involved wooden statuettes that Sindhis have been importing from Indonesia. The carvings came with a tag onto which a logo outlining the shape of Jamaica was imprinted with the country's name within and the words "Island Souvenirs" just below. Messaging just below the logo implored shoppers to "support our local cottage industry." The conflated image and message deceptively conveyed the idea that the item was made in Jamaica. The item's origin was betrayed however by a small sticker located underneath that stated that it was "Made in Indonesia." This was the one protective measure that the Jamaican authorities imposed. However, of the fifteen or so carvings in that particular wholesale shop, only one had the sticker remaining, the rest had been carefully removed.

This overall practice is of great concern to the Jamaican government and in particular to the Jamaican Intellectual Property Office (JIPO). When a member of the organization learned of my work, I was asked to present my early findings to the agency and other invited representatives from interested agencies at JIPO headquarters in Kingston. All in attendance remarked at how unaware they were as to the degree to which the Sindhi's copied local products and how infuriating the practice was. The representative from the Jamaica Customs Department was concerned over how these goods were being permitted entry into the country. JAMPRO, the Jamaican Production Company was worried about the effect these copies would have on Jamaican branding. However, members of JIPO admitted that legally there was in fact very little that could be done. They argued that because the goods were not personally registered, nor were they officially trademarked products of Jamaica, the copyright laws did not apply. I asked local artisans at JAMIA about copyrighting their products. Each one despaired at the cost of doing so, as each design they made would have to be registered. Additionally by the time their application was processed, they presumed that the Sindhis would have already copied and begun selling their goods, thus making the whole thing pointless.

The Sindhi counterfeit practice was not limited to just locally made goods. There are a few key brands that sell successfully among tourists, one being Tuff Gong, which is the official label for the Bob Marley family of goods, another being Red Stripe, and most recently the Usain Bolt branded line. Another apparel brand, which does quite well, and particularly among American tourists is Harley-Davidson, which brought attention to the issue of counterfeiting in Jamaica's tourist goods sector. From the mid 1990s, Harley-Davidson was the largest counterfeited brand

in Jamaica, with proposed losses of US\$ 8—10 million per year.³⁵ As with the wooden statues discussed above, the counterfeit Harley-Davidson gear would establish authenticity by being tagged with an official looking brand name and logo. Ten wholesalers/retailers in Montego Bay and Negril were identified as the main offenders, and were legally pursued by the company.³⁶ In addition to litigative actions, Harley-Davidson opened up its own retail spaces in order to guarantee that their customers purchased legitimate goods, one of the stores being located right on the Hip Strip. Harley-Davidson's legal action helped to bring the commercial community of Montego Bay into compliance with the legitimate production and distribution of well-known brands. As a result, to benefit from the sale of those branded goods, Sindhi producers have begun to purchase the merchandise distribution rights for them as is the case with Tuff Gong and Usain Bolt lines in Western Jamaica.

I briefly mention the direct counterfeiting of known brands to address a more intriguing strategy now being practiced by Sindhi producers. Despite ceasing the copying of the direct logos and trademarks of popular brands, Sindhi producers, with an eye toward U.S. clothing trends, have found another means to appeal to the North American tourist aesthetic. In Ravi's shop I noticed a particular style of t-shirt that strongly resembled the thematic styles and motifs of hugely popular American brands Hollister and Abercrombie & Fitch. There has been some discussion on the direct counterfeiting of the Hollister brand name in Guatemala (Thomas 2013:153-154). But, by only employing the motifs of those brands, such as their deep V-necks and surfer aesthetic, the shirts in Montego Bay traded on what Nakassis has deemed the immaterial "surfeits" of the brand—the "excess of social meaning that emerges out of engagements with branded

goods..." (2013:112, see also Nakassis 2012). The surfeits may be the "gap between materiality and symbolic value that is always under negotiation," in the process of branding (Newell 2013:141). Perhaps the motifs provide the shirts with a type of branded *hau* as Mazzarella (2003) has suggested. Indeed, by their presentation and the thematic implication of the original Hollister aesthetic, these shirts were imbued with the relaxed, laid back island spirit that tourists came to expect from a Jamaican holiday. Ravi informed me that a local Sindhi wholesaler produced the shirts under the labels "Surf Classic" and "Sunkissed Jamaica." These shirts were some of Reggae City's best sellers, and were especially popular with American tourists.

The t-shirts could be found in most of the shops along the strip, but Nish's shop had a particularly broad selection of Sunkissed merchandise. Nish's shop was located next door to Ravi. With his now seasoned Jamaican accent, Nish told me how over the past few years he has been closely involved with a local producer who designs his own goods and uses Nish's shop as a product test site. Nish told me that the producer's name was Raj, and that he was based in Negril. Raj was fond of visiting Miami Beach and became influenced by the brands that conveyed the laid back atmosphere of the city, which held a certain consonance with that of Jamaica, or at least Montego Bay. He thus came up with an ersatz Hollister motif that replaced the brand name with the word "Jamaica" and inserting the Jamaican date of independence—1962—where on most Hollister shirts the company's date of establishment is located. The imagery on the shirts would maintain the Hollister themes of surfer, beach, and island iconography, some with Jamaica's national flower, the hibiscus.

Admittedly the shirts were extremely attractive and made all the more appealing by their soft cotton texture. Nish was quick to assert his contribution in the design process by exclaiming how he had insisted that the designer use the V-neck: "they were revolutionary, the V-neck was unique to the market, and it was me who told him to do it!" Nish also designs some of the items that he sells in his store, which standing at over 3000 square feet is a testament to his success. He explains that in last five years— not coincidentally around the time of the Harley-Davidson crackdown— "Sindhi design has grown a lot, and we have three really good suppliers, really creative man, who have been living here for twenty years, because we Indians had to learn the culture, and create designs what a white man would like, a black man would like, and they serve the whole industry... you have to get to know what people will like." By counterfeiting these goods, Sindhis "challenge the logic of copyright law [and] the injustice of income disparity..." (Luvass 2013:130) by seizing upon the circuits of accumulation thought to be exclusive to major corporations. Indeed, through copying and redesign they "enact a material intervention into the workings of the global neoliberal economy" as Luvass (2013:130) has asserted with Indonesian DIY fashion labels that trade on the infringement of popular brands. But in Jamaica, the local, black Jamaican market of goods is also undermined by the design efforts of Sindhis.

These top quality shirts, while sold at most of the Sindhi-owned shops, were not available at the few local Jamaican souvenir shops, and certainly not at the local craft markets. The Sindhi wholesaler that we met in chapter one, Dinesh also designed many of the products in his shop. Dinesh claimed to serve the craft markets exclusively, and almost as a point of virtue because of

his proclaimed sympathy for the craft vendors' plight, "... these poor guys, I give them the blessings, I work with them," he explained patronizingly, again intimating the inadequacy of Jamaicans involved in the souvenir trade. His "blessings" consisted of his purported exclusive provision to craft vendors of selected products that he designed and manufactured. "Indians will not like me because some of the things I design I will not sell [to] them. A quarter of my store, Indians will not have it," he asserted.

However good his intentions, vendor interaction with Dinesh was far from unproblematic. What follows is an abbreviated transcription that details the types of relationships Dinesh has with his vendor customers:

Vendor 1: "If there was a police officer here Dinesh you would go to jail for your prices!"

[they argue over the US\$ 6 cost for an item]

Dinesh: "You're still short by \$2"

Vendor 1: "Short, you blow-wow! This is a man I come shop from all the time and him a tell me say me a rob him \$2?"

Vendor 2: "Him always trying to gain..."

Vendor 1: "All him have is sweet mouth and him can't use that on me"

Dinesh: "You a argue over pickney [child's] money, nuh backside!"

Vendor 1: "I need a bill. Last time you let me out and never gave me a bill, and I want to know how I spend my money."

Dinesh: "But you never pay the full amount why should I give you a bill?"

Vendor 1: "I pay you the full money...wha' wrong with you?! Me did ever owe you anything?"

Dinesh: "Of course!"

Vendor 1: "Man, write me the bill and give me..."

[Now whispering to me]: "You see him nah put no carbon [copy] underneath it [the receipt]...everybody a run from the tax, that's why the country cant come up. Him no have no copy so him nah pay no tax... so when the tax man come

there is nothing to see...If you watch him, there's nothing on the copy, he will write and give you a blank, so when they come, he will say its not there."

[Vendor 2 approaches the counter and salutes Dinesh: "hey criminal!"]

Vendor 2: "You no hear you name call, criminal? Give me some keychain."

Dinesh: "\$3 for one, I charge you less you know. \$4 dollars for these you know..."

Vendor 2: "But the sign there says 3 for \$10, how you giving me a special price?"

Though couched in a fair bit of banter, the above dialogue reveals an adequate amount of distrust and indifference toward Dinesh on the part of the vendors. It is, however, typical of the kind of verbal relations that Caribbean locals have with immigrants in the commercial sphere (see Maurer 1997: 140).

Dinesh has been in Jamaica for over thirteen years and began working, like most Sindhis, in the employ of a previously arrived Sindhi boss. He began his wholesale business four years ago in a nondescript second-floor wholesale/retail space in downtown Montego Bay just across from the craft market. His shop's location would appear to confirm his claim of craft market exclusivity, but it became quickly clear that serving the neighboring two hundred stall market was merely a business strategy. While plentiful, his stock would not be considered high-end merchandise. He nonetheless did brisk business as the vendors from the market often came to him as a primary source of goods. Or in moments when tourists asked for a particular item they did not have in stock, they would run across to Dinesh to see if he did. This of course meant that the goods that Dinesh sold and more importantly, that he designed, dominated the craft market, the problematic implications of which have been demonstrated in the first chapter. Where Nish and Raj were designing goods directly for the tourist market, it appeared that the quality and commensurate

affordability of the goods that Dinesh designed and sold were meant for an alternative, secondary market. Again, while not unattractive, Dinesh's products had no flair, no impression of a larger consideration for the tastes and preferences of the end customer. They were the kind of disposable goods that were perfunctorily purchased. Dinesh's customers were the vendors, and how they fared with the goods beyond their purchase was their concern.

Dinesh's main selling point was that "no Indians will get these bags," or whatever item a craft vendor was contemplating. That his vendor customers were regularly reminded of this was critical, as his prices were not really all that good. On one occasion, a vendor charged, "I am sure I have seen those bags in Falmouth...not you alone sell it. Everything you tell me in here is your design, but I prove that to you that it is not!" Dinesh replied in an accent that sputtered in its attempt at Jamaican patois, "Go on and leave the ting, I don't want your money, you want everything for free anyway nuh backside!" The vendor was right. I had personally seen the same bag elsewhere. It was a plain black over shoulder carrying bag, which had the word "Jamaica" in Comic Sans typeface repeated across it at varying angles in multiple colors of red, gold, and green. In fact, I had seen a similar, if not the same, bag on an earlier trip to Barcelona, with the city's name displayed in similar fashion, though with different colors, and again in Miami with that city's name.

Perhaps Dinesh's contribution, taking him at his word that he in fact "designed" the bag, was the addition of the word "Jamaica." But implied in his declaration of design is an insistence of production, and bringing something into the commercial space that is needed. In fact, in every

instance of either counterfeit or design, what has been demonstrated is the evolution in which counterfeit becomes design, as exemplified by Luvaas' Indonesian DIY-ers (2013), and thus a contribution that is particular to Sindhi business. And so, as suggested by Nakassis, we observe how the brand surfeits produced by Sindhis "opens up new performative spaces, possibilities, social relations, and material forms that exist in tension with, and beyond, the brand even as they emerge through it" (2013:123). From that space emerges a performance of the Sindhi ethic and skill of business that allows Sindhis to create and seize new opportunities for profit that place the market more under their control.

However, despite their efforts to control that market, and their seemingly indefatigable sense of business savvy and capability, how successfully have the Sindhis managed to seize the market? Without question, their performance in the local souvenir market is markedly more profitable than that of their fellow Jamaican shop owners, and much better than that of the craft vendors. But is the structural form of Jamaica's economy sustaining for Sindhi business? Or are they, too, vulnerable to the effects of sufferation?

Sindhi Sufferation?

In the post-recession economic climate, it appeared that Sindhi merchants, especially sindworkis were sacrificing more and receiving less. In fact, the ever-increasing profits they were thought to have been earning were hardly a reality. The number of stay over tourists had remained mostly stable during and after the recession, and had quickly returned to growth as the recession abated. This was a statistic that Jamaican politicians—especially the Minister of Tourism—bandied

about as evidence of the industry's steady economic position.³⁷ But, according to Sindhi merchants, what has failed to be recognized, or admitted, by those politicians was that the spending among those stop overs had decreased.

As one long time merchant, Sam, confided, "If other people like you would come and sit out here for a day and see how many people come here, and see what sort of business we're doing, they'd probably ask how we pay the electrical bill. It's not a bed of roses, but what are we going to do? You can't make blood out of stone, you have to ride with the times and be patient and hope that things will turn." Sam continued to explain that many Sindhi shops were unable to ride with the times. He claimed that the period saw the increased closing of Sindhi shops throughout the area, and where they didn't close, they downsized.

This was experienced first-hand when Ravi seemingly abruptly decided to send Lakshan back home without warning toward the end of my time in the field. One afternoon, I was at Reggae City chatting with Krishna and a couple of the Jamaican workers. Ravi and Lakshan pulled up in Ravi's Toyota Matrix, and Lakshan entered the shop with tears in his eyes. Saying nothing to us, he grabbed a few items from behind the counter and shaking his head, he left only saying, "he's sending me home and I don't know why." The entire store was in shock, with the exception of Krishna, who looked much less perplexed than the rest of us.

A week passed before I could ask Ravi what happened. He explained that he "caught Lakshan smoking ganja..." and that he "wouldn't have any of that." As if to try and convince me, he asked

if I had noticed how odd and aggressive Lakshan had been acting lately. I had not, but I gave an expression that intimated that perhaps I had, so as to not unnecessarily contradict Ravi's assertion, of which he had clearly convinced himself. Over the next several weeks, I heard pieces of the story from the girls in the shop, and from neighboring shop owners, proving that under the right circumstances the Sindhis did comprise some form of community, if even just to simply gossip. The story was that Ravi could no longer afford to keep Lakshan on staff. Lakshan was a truly successful salesperson with a repeat clientele that included regular holidayers to missionary groups, who would only buy souvenirs from him during their annual missions. On the basis of this success he began to demand a higher salary. Apparently Krishna had proved himself a capable worker, and a therefore would be a more affordable replacement for Lakshan. The gossip was that Ravi made up the ganja story to both save face and to justify voiding Lakshan's contract. But all of the neighboring shopkeepers knew that times were rough, and that Ravi was overextended with two shops, and two Sindhi and four Jamaican employees. What was interesting about this situation was that, as explained at the beginning of this chapter, salaries were not paid out regularly, but remittances were sent to Lakshan's family on his behalf, and his salary would have to be paid in full at some point. A closer look at the actual financial expenses of a Sindhi shop reveals why Lakshan would have been let go.

In our discussions, Sindhis would often note how their payment of the rent, electricity, and taxes served as patriotic contributions to the Jamaican state. They asserted that certainly no one's rents or commercial electric bills were as high, and no Jamaicans paid taxes as consistently as they (although that they even paid taxes was challenged by local Jamaicans, as shown in the earlier

dialogue in Dinesh's shop). "We are holding up JPS (Jamaica Public Service Company—the energy company)! The JPS bill alone can kill your business!" Ravi once vehemently proclaimed. Immigrant merchants in the British Virgin Islands engaged in the same sort of discourse in suggesting that their payment of "customs...lights, water,[and] tax" was somehow necessary for the local economy (Maurer 1997:40-41). The rate JPS, the sole electricity supplier in the country, charged commercial properties was exorbitant. At Reggae City, which was an average size store, the bill was reported to be over US\$ 1500 per month. The cost of electricity was universally lamented in Jamaica and locals critical of Sindhi businesses cynically asserted that they could easily afford it. Sindhis in response asserted that locals could not know the difficulties of actually paying one's electric bill, since they assumed that their critics either didn't pay, or stole electricity, and because of these tactics they couldn't fathom the amounts that Sindhi retailers paid.

The recessionary environment coupled with the high costs of electricity made the chances of success in opening a new shop extremely low. This was illustrated by the situation of new shop owner Vijay, who had renewed his contract again at the start of the recession, and thought that three years later it might be safe to start his own souvenir shop. While things were definitely on an upswing by 2011, Vijay echoed Sam's previous statement: "Those [tourists] who come have no buying power. They come and look and look, but they don't buy. And when they do it's always key rings or some small thing. It would have been better to have taken my pay and gone back to India. The [Jamaican] government collects money off of each tourist that comes in [landing fee and departure tax included in ticket], so they're ok." Vijay, Sam, Ravi, and even Lakshan were in

their own way feeling the effects of the recession. Embedded in their comments, and even in those made earlier by Dinesh, was a critique of Jamaican governance, which suggested that things could not get better. So, could it be suggested that the business environment created by the government can be considered a condition of Sindhi sufferation?

I mentioned earlier how Ravi complained about the high cost of doing business, particularly the cost of electricity commanded by JPS. Before that I described how Dinesh derided the Jamaican government for damaging the chances for its citizens by allowing all-inclusives into the country. Also we just heard Vijay comment on how the government benefits from tourist arrivals, even if they do not shop with local or Sindhi merchants. These perils, as the Sindhis view them have made significant demands on their business, and have drawn out of the merchants the skill and ethic necessary to face these challenges. Despite the high cost of electricity, Ravi, and others remain in business by cutting staff and having those that remain work longer hours. And the all-inclusive's exclusiveness has been largely worked around by Sindhi shops incentivizing hotel and other bus services to bring tourists to their shops.

The opening of the Royal Caribbean port in Falmouth, the capital of the neighboring parish of Trelawney intensified the structural problems faced by Sindhi shop owners: This was planned to be of benefit to all tourist-related businesses on the north coast, but it had the opposite effect. "When they opened that port it was like a bomb went off," said Ravi. He continued, "It completely blew away all the business in Ochi [Ocho Rios]," "have you been to Ochi? It was second only to Montego Bay on the north coast...now it's like a ghost town." According to Ravi

only 20% of the Sindhi shops in Ocho Rios remain. Entire Sindhi owned complexes, such as the ornately designed Taj Mahal Shopping Centre stand nearly empty. The pitch of Ravi's voice became higher, "Tell me why the hell they'd [the government] do that? Build one town to destroy a perfectly working 'nother town?" "It makes no sense! And now things are slowing here in MoBay," he expressed obviously distressed.

The idea behind the Falmouth cruise port was that the city, with its Georgian architecture, would be a picturesque setting that would attract tourists to Jamaica. In addition to renovations to the immediate area, shops were built right on the terminal, so that cruisers could conveniently buy their souvenirs just before re-boarding the ship. This was part of the "landed" business model of cruise ship companies that endeavored to retain as much revenue as possible. It was a format that brought the all-inclusive experience of the ship on land in "tourism villages" where cruisers could eat and shop, and sometimes sunbathe and swim without ever really venturing inland (Becker 2013:154). According to Mr. Daswani, these shops required a start up cost of nearly US\$ 200,000, making them cost-prohibitive to all but the most successful and liquid of would be retailers. Additionally in order to apply for a shop license one had to actually go to Royal Caribbean's Miami headquarters. Mr. Daswani, who could afford to open a shop at the pier tells of the cost:

Stores at the pier cost 75 dollars a square foot for rental and US\$ 80,000 upfront deposit. When Falmouth says that is what you have to pay, who's going to do that, Jamaicans? Many Sindhis do that because Ocho Rios is devastated. And me born and grow here, was never supported by my government, they fed me to the wolves, I had to listen to the tune of Royal Caribbean.

The increased activity of Royal Caribbean at the Falmouth port saw a concomitant increase in terminal shopping and a commensurate decline of both activity and shopping in Montego Bay. The Sindhi business model of extended work hours and razor-thin margins is predicated on a long-term engagement with the market. However, the market for Sindhis in Montego Bay has become one of attrition. And so merchants like Ravi and Vijay are stuck. Having not made enough money early enough to pull out of this market and find more fruitful terrain, they (like so many others) had to try their best to merely persist. Those who could not, failed in their businesses and in their ethical project of being Sindhi businessmen. Their continuing efforts to persist in this increasingly difficult market place were driven by their attempts to realize these ethics. The shop owners and sindworkis drew on their sense of their own essential business subjectivity to face the challenge, or as articulated by Zaloom, that "capitalist ethic that centers on the mastery of the self under conditions of hazard and possibility" (2006:94). They looked to their inherent skill to navigate the circumstances rather than beginning a political or social critique of their situation in which they could have potentially joined in with other Jamaicans engaged in the tourist trade.

In the previous chapters I have argued that the market is constructed through the broader assertion of values that aim to militate against the effects of sufferation. Sindhis are obviously not a group within the tourism sector that experiences as great a degree of sufferation as other Jamaicans such as craft vendors and artisans. After all, the ability to afford a US\$ 1,500 monthly rent or an US\$ 80,000 deposit is impossible for these people. Yet by detailing Sindhi efforts in,

and sacrifices made for, the market I have illustrated that the structures of the tourism market in Jamaica are highly problematic even for those groups that are seen by other Jamaicans to be successful in it. In addition I have revealed how these difficulties are framed through specific ethics that rarely makes visible the structural constraints of this marketplace.

These ethics, like those described by Zaloom and Ho for financial traders, emphasize that if a person has the will and the requisite innate talent they will inevitably succeed in the market. It therefore supports continuing activity in a volatile, precarious and insecure situation. Yet it is different from that described in these ethnographies because it is founded, like in vendors discourses of race, in a sense of an essential ethnic quality of "the Sindhi business brain." This belief in a quality of a community that inheres in individuals allows sindworkis and shop owners to endure in an increasingly precarious situation. This sense remains different from that of JAMIA and vendors, however, because the market itself is understood as the medium for the expression of a specific kind of moral self rather than an impediment in its realization. When we step back from these various ethical projects, however, it is clear that there are objective, structural reasons that relate to government policy, class privilege and the positioning of Jamaica within the Caribbean and global economy that contribute to the sense of suffering endurance that they all contain. As an anthropologist concerned with these ethics and the unequal situation that generates them, I am able to scale up these specific senses of sufferation into an analytic of sufferation. So while female vendors and JAMIA would not recognize the Sindhis as fellow sufferers, my analytic reveals that they are.

In the next chapter we will examine the market configuration of, and response to, sufferation from yet another vantage point provided by the experiences of the Rastafari Indigenous Village.

The Rastafari Indigenous Village

Take Rasta man culture for instance
 Dem think is political joke
 But we people know better than that
 I and I know the truth of it all
 And now I say we must create a scene
 We must recapture our culture by any means
 Babylon makes the rules...
 Where my people suffer

-Steel Pulse, "Babylon Makes the Rules"; 1979

The previous chapters have presented the ethics and practices by which vendors, artisans, and Sindhi merchants have respectively tried to negotiate their place in the tourist economy of Montego Bay and find success in spite of sufferation. All these ethics of sufferation identify the market place people endure in as an environment in which they do not receive the correct or sufficient support. For the vendors at Bay Fort it was the government's failure to protect them from Sindhis that generates sufferation. JAMIA sought greater support from the government for their artisanal labour and industry of crafts. Even Sindhis were distraught over the government's failure to better provide equitable opportunity with the opening of Royal Caribbean's port in Falmouth. All of these ethical attributions are focused on the business of selling and production

of the material products of souvenirs and tourist goods. Through examining these attributions I have scaled up Jamaican and Sindhi experiences of suffering into an analytic of suffering. In this chapter I turn this analytic onto another arena in which the government has failed to support its citizens, in the enabling of their cultural property rights.

In this chapter I analyze the radically alternative strategy of the Rastafari Indigenous Village (RIV hereafter, or the Village). This group seeks to stake claim to the heart of that which they believe brings tourists to Jamaica—the country's cultural reputation—that they believe is largely predicated on Rastafari culture. RIV claims that the state and the wider exploitative, "Babylonian" economic system profits from their culture, and in doing so they assert a framework of sufferation. Through the creation of the tour, RIV has devised a means by which they can become integrated into the circuit of tourist revenue. This, they believe, can create opportunity for the village members, as well as mitigate their cultural exploitation. As we will see, RIV's market participation is guided by an ethic of rights, which is framed through a discourse of intellectual and cultural property. The basis for this claim of rights through property is an argument of Rastafari indigeneity. However, their strategy is not without its complications. This chapter examines these claims of rights and reconsiders the standard anthropological accounts of the relations between the market, property, and indigeneity.

The Rastafari Indigenous Village

IION Station (IION), which is an acronym for the "Indigenous Initiating-circle of Nature" is a group of Rastafari who came together to form the Rastafari Indigenous Village. IION are self-

described as "united by their shared concerns over the slow responses within the Rastafari movement to rapid socioeconomic changes taking place within Jamaican society." Through regular interaction throughout Montego Bay over the past several years, whether at community events or musical performances, the group became what its members describe as a "social family network." They articulated their concerns through expressions of talent as artisans, poets, musicians, craftspersons, and designers, but they mostly functioned as a fusion Reggae-Nyahbinghi music group. As a network they shared aspirations to raise positive awareness, increase education in their communities, and to create opportunities for their small businesses, which were tied to various artistic practices based on collective and cooperative development.

In 2007 members of the group were approached with a request from a party of ninety black American women tourists who wanted an immersion into Rastafari culture focusing on the wellness aspects of Rastafarian food, herbal remedies, and spirituality. Given the size of this group of tourists, IION Station approached the Tourism Product Development Company (TPDCo.) for assistance in organizing the event. You may recall from chapters one and two that TPDCo. is the government agency charged with overseeing the standards of tourism "products," namely attractions like craft markets and tours. Another function of the agency is advising the community on the development of new tourism projects as related to regulations, training, and overall compliance.

With the help of TPDCo., the IION Station brethren created a successful event. Following the event two members of IION Station recognized that creating a similar more permanent

experience was an opportunity to take advantage of a very clear demand in the market. Doing so would help them achieve their social agenda, and help to lift the brethren themselves out of the poverty that some of them experienced. Additionally, this would be a chance to present Rastafari culture to visitors and to share its message on their own terms. This would correct what members described as thin presentations heavily oriented toward Bob Marley and his music.

Admitting that tourism could be used as a mechanism of development, sustainability, and outreach was difficult for the group. This was mainly because Rastafari by tradition and virtue are anti-capitalist (Chevannes 1995). Also, the tourist industry is often viewed extremely negatively, with many Rastafari, and even the brethren of IION remarking that "tourism is 'whore-ism'." Moving toward this endeavor caused a rift in the group leading to the departure of several members. The remaining IION Station members were joined by a TPDCo. official, Arlene, who, with her academic training and interest in heritage tourism became a partner in the newly founded venture. Together they formed a company under a limited liability registration as "the Rastafari Indigenous Village" and a non-profit, the Royal Africa Hall Benevolent Society, so as to qualify for public funding.

At the start of my fieldwork the village was led by First Man, Kanaka, and Arlene. However, because the Village does not officially subscribe to hierarchical organization, the term "guided" was preferred. First Man and Kanaka were the two members who initially reached out to TPDCo for assistance with the original group of American tourists, and Arlene was the TPDCo official who assisted them. Not long after I began working with the group Kanaka passed away

unexpectedly. His passing was considered a critical loss to the direction of the Village. Aside from being a founding member, his stringent adherence to Rastafari ideology and his strong aversion to all things Babylonian functioned as an influential check against the over involvement of RIV with the government or commercial endeavors. He balanced the more directly commercial ambitions of Arlene. This allowed First Man to take the middle ground between Kanaka and Arlene thereby mitigating some of the possible contradictions in the project of the Village.

The remaining members of the village included performer, and original IION Station member Izinigha, who also oversaw the Village craft mall; Maureen, who ran the onsite "ital" kitchen; the Village's Nyahbinghi drummers: Jah Teba, Golden Ankh, Fire Shine, and Jah B; and local dub poet Ras Rod. Ras Rod would over the duration of my fieldwork take on a more central role in the direction of the village, in large part serving as Kanaka's replacement. There was a larger membership to the Village, but they seldom took part in the day-to-day tours, but rather participated in major events. The Village's members came from impoverished to modest backgrounds, and one of them lived on the premises for lack of residence elsewhere.

Outside of Arlene, First Man, and Ras Rod, the remaining members were little concerned with the direction of the village. For the most part they trusted the decisions of Arlene, First Man, and Ras Rod. They were primarily focused on the unique opportunity to both earn an income and pursue their Rastafari ethic. This income, while somewhat more secure than other sources open to them, was still not sufficient enough for them to turn down outside opportunities for work.

This fact would somewhat temper their sense of investment in the Village project. Therefore members sometimes struggled in interviews to articulate their ambitions for the village and what long term value it held for them. The common account of their participation in the village was that it provided a sense of autonomy where they "had no boss." This notion was explained by First Man as the Village's "horizontal" organizational structure. This structure is founded on the value Rastafarians place on acephalous organizational forms, and also from the long enduring work ethic of self-enterprise and suspicion of authority (Edmonds 2002). This could easily be confused as RIV functioning according to the "corporate norms of self-initiative, self-responsibility, and self-engineering" of the neoliberal subject (Ong 2006:222). As I have shown with both Bay Fort vendors, and JAMIA, there are particular ethics of work and organization in the Caribbean that are consonant with the general thrust of neoliberal practices of individualism, but in fact precede the concept's import into the region. Additionally, Rastafari draw organizational inspiration from the social, economic, and development platforms of the culture's figureheads. Alvaré (2014) has shown this to be the case in Trinidad, with a group of Rastafarians who have modeled their Faith Based Organization on Haile Selassie's "gospel of development."

The Village is located on a roughly three acre sized parcel of a much larger area of land owned by a politically connected family, the Nelsons. Leasing to the Village was a strategic move by the Nelsons as the tour provided patronage to the Nelsons' restaurant and bar located on another property site, which would complement the tour by catering to the tastes of tourists in an arena

the Village would not. In fact to access the Village tourists have to pass through the Nelsons' bar on entry and exit.

The village itself is designed to be an authentic living interactive museum, where a wide range of visitors are introduced to the many facets of Rastafari and Jamaica. Situated in a garden of mostly natural flora and fauna, it has a medicinal herbal garden; a place to develop and exhibit art and craft; and serves as a gathering place to share Nyahbinghi rhythms and chants. It is a "working village" in that, while none but one of the "villagers" lives on premises, they work together as a community, to live the philosophy, movement, and lifestyle of Rastafari. Visitors to the village numbered more than a thousand in 2011 and included: Jamaican school children; university students; and local residents; but mostly overseas tourists. These tourists include a mix of middle-income European visitors, and some Americans, who were almost always white. The makeup of the clientele however was greatly determined by the tour companies that RIV partnered with. One in particular, Caribic Tours, had a strong base with tourists from Germany and the Netherlands. Toward the end of my fieldwork, as the Village benefitted from broader publicity through the Jamaica Tourist Board, the visitors became much more diverse. The following section provides a depiction of the tour.

The Village Tour

After a tour group passes through the Nelsons' restaurant and bar they are guided through a garden and across a lawn by a barefoot docent clad in a burlap outfit, or what is known in Jamaica as "crocus bag." When the tour approaches the Montego River, which at this point

stands no deeper than a foot, the group is told how river water is important to Jamaica, and that the country's name was given by the original Taino inhabitants, Xamayca, means "the land of wood of water." Before crossing, and as the guests are removing shoes and rolling up their pant legs in preparation, the guide provides an explanation of the spiritual importance and symbolism of rivers saying that "like life you never go through the same river twice." They then welcome the group to take a reflective moment to "give thanks" and use the opportunity to "take one step at a time and to share the world space communally." The tourists generally are very taken by this moment and become visibly emotionally affected. In the process of crossing, some guides opt to explain that in Yoruba heritage the river is represented by the river goddess, or orisha, named Oshun, the "river mumma." She controls the river, it is explained, and guests are invited to give thanks by throwing five one dollar coins into the river, an amount and denomination I was told is completely arbitrary.

Having crossed to the other bank, guests decide to either slip on their shoes or take in the full barefoot experience (following the example of the guide). A wall of tall bamboo that panels the background is the next point of discussion. The group is told that bamboo is technically a grass, and one of the world's fastest growing, and that it helps with cleaning the air. The guide continues to explain how Jamaican bamboo differs from its Asian variant. If not amused by the botanical minutiae of the plant, the group's interest is gained when they are told in a mythological fashion how bamboo must only be cut on the darkest of nights, in the absence of moonlight.

By now the Nyahbinghi drums being played in the village can be heard in the distance. As the group moves along the path toward the sound the guide points out the Poinciana tree, whose pods provide the beads used in maraca-like shakers played in conjunction with the Nyahbinghi drum orchestra. Guests are often encouraged to pick up fallen pods and shake them as they walk along. Next along the tour, the group comes upon an area of several Castor plants. Stopping to look closer at the castor nuts, the external and internal benefits of their oil are described. At this point it is advertised that castor oil made by a local woman is available for purchase in the village.

Talk of the ingestible plant segues into a discussion of the nut dense vegan diet subscribed to by many Rastafari, which opens up into a presentation of the many banana trees coming up on the approach. Seen as a treat to the many North American and European visitors, who, while often keen consumers of banana, have seldom, if ever, encountered the fruit trees. The visitors are given a comprehensive lesson on bananas, their uses both unripened (green) and ripened, how they are picked, and as an allegory demonstrating the relatedness between all in nature, are told that bananas, like babies, take nine months to grow. Moving past the bananas, the group comes upon an old, single, semi functional sugar cane mill. The guide simulates how the cane is pushed through one side as the top mechanism is turned and juice comes out the other. Further detail of the remaining process from cane to sugar is often provided, though this depends upon the length and size of the tour.

Tall coconut trees are just beyond the mill, and as the group moves nearer to them different types of coconut trees are given a brief history as their produce of water, oil, and husks, and their uses, are described. The group is warned not to stand underneath the tree, which is deemed to be "generous." This is often responded to with laughter and cautionary glances upward. As the group follows the trail past Heliconias and other attractive flora like Ginger and Lily, they are shown the local elongated Otaheite apples, which are to be sampled later along the tour. Afterwards they are shown the local cacao tree whose podded beans are used to make Jamaican chocolate tea. Often this stop is omitted because local children have stripped the trees bare. As the walk nears its end, the group is told to look down at the "Shame Me Macka" herb, which responds to touch by rapidly contracting and immediately springing back to full form. This little plant is often the star of the walk. By this point the group has arrived at the village gate and are welcomed by the full pulse of Nyahbinghi drumming.

Entering the grounds, visitors rest on shaded bamboo benches positioned perpendicularly to each other, giving the visitors full view of the village's main sites of attraction. Receiving freshly cut coconut water to drink the visitors begin the second segment of their tour with a lecture. At this point their now familiar docent retires and another "brethren" takes over. Recounting the histories of Rastafari, slavery, and Jamaica in a blended narrative that conveys an ontology of Rastafarian culture, the guide directs the groups' attention to the bonfire lit in the center of the village. He explains the symbolic importance of fire as an agent of spiritual purification. The group is then brought just beyond the bonfire to "the seal," a small ritualistic basin of water surrounded by healing herbs, which sits in the center of a rock outline of the shape of Jamaica. At

the seal the guide talks about the importance of entering into a sacred space and being balanced within it and within one's self. The herbs present are acknowledged as having their own balanced and balancing energies. Guests are told that those who enter the space of the village should likewise be spiritually aligned and are invited become so by circling the seal three times.

Continuing the tour, the group is guided toward the "ital" kitchen, "ital," a variant of the word "vital," is indicative of a vegan, unprocessed diet that shares a religious meaning similar to "Kosher" and "Halal." Passing a stage area used on occasion for the reading of poetry and other presentations, the guests arrive at the kitchen. A presentation is given by sister Maureen on what comprises the Rastafari diet and its salubrious effect. Displaying a variety of herbs, nuts and fruit, Maureen details their nutritional and medicinal components, often challenging more daring visitors to "try" the diminutive "bird pepper" (Pequin), which is touted as good for digestion.

Leaving the kitchen the group moves on to the labyrinth. Made of short, three-foot-high bamboo posts, the labyrinth was created for meditation as guests make their way through the maze and complete their journey at its center. Here there is a sitting stone on which they can complete their meditation. This is described to tourists as a "healing garden," a "healing walk," or a "meditation walk." Visitors are told that it is a "very balancing thing to do," and that "as you walk through to the center, you walk through to the center of yourself." Just behind the labyrinth, a herbal spa overlooking the river is under construction where massages and "bush baths" will be provided, and together with the labyrinth, the area will become a spa garden.

After a few guests venture walking through the labyrinth in an attempt to gain a meditative state, the group passes a little hut, with a hammock hung within, known as the "chill out hut." There, tourists take pictures of themselves in front of the hut. This building stands as a representation of a purported village residence, representative because the only person who lives on site does so in a large camping tent hidden at the back of the property. Across from the hut one of the "villagers" is usually "on post" beating herbs in a large mortar, and tending to a yam being roasted upon a wheel rim stove. Opposite the hut is the herb garden with over ninety rock beds of healing herbs, not all natural to Jamaica, but all part of the local medicinal repertoire. Called the village's herbal "farm-acy," the guide typically goes over about six or so herbs like "Search Mi Heart," "Leaf of Life," mint, dandelion, "Dog Tongue," "Guinea Hen," and Lemongrass. The guide often makes clear for wondering minds that there is no marijuana grown within the garden and then invites the group to go around and have a closer look.

The tour then culminates at a visit to "the big hut." It appears just as its name implies, and in the hut the guests are led to bamboo chairs and benches that face a gathering of drums. The hut is meant as a didactic instrument. Its many posts are decorated with pictures of key members of the Rastafari pantheon—Haile Selassie, Marcus Garvey, and Empress Menen of Ethiopia (Haile Selassie's wife), as well as their speeches. It is also filled with other African and African diasporic iconography such as the Kemetic (Egyptian) ankh and Akan adinkra symbols. In the big hut all members of the village are present and the program continues with a lecture about the principles, beliefs, and practices of Rastafari. During this the kitchen staff serve the guests a light snack of fruits, or sometimes a more substantial, cooked meal, depending on the tour, plated in

bamboo, coconut, or calabash dishes. After the lecture and meal, one or more brethren recite a poem. This is followed by chanting, all to a soaring background of Nyahbinghi rhythms. This continues for nearly thirty minutes, and then guests are invited to try their hand at the drums. It is only during this moment of interaction that guests are permitted to take photos of the brethren. Those who try beforehand are told that to do so would objectify the brethren, and are reminded that they are partaking in an experience of cultural exchange, and not one way spectatorship. At the end of the hut presentation guests are told that personalized engraved shakers are available for purchase. After saying their goodbyes to the musicians the group is led to the onsite "craft mall," where a variety of Rastafari and Jamaica-themed souvenirs—some locally made and others purchased from Sindhi wholesalers— are on sale. Across from the craft mall RIV has constructed a museum as well as three two story cottages with toilet facilities to accommodate future guests who wish to remain in what many tourists regard as paradise.

With the village tour, RIV is tapping into a worldwide trend in which lifestyle ideologies are oriented toward slower and more traditional forms of living (Jaffe 2010:31). One way in which they have aligned themselves in this manner is their affiliation with the Slow Food movement, sending representatives to the organization's 2008 Terra Madre conference in Italy. Also the labyrinth depicted above was explained to be part of an international network of labyrinths affiliated with the Labyrinth Society. This is an international group that promotes the spiritual and psychological benefits of maze walking. These activities are consonant with well established health conscious movements, products and lifestyles that are touted as the antidote to the fast-paced lives led in the developed world. Dutch anthropologist Bart Barendregt has termed such

movements as "eco-chic," "a combination of lifestyle politics, environmentalism, spirituality, concern with health and beauty, and a return to simple living" (Jaffe 2010:31).

Rivke Jaffe, building on Barendregt's term has coined the similarly purposed "ital chic" in identifying "consumption that combines environmental, ethical, and health concerns with a luxurious, chic sensibility...articulated principally through the indigenous practices, philosophy, and aesthetics associated with Rastafari" (2010:32). Ital chic is a "form of consumption that revalorizes local, pre-global tastes and traditions in a very modern, global way" (Jaffe 2010:40). In identifying ital chic Jaffe borrows Edmonds (2002) definition of "ital" as "a commitment to using things in their natural or organic states..." (2010:32). The ital principle as discussed in this section is central to the Rastafari lifestyle and that which comprises members' "livity," or spiritual life. It is the commodification of the Rastafarian "ital livity" that Jaffe has identified as the driving force behind ital chic. The process involves the "reframing of Rastafari elements as fashionable [that] happens in part through the global recognition and validation of Rastafari and the international trends toward slow, natural, and ethical living" (Jaffe 2010:33).

The Market of Ital Chic

The presentations of ital chic appropriate the "auratic, affective, social worth..." of Rastafarian culture, symbols, and aesthetic forms for commercial profit with little to no benefit returned to Rastafarians or any particular community among them (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009: 27). Rastafarian culture, therefore, suffers from its own popularity. This is noted in the number of products that carry direct or suggestive markings or references to the culture. Jaffe (2010) gives

numerous examples of commercial products and services that employ the affect of ital chic, such as health spas and restaurants, natural food and beauty products, and even the (modified) wearing of dreadlocks. I would suggest though that ital chic can be used beyond the limited sense of becoming natural to encompass a wider range of sentiments, such as rebelliousness or creativity. This opens up an examination of the articles of Rastafari culture to be used in much broader commercial contexts.

The extended use of ital chic may simply be the presence of the Rastafarian red, gold and green tricolors in a clothing line, such as its popular display in Adidas' own copyrighted three stripe motif. Or it could be the employment of Rastafarian terms in the names and promotion of products, such as in London-based Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee start-up, Iriieville's brand of "Irie Coffee." The use of the term "irie," which is a superlative form of being "all right," in this case serves to demonstrate both the impact of ital chic as a presentation of relaxation as well a sense of coolness. Critically, it shows that ital chic can also include the use of Rasta language. One of the most recent and controversial examples of this use of language was Volkswagen USA's 2013 Super Bowl ad "Get Happy," which featured a white American man in a nondescript office of mostly disgruntled and pessimistic employees. In the ad this lead actor, speaking in Jamaican patois encouraged everyone to be more optimistic by eventually giving them a ride in his VW Beetle. This commercial has been primarily criticized in the Jamaican media as a parody of Jamaican culture broadly construed. However, the terms used throughout the commercial were predominantly Rastafarian. For example the cast regularly respond with the popular affirmative Rastafarian phrase, "Yes, I"— the "I" pronoun being used in Rastafari speak, known as "Iyaric,"

to represent the God principle in man, commonly referenced as "I and I." Aside from the terms, the general positivity represented is strongly, if not exclusively, a reference to the stereotypical laid back attitudes of Rastafarians, which is often ascribed to all Jamaicans.

Another example made popular by the British television program, *Dragon's Den*, where entrepreneurs pitch their ideas to investors, is the "Reggae, Reggae Sauce" brand. The product was created by Jamaican expatriate Levi Roots—real name Keith Valentine Graham—who is himself a proclaimed Rastafarian, and arguably the main object of the sauce's marketing. The sauce's bottle is emblazoned with red, gold, and green in the background of the silhouette of a dancing Rastafarian with dreadlocks swaying behind him. This image trades on the aesthetic and "spirit" of Rastafarian reggae culture by its imagery and accompanying tag line "Put some music in your food." This is the same sentiment at the heart of *ital* chic and that which is insinuated in the marketing of the aforementioned brands: the promotion of an alternative way of life, which is perhaps simpler, but definitely more peaceful and happy as long as you drive a Beetle, eat a particular sauce, or drink a certain brand of coffee. However, one only has to look to the Sindhi souvenir shops and their countless red, gold, and green and dreadlocked products to encounter the everyday exploitation of Rastafarian culture.

Rights as Market Ethics

These products pull apart all of the ethical principles that lie within the language and material presentations of Rastafari culture. In doing so they profit from the promotion of Rastafari values, through the "(dis)articulation of global brand logics" of these values and their "local

aesthetics" (Nakassis 2012:701). Through the projects of the village, RIV seeks to mitigate Rastafarians' loss of both revenue from products and, perhaps more importantly, control over the cultural image by themselves trading on the phenomenon of "ital chic." The market for RIV is thus understood through an ethic of rights, and the particular forms of rights in their view are those of intellectual and cultural property. Rasta agitation over cultural rights is inspired by more than the infringement of property and seeks to address the long endured exploitation of the rights of black people. Deborah Thomas' own discussion of the Rastafari Indigenous Village pairs that initiative with the history of state violence against Rastafari in Jamaica (2011; chapter 5). IP claims are thus an attempt to seek recompense for that historical abuse as well as contemporary abuses created by the unauthorized use of Rastafari cultural images and objects.

The issue at the core of the ethics of the members of the RIV is, as Michael Brown notes, "less about intellectual property than about resistance to the uncontrolled proliferation of signs" (2003:86). However, promoting and profiting from ital chic uses that which infringes on Rastafari rights in defense of those rights. For the Village the configuration and use of intellectual property rights serves as an equalizing force in the commercial re-appropriation of Rastafarian culture. For example First Man told me, "From an intellectual property stand point we don't have any real ownership on nothing," continuing he added "without having ownership, 'free trade' is what is taking place, and other people can really come and take away our ideas and culture because we don't have the instruments to protect ourself."

Without full IP provisions, First Man, like other RIV members, suggested that various cultural industries in Jamaica, like Rastafari, are vulnerable to exploitation by outside groups. He was critical of the government's complicity in the matter, "A man can come and buy people's things who haven't protected them, set up a factory or choose a factory on the outside, and there is no interference from government, and then you find you have no legs to stand on more than to just quarrel." "Quarreling" refers to an argument of market morality, as evidenced in the first chapter regarding vendors' claims of injustice in the market system. Without sufficient institutional safeguards or processes that provide commercial security for craftspeople or others in the creative industry, the only recourse is to "quarrel." "All you can do is to have something in place that shows that this is wrong," First Man concedes. He explains his trouble with the current system, or lack thereof, in the country:

Jamaica is just a park for business. Everyone else has it as somewhere where they are doing business and their repatriation (remittance) process is in place for their dollars to go back. We as the African (Jamaican) that lives here...we live here, we don't do business here, we are the workers and the consumers and once that is still in our head we are not going to know what to tell government say and we are not going to try and identify our own channels, and we are going to continue to battle in trying to get it from them people, we need to try a create our own markets.

For First Man one channel is the village, and its broader endeavor of intellectual property claims. These claims, he contends, "ensure a relationship and to safeguard [against] someone simply coming in [and infringing on locals' rights]..." First Man asserts that creating an attractive product is the most likely way of gaining protection by forcing state recognition. "There are so

many products that the Rasta man can do right now, like the village. No one can really right now do a product like the village and have it as authentic as it can be."

Government interest in the commercial project of the village unfortunately has not translated into support for the issues around Rastafari intellectual property. The Jamaican Intellectual Property Office (JIPO) and the Jamaican Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO) are the two agencies respectively charged with protecting Jamaica's intellectual and cultural property and with finding ways in which the country can be promoted for national commercial benefit. JIPO seeks to curtail the increasing foreign profiting from nationally inspired products by the creation and issue of protective seals and markings, as well as by bringing suit against any breach of copyright. The limits of these agencies' power and reach, however, has meant that little can be done in the way of addressing concerns over IP infringement.

Charles Robertson, a top administrator for JAMPRO conceded in an interview with me that the government has been "a poor steward of Jamaica's cultural property." He explained that JAMPRO had witnessed businesses in countries like China and India capitalize on Jamaica's brand through manufacturing, and likewise other foreign groups profit from Jamaican branded sauces, coffees, music and culture. He states, "A number of foreign [companies in] countries seem to take the brand and develop a product surrounding it and sell it back to us." He cites the efforts of his organization and JIPO where they have begun the task of registering items, images, etc., but admits that the challenge is in their regulation, "We don't have the resources to police, for example, if someone in the US infringes on our copyright. We can't sue them from Jamaica it

has to be done there, so the brand has to be registered there and then you litigate in the States." Mr. Robertson's admission gives pause, and draws to mind Brown's (2003) titular question, "Who owns Native Culture?" a question complicated by the limited resources available to claimants in the Caribbean.

Trading on cultural branding serves as a viable means to diversify the economy for states who "see little other recourse given the demise of a model of development based on direct aid and trade preferences from former colonial powers" (Maurer 2004:310). Jamaica therefore seeks "The creation of distinctive 'island identities' through image industries like tourism..." (ibid.). Kedron Thomas has noted how increasingly the "self commodification of ethnicity is becoming more frequently proposed development strategy" in developing countries (2013:218). Despite the argument that the most popular and profitable aspects of Jamaican culture and iconography have been produced by the island's Rastafarian communities, unfortunately the Jamaican government is unable to defend against infringements on what it considers broader Jamaican intellectual property, much less that of Rastafari.

First Man, therefore, told me that Rastafari IP rights "are in a redress mode, reconciliation mode." He affirmed that the contesting of ownership over explicit Rastafarian-influenced products is underway by the Ethio-Africa Diaspora Union Millennium Council, or more concisely known as the "Rastafari Millennium Council," (the Council, hereafter). Founded in 2007, the Council is an organization composed of multiple Rastafarian groups, of which RIV is one, which works on behalf of the broader Rastafari community with the aim of representing

their causes and protecting their rights. Two of the Council's four point mission objectives exclusively address intellectual property and the "theft and abuse of the symbols, emblems, music, cultural marks, tangible and intangible heritage of the Rastafari community worldwide."

State inability to protect Jamaican intellectual property and that specific to Rastafari communities, means that RIV and the Council's challenge is not reducible to a singular discourse or simple action. With little to no help available within Jamaica, the Council has turned to the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and works primarily within its infrastructures in their fight to address their claim of IP infringement. WIPO has for some time demonstrated support for Jamaica's Maroon communities and members of the Rastafari Council have recently also been able to also attract their attention. Council members have recently begun participating in WIPO activities during the organization's visits to the country. Once such activity that took place during my fieldwork saw delegates from the Charles Town Maroon community of Portland, Jamaica and RIV participate in a multi-day seminar on the documenting of indigenous cultural practices.

Frustrated Sovereignty

The relationship with WIPO, however, is predicated upon the assertion of indigeneity. Unlike that of first nation groups, Rastafari's indigeneity is made problematic by its late inception and its individual electability. Though considered indigenous to Jamaica in the non-legal sense, the Rastafari community does not, in fact, qualify as an "indigenous community" under prevailing international norms, which assert that indigenous groups are deemed so by "[H]aving a historical

continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them."

For members of the village, "indigenous does not [necessarily] mean endemic," and the group charts a nuanced path to their autochthonous identity. The group maintains that people who were not indigenous to a land can become so by law, referring in particular to the Maroon community of Jamaica as an example of successful indigenous qualification. In their defense Rastafari indigeneity has been defined and defended on the bases of various instruments that provide indigenous status (Goffe 2009). These include: individual self-identification as a member of an indigenous community; the entitlement of displaced persons to the continuity of pre-displacement tradition; and the rights as a traditional community; and minority group (Goffe 2009). Deborah Thomas provides helpful insights into how to analyze Rastafari's alternate indigeneity as she considers how a Rasta indigeneity problematically sits within the history of Rastafari persecution in Jamaica:

[T]he framing of Rastafari as Jamaica's indigenous population...is not only a bit of rhetorical sleight-of-hand...it is also an attempt to redefine "indigenous" as that which has been created and developed on Jamaican soil, though not necessarily prior to European conquest [...]. [Indigeneity] is mobilized instead to draw attention to a history of disenfranchisement – both politically and in relation to land ownership. Redefining indigeneity in this way, then, gives teeth to the reframing of citizenship...[t]o position Rastafarians as indigenous is thus not only to emphasize the connection to land and their rejection of the technologies and simulacra that provide toxic structure to the modern condition or to focus on

aspects of the lifestyle that are rooted in a relationship to the natural landscape that few Jamaicans currently maintain. It is also to invert the usual hierarchies, to convince people around the world of Rastafarians lifestyle... (2011:212-213).

Claims to indigeneity, as Thomas asserts, enable the legitimization of Rastafari citizenship and place within the geographical and political landscape of Jamaica. For the purpose of IP rights however, RIVs claims are challenged by the complex history of not only Rastafari's origin and orientation, but of Caribbean culture broadly. The adoption of Rastafari as a force of general cultural influence and formation in Jamaica, and that Rastafari "...whether urban or rural – is also fully globalized, in terms of adherents, technology, and outlook" (Thomas 2011:208), complicates claims to explicit ownership of Rastafarian cultural products. One could also argue that Jamaican culture is in a large part what composes Rastafari culture, supporting the notion that "salient features of culture are, by definition, shared and therefore public" (Brown 2003: 28). And herein lies the problem for RIV and the Council: IP rights claims made by indigenous people are made on the basis of collective possession.

That collectivity, especially in the context of commercial infringement, is mandated by cultural difference (Strathern 1999:168; Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:74, 3). This "difference" is defined by Humphrey and Verdery as "a homology between the oneness of the group or 'people' and certain kinds of objects in which they see their identity as residing" (2004:7). But the easy integration between Rastafari culture and everyday Jamaican culture and again the electability of Rastafari adherence, complicates who does or does not count as a "people" whether Rastafarian, or Jamaican and who can access their objects. Because of the blurred lines of identification

between Rastafarian and Jamaican culture, there has been a need for Rastafari to assert their difference and their separation.

This is unlike where indigenous culture is deemed unusable and unprofitable, and thus the "thrust of the indigenous IPR [intellectual property rights] movement" has been to "re-embed [and] re-contextualize indigenous ownership in indigenous traditional culture" (Strathern 1999:167). As Humphrey and Verdery have noted "the question of value," is central to any property relation and "no one wants to establish social relationships with respect to things of no value" (2004:2). But, this is not the case in Jamaica as evidenced by the previous section's discussion, which noted the profitable display and promotion of Jamaica's "indigenous" products by the Jamaican state and by other local and foreign commercial entities.

So the Council and RIV are compelled to employ the tactic of differentiating indigeneity to make the case for, and claims to, indigeneity. Arguably this has been done to some significant success, given the support they have received from WIPO. As Haidy Geismar has demonstrated with Māori and ni-Vanuatu peoples, intellectual and cultural property serve as categories that can "constitute indigenous identities and, by extension, sovereignties...for the production of alternative economic imaginaries" (2013:xi). Likewise RIV's proposed indigeneity is the basis on which they make their claims, which in working to shore up their sense of autochthony serves as the basis of their economic strategy. This is what Li has termed the "management of dispossession" the means by which the concept of indigeneity is used as a defensive response to capitalism, which appears in "processes of dispossession as an external force against which

indigenous people and their allies stand united" (2010:385). Through IP, RIV in particular and Rastafari, such as First Man, broadly reposition themselves within the economy, so that their grievances can be viewed by people in positions of authority as legitimate.

Humphrey and Verdery have noted the problems of assuming the language of "rights" prevalent in Euro-American discourses of property. Instead they suggest that it may be preferable to employ terms such as "claims, liabilities, or debts" (2004:6). However, there is an inherent contentiousness in the claims of IP rights as groups strive to assert or contest ownership, and imbedded in that process is a convention of morality that resonates with the spirit of resistance at the heart of Rastafari. Therefore the "property regime," or the "dominant set of shared understandings about property in a given political economy" as it is understood in Jamaica, and determined by organizations like WIPO, is easily adopted by Rastafari (Humphrey and Verdery 2004:17). IP discourses employed by RIV and the Council are understood through these lenses, and their use should not be viewed as surprising. This is made especially clear where a language of reparations is used as a framework for compensation over claims of infringed intellectual or cultural property rights. Humphrey and Verdery, citing Povinelli, suggest that reparations is a mode of compensation for an injustice that "makes a taking seem consensual" by implying "a moment of consent, which must be elicited" (2004:12). Thomas asserts, however, that "reparations is not just a claim for compensation. Rather, the quantification of redress is a strategy for recognition..." (2011: 220).

RIV makes property claims so as "to improve their situations or seek redress..." through a "politics of recognition" (Humphrey and Verdery 2004: 8). As Povinelli notes, however, "the law of recognition mandate a social and affective (spiritualized kinship and descent) content of Indigenous territoriality; it mandates a specific ideological form of those social relations – agential, abstract, universalizing, context-breaking" (Povinelli 2004:193). In that process, RIV's recognition, by either the Jamaican state or WIPO enables an indigenization by way of "provincialization," as Haidy Geismar (2013) centrally argues in her text on the relations between intellectual and cultural property and indigeneity in the Pacific. Provincialization and its property forms, such as copyright, "consolidate multiple discussions of rights, allowing participation in wider spheres of exchange, while at the same time limiting the terms of their engagement" (Geismar 2013:61-62). Therefore the demand for recognition of RIV by its members is also an act of delimitation, bringing the group into the Jamaican nation-state. The state, Geismar asserts, is "the ultimate provincial entity" though often "compromised by multilateral trade agreements and international conventions" as we have seen by the account of Charles Robertson from JAMPRO (Geismar 2013: 21, 23). Therefore, culture as an economic, social, or political resource is "made viable" by state recognized entitlements (Geismar 2013:21).

Intellectual and cultural properties are "powerful imaginaries" for the development and assertion of "ideas about indigenous sovereignty and alternative economies" (Geismar 2013:213). Progress, or "moving into the twenty-first century" as noted by First Man, means creating commercial opportunities for the Rastafari community. First Man explains the idea:

The Rastafari way of life serves as a model that says indigenous people who think like this and are in a way of life don't necessarily have to convert themselves to the system...but can find a way to get each person in their evolving space and expand themselves at the same time...moving toward that kind of Marcus Garvey model [of collective self-reliance].

However, these imaginaries manifest in the form of the tour and material culture of the RIV and the demands for intellectual property rights, put into practice an "untidy, negotiated arrangement involving multiple tradeoffs" (Brown 2004:55). Legal recognitions are required for the making of legal claims, and culture has to be situated within the terms of these legal practices. In that process, however, much is lost, as well as gained. The village, as an agent of commodification of Rastafari "cultural products" becomes a "force of world making" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:28). Ethno-preneurialism has been shown as a "mode of finding selfhood through vernacular objects" (ibid.). However, in the case of the Rastafari Indigenous Village, that selfhood is compromised at best, and completely undermined at worst.

Gone into Babylon: Market Moralities

RIV has been successful in gaining some recognition from the state. In 2011 they earned a development grant worth over twenty million Jamaican dollars (US\$ 200,000) with funding awarded by the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) and the Rural Economic Development Initiative (REDI). Such a grant is what JAMIA hoped for, but did not achieve. This grant was used to fund significant renovation at the village. The village was able to improve the infrastructure and features of their establishment with the construction of a Rastafari museum,

three cottages for overnight tourist visits, with separate toilet and washing facilities, a herbal spa center, and an improved kitchen site. The project was officially opened on April 4, 2014 by Sharon Ffolkes Abrahams, State Minister for Industry, Investment, and Commerce, and Member of Parliament for West Central St James, the parish constituency where the village is located. The State Minister described the Village's concept as "a great vision of how [to] do community tourism...".

The support from the state has brought the village into the official catalogue of attractions listed by the Jamaica Tourist Board. Therefore it sits squarely within the remit of this organization's promotion of *ital chic*. RIV is a microcosm of emerging forms of heritage and community tourism in Jamaica. This has seen the emergent popularity of the "village as business" model, spearheaded by Diana McIntyre-Pike, president of Countrystyle Community Tourism Network (CCTN). CCTN is a network of several "villages" across Jamaica intended "to assist communities in developing their infrastructure so that they can offer community experience tours to local and international visitors, so that these visitors can experience the lifestyle of our villages, our people, our heritage, our culture, our Jamaican foods and so much more."³⁸ Known as "the Jamaican Model," village as business projects have gained the attention of the UNESCO World Heritage Centre, with Mrs. McIntyre-Pike having been recently invited to their World Heritage Sustainable Tourism Experts meeting. The model has also garnered the interest of several governments invested in developing community and heritage based tourism programs, as evidenced by a South African delegation of entrepreneurs, scholars, and government officials who visited Jamaica and RIV during my fieldwork. The delegation sought to learn how to better

support and promote a Rastafarian village located in Knysna, a town located in South Africa's Western Cape province and how to apply the model to other projects in the country.

RIV's village as business model has seen increased support from government funding initiatives and agencies. However, qualifying for that support did not come without ramifications. First Man acknowledges that the current format is problematic, however it is essential for "getting a group of people together who never thought about business structure, timelines and so on, to actually start thinking that way." Seeking funding assistance from the Jamaican state and becoming involved in ventures related to tourism are both activities that directly contradict the principles of Rastafari's anti-Babylonian ideology. In explaining the difficulty of their position, First Man recalled, that he "had to go around to the community of Rasta and prepare their mind and explain that what we are doing is progress, but the community said of course '[we] are using the name of Rastafari to collect how much money...!'" Additionally, members of the broader Rastafari community were uncomfortable with what they saw as RIV's complicity with "Babylon." "I had to let them know that it is criteria based," he recounted. In order to receive any funding, he explained that "you have to be in tourism, you have to be a benevolent society, be an LLC....all of these things." It was difficult even for one of the founding members of the village to perceive applying for JSIF funding as anything but encouraging Rastafari to "go into Babylon...". "Even though you might say you don't want to take Rastafari totally into that mode," First Man muses, "...you certainly don't want a situation where we can't manage to survive in the twenty-first century. You have to be able to deliver on certain things."

In noting the "many 'products' that the Rasta man can do," First Man evinces the innate commercial value and potential diversity of Rastafarian commodities. It was explained to me that other future products and projects would naturally arise from the village project. One such idea was the easy merchandizing of Jamaican Blue Mountain Coffee, simply marketed in RIV packaging. This model of marketing locally made goods under the RIV brand was conceived to potentially encompass a number of future products including soaps, oils, and crafts. Also, each new facility within the village was thought be an independent attraction within itself. One could come to the village solely for the spa services, or to stay in the cottages, without necessarily partaking in the tour.

The village for its members is "Rastafari put into a framework of modern existence" and a blueprint for sustainability of the community. To the village, Rastafari began in a "technological time, and was spread by technology," and thus they "exist in a modern time [but] are choosing ancient ways, [as a] modern people who are making a decision to balance technology...to move on into the twenty-first century and "be able to even govern yourself." "I think that what we are doing at the village is a good primer toward self governance..." This "self-governance" according to First Man included valuable skill sets such as planning, corporation, structure, standards "all of these things are going to be important for us to exist," First Man asserts, "...and its an attitude that is necessary for development." "The Maroons are searching for a model themselves," he declares in comparison, "and they still don't have one that empowers the individual, everyone is working trying to get paid, which is the same with us now, but for the future, their model has no definition." For First Man the village is a potential model not just for

Rastafari but also for all indigenous communities. First Man envisages a day when the village can develop beyond an attraction, and perhaps into an actual village where Rastafari people buy and cultivate land, and manufacture goods, though he is keen to maintain a museum and provide lectures.

And so, given the limits of commercial opportunity, RIV, lean on self- commodification. This is what the Comaroffs have famously noted as "ethno-preneurialism," the driving force behind what they have identified and dubbed "Ethnicity, Inc.," "... the incorporation of identity, the rendering of ethnicized populations into corporations of one kind or another [and] the creeping commodification of their cultural products and practices (2009:21). However, Jaffe gives a warning that in ital chic's drawing on Rasta aesthetics and symbols as it promises beauty, health, spiritual wellness, and cultural pride, it simultaneously sanitizes and pacifies the sharpest aspects of Rastafari culture (Jaffe 2010:40).

Alvaré (2010) encountered a similar occurrence with a group of erstwhile radical Trinidadian Rastafari who endeavored to found an NGO in order to access funding for their social project. What Alvaré discovered was that in the group's proceeding through the demands of the state's NGO registration process, their revolutionary ideology was challenged by the guidelines causing a reevaluation of their notions of social justice leading them to "'fall into' new patterns of NGO practice" (2010:180). In order to not only qualify, but to compete with other NGOs for the funds their group had to "adopt the structure, discourses, and practices associated with the

professionalized NGO model" (2010:188) and "recognize their connections with state governments and realize the limits of their own supposed autonomy" (2010:193).

Compliance then engenders the sanitization of, and distancing from, the radicalism inherent in Rasta ideology and practice. This occurs in the effort to "make Rastafari acceptable, to ensure that its broad idioms are marked as clean and proper" as Jaffe notes in the broader commercialization of Rastafari (2010:33). The question remains how, or even if, partaking in the business of Rastafari helps to attain the rights of property, or if the group simply becomes another stakeholder in the success of Rastafari commodification. The village project is thus highly problematic because of its engagement with market value as articulated through the positioning of its culture as property.

As the "Rastafari Indigenous Village" (RIV), the brethren of the "IION Station" family seek to profit from what they see as the foundation for Jamaica's internationally popular culture: their own Rastafari tradition. However, as mentioned, capitalism, as a Babylonian evil, is anathema to the Rastafari way of life. Therefore, RIV attempt involvement in the market without being influenced by its values and without jeopardizing their own by seeking to separate the market from their ethics. In this way they are differentiated from JAMIA, craft vendors and Sindhi businesses that seek to more fully integrate their morals and ethics within the market. However, this project of separation is complicated by the organizational and financial methods and frameworks required to run their business. RIV, more so than any other group discussed in this thesis, "struggle to come to terms with the clash of deeply ingrained moralities and the daily

pressures, opportunities, and inequalities posed by [the] market..." (Mandel and Humphrey 2002:1).

Sufferation through Sanitization

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, Rastafari itself was a means by which black Jamaicans coped with the systemic suffering produced by the Jamaican colonial state. The group came to epitomize "the sufferer" serving as an abiding reminder of the wickedness of Babylon. However, that suffering over time and through the popularized musical form by which it was conveyed became the basis of commercial interest. The village project was envisioned as a format whereby the "interest" of Rastafari commerce could be recouped from those who have capitalized on their culture. That process, though, has not been without its complications and controversies. Again, Rastafari's anti-capitalist orientation runs in direct contradiction with the commercial model of the village. However, as evidenced by tourism marketing there is a firm sense that Jamaican commercial potential is tied up in the "'exploitable' collective self" of Jamaican culture (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:5), an issue that stands at the heart of our discussion.

During my fieldwork with RIV, Deborah Thomas released her latest work, *Exceptional Violence* (2011). The book takes violence and representations of violence in Jamaica as entry points to examine postcolonial state formation in Jamaica and forwards reparations as a critical and analytical framework. The final chapter "Resurrected Bodies 1963/2007," provided an extensive discussion of the state and Rastafari relations against the backdrop of the 1963 government massacre of Rastafarians, known as the "Coral Gardens incident," or "Bad Friday." The chapter

explores the changing relationship between the two parties with a profile of the then nascent Rastafari Indigenous Village. She noted the apparent contradictions and incongruences between the conventional ethos of Rastafari and its adherents' "resistance to tethering their futures on the whims of a neoliberal global market that privileges movement, entrepreneurship, and individualism" and the contemporary project of RIV (2011:207). However, she warned against the temptation to give such a project a "cynical read" (2011:16) and suggested instead to view the project in light of its temporal context, stating:

Think about what Rasta's shift from disengagement to engagement means in contemporary context and, in the process, consider the kinds of engagement that are possible today, compared with those that might have been possible at other moments....[I]f during the modernist moment of the mid-20th century Rastafarians condemned the state, defined citizenship in relation to Africa, refused wage labor and instead emphasized self-determination and self-sufficiency through forms of communal living, in the neoliberal era they seek greater recognition from and representation within the Jamaican state. And while they continue to emphasize self-determination and self-sufficiency, the means by which this might be realized have changed...(2011:218).

There is at the heart of RIV's project of intellectual property a radical proposition with the potential to ultimately challenge who truly owns, or at least is able to speak for Jamaica's cultural brand. The RIV project could disrupt what has been for so long the conventional packaging of Caribbean culture as Rastafarianism. However, in officially enveloping Rastafari into Jamaica's national branding campaign, RIV has forfeited the opportunity to challenge the restricted notion of what Jamaica's brand is. If they had pursued their project of seeking intellectual property rights to its fullest realization they would have been able to demonstrate that much of the cultural

content of brand Jamaica does not rest on a Jamaican 'authenticity.' Instead it draws its aesthetic forms from the utopian political vision of the Rastafarian movement that focuses, quite differently, on what Jamaican society should be.

Perhaps, in the future the RIV, as Jaffe optimistically suggests about the commercial project of Rasta commodification, can "represent a space of education, or serve as a platform for political mobilization" (2010:45). Jaffe suggests, "The transformation of the symbols and image of a movement of resistance into marketable commodities can but does not necessarily indicate the commodification of the counterculture itself" (Jaffe 2010:45). This is exactly what RIV claim. They argue that the village project is in large part a political one whereby they "agitate for the rights of Rastafari" and challenge Rastafari's infringed intellectual property rights. So then, does the village demonstrate "the ways in which consumption, the state, and Rastafari have come together at a specific point in Jamaica's history" (Jaffe 2010:40)? Or is it instead a capitalist manifestation and logic "that dampens the resistive power of a movement...[and] is commodifying resistance." (2010:40, 45)? The existence of such questions in regard to anything Rastafari is anathema to the movement's ideology. Despite First Man's assertion that the "[RIV] model is Haile Selassie I model, which is Rastafari model," and that they are "following along the words of our almighty" it is in the space of justification that Rastafari is undermined, if not undone. However, that space may yet provide the "possibility of alternatives" to "mediate between sovereignty and the state [and] between market and culture (Geismar 2013:215). Although Rastafari perceive themselves as "exiles" in the West, "alienated from their African homeland" (Edmonds 2012:40), Roberts (2014:187) considering how Rastafari might be

"rethinking...their existence inside the Jamaican polity" cites Sylvia Wynter (1970) who observes, that "Through their longing for Africa, Rastafarians stumbled upon their Jamaican roots." I believe this is true, and also that it cannot be better demonstrated than through Rastafari's current potentially radical project of seeking intellectual property rights.

Lottery Scammers in Montego Bay

We want food fi nyam [eat]
 So what we do? scam, scam, scam
 Want money inna hand
 So what we do? scam, scam, scam
 Want house and land
 So what we do? scam, scam, scam

-Stamma Gramma, "Scammer's Anthem"; 2013

In the beginning of this thesis' first chapter I noted how Bay Fort craft vendor Hazel's claim that "Nuttin' no gwaan fi we!" in the market was similarly remarked by young Jamaican men in Horst and Miller's (2006:125) earlier work on cell phone communication in the country. Although the sentiment was still quite pervasive among Jamaican youth, I interestingly did not encounter it among a particular set of young men in one Montego Bay neighborhood. They, like young men throughout the developed and developing world, encountered declining educational and employment opportunities, which have "precipitated widespread feelings among young men of having surplus time, of being detached from education, and of being left behind" (Jeffrey 2010:466). Such were the conditions that created the sense that nothing was going on. Moreover, it was as if the conditions were purposely so. Sufferation was often thus construed— as intentional.

However, despite facing poor prospects, by doing nothing, young men in Jamaica run the risk of being stigmatized as "wotlis," or worthless (Chevannes 2001:223). Avoidance of worthlessness serves as a social motivation to earn capital by any means in order to "make life," whether by "juggling"— taking on multiple casual jobs in hope of making a survivable living, or by the more implicitly illegal, "hustling" (Horst and Miller 2006:129).³⁹ And so a group of roughly ten men from their mid twenties to early thirties who, having exhausted and become exhausted by the opportunities to juggle, chose to hustle by forming a scammer crew.⁴⁰ They had joined the quickly developing money transfer scheme, which deceives Americans into wiring large sums of money to Jamaica through financial service companies Western Union and MoneyGram.

I spent many hours in the lanes and yards of the neighborhood of this scammer crew, learning not just about the practice of scamming, but how it created new opportunities for them.⁴¹ Opportunities by which they would not only reimagine their place in Jamaican society, but also in relation to the "foreign," the colloquial signifier for migration target countries that in common parlance primarily stands for the United States. Scammers' use of Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology and their performance in phone solicitations create a new interface in which the contours of social interaction with the United States are revolutionized as "America" as an aspirational icon becomes denuded of its aura of opportunity and optimism.

For each of the groups discussed so far there has been an ethic of the market that guides their strategy for navigating that market. However, for scammers, scamming as a notion and practice is an ethic, strategy and a daily tactic. The performance of the scam, its utilization of

communication technology, and the financial rewards received redress the restricted social mobility of poor Jamaicans and the "outlook whereby local ambitions require foreign realization" (Thomas 2004:261). Through their practice scammers challenge the conventional notion that the Caribbean necessarily lies in a situation of passive dependence upon, and expectation of, the tutelary mercies of U.S. tourist patronage so evidenced in all of the preceding chapters. The first chapter demonstrated how vendors had largely given up on actual progress and instead engaged with a somewhat perfunctory economic practice, the subsequent chapters have demonstrated multiple ethics, strategies and tactics for engaging the market to somewhat hopeless and problematic ends. In this chapter scammers seek a means outside of the conscripted remit of the tourist economy to try and succeed.

The "Get Money" Crew

The crew, which for the sake of descriptive convenience I will call "Get Money" as a tribute to the group ethos, was comprised of several friends who lived on the same "scheme," or area of a housing development. As Horst and Miller note a crew is a mode of communication and socialization that provides support in friendship and in opportunity (2006:126). I was able to gain access to "Get Money" through an acquaintance of mine who often visited a friend in their neighborhood. Each member of Get Money had gone through the Jamaican public school system, with some having finished their high school O-Levels and others dropping out beforehand. They had each been variably involved in one occupation or another, most of which would be described as casual labor.

Those with further education were able to get more stable jobs such as in the city's call centers. However, they left due to poor pay in this sector. Nearly each member of the crew lived with their family, the exception being one or two members who lived between their family homes and that of their girlfriend's parents. These cases involved a girlfriend with whom the scammer had a child, and who chose to remain with her family. Almost every crew member had children, with many of them and their mothers residing with the member's family. Their neighborhood was not impoverished but actually quite mixed. This was due to the some initial construction in this area that aimed to turn it into a place for aspirant middle class black Jamaican families. But as I outlined in the introduction the downward shift in public sector opportunity in the 80s and the continued financial hardship of the 90s meant a thwarted mobility of those anticipated residents. The area eventually opened up to lower income families.

Everyone in the crew did one of two jobs in the system of the scam: they either did phone work or collected the money. To handle calls one had to have "chat" or be able to confidently and convincingly speak with prospective or regular victims and maintain relationships with them. Collecting money was not necessarily easier as it was the part of the scam that carried the most risk. By the time of my fieldwork scamming had already been a known practice for a few years, having "started" in Granville, an area just outside of Montego Bay around 2007. Many money transfer companies became highly suspicious of multiple transactions, or transactions in particular amounts. Therefore, the money collector had to be willing to travel between branches, and also have a personal profile that would not raise suspicion. For this reason, the money collectors in Get Money all had "official" jobs somewhere, or at least an employee ID from a job

they once had. Over time as collecting money became more difficult due to increased protective measures being implemented by transfer operations, and as scammers came up with increasingly clever ways to collect money, phone calling became ever more important with all members of the crew participating. What immediately follows is a description of the calling component of the scam.

The Empire Calls Back: Techniques of the Scam

The Jamaican lottery scam is similar to the infamous Nigerian 419 email scam in that it aims to persuade a target to wire transfer a sum of money with promise of a later receipt of a larger amount. Apart from this similarity the Jamaican scam differs in both premise and strategy. Rather than the Nigerian method of sending an email, which eventually leads to phone conversation (Glickman 2005), the Jamaican scam is presented from the start as a personalized phone call in which the target is notified of having been owed a sum of money by a representative of an American company, bank, or association. These respective strategies are designed for different outcomes. The Nigerian email scam, through incredible scenarios and poor grammar, seeks only the most credulous of victims by filtering out "false positives" (Herley 2012). The Jamaican lottery scam, in contrast, aims to convince as many individuals as possible. For this reason the scam has a much greater need to manufacture plausibility, which is made possible in large part by identity data provided by pseudonymous Jamaican and American brokers located in the United States. Scammers use this data to not only locate their victims but to personalize their pitch.

Internet technologies and money transfer services have for some time been popularly paired in acts of scamming. However, telephony in Jamaican scamming is a crucial component that differentiates its practice. To attract as many targets as possible, scammers solicit the interest of their targets with a procedural formality and professionalism analogous to customer service agents in a call center. They, like these agents, seek to establish their legitimacy and be heard as ideal transnational service workers (Mirchandani 2012:134). That scammers take such an approach is no coincidence as St. James is home to several call center operations, the largest of which is Xerox-owned ACS (Affiliated Computer Services) which is contracted to do customer service for U.S. companies in the telecommunications, health care, and technology industries (the most prominent of which is Amazon.com).⁴² ACS has seven locations throughout Jamaica five of which are located within St. James and most scammers have relatives or friends who have worked in the industry, if they themselves have not.

Like their legitimate call center counterparts, scammers operate from a running script of sorts, though more improvisational, posing as a customer service representative for Bank of America, or an agent of the partly fabricated "U.S. Claims Commission." As call center workers are taught to produce an affect in their speech designed to appeal to and appease their customers, scammers likewise try to create familiar and compelling personas. However, where legitimate customer service agents working to come across as unscripted, genuine, and sincere (Mirchandani 2012) would not be expected to entirely conceal the traits of a Jamaican identity, the scammer seeks to appear genuine by producing a kind of parodic American accent. The accent is put to use as a means of allaying any concern that business is being conducted with a foreigner, which can be

easily betrayed by an unconvincing telephone performance. Customer service agents undergo extensive language training in preparation for their interaction with Western customers. This, in addition to "the continual creation of one's identity" is what Mirchandani, writing on Indian call centers, has termed "authenticity work" (2012:8, 36). For scammers, Jamaica's proximity to, and encounter with, the U.S. serves to supplement the forms of authenticity detailed by Mirchandani. Scammer accents, though at times caricatural, are informed by an experiential repertoire developed by a long history of exposure to American media, music, and, particularly in St. James, American tourism beginning with the growing tourist traffic of the post-war period. As Obika Gray explains, "contact with distant American others through travel, film, music, radio broadcasts, and pulp fiction...transported Jamaicans...into an American-dominated and worldwide political, economic, and cultural space" (2004:100). So where the enunciative accuracy of an attempted accent fails, it is deftly recovered by a keen understanding of American cultural nuance, which often helps recover a pitch.

Business process outsourcing (BPO) from North America and Europe to the Caribbean began throughout the late eighties and early nineties and resulted in the service industry becoming the hallmark of globalized business practice in the region. It was in 1986 as part of a structural adjustment deal that Jamaica saw the introduction of the information service industry, which promised increases in foreign exchange, employment, and technological advancement (Mullings 1999:290).⁴³ Twenty-five years later and the low wages and high turnover rates of Jamaican call center work supports the anthropological critique of BPO.⁴⁴ Illustrating what Bear has noted as the "logics of outsourcing,"—"a reduction of infrastructure, accountability and the costs of

labour to the minimum..." (2013:379), the industry has been shown to produce a reformulated exploitation of labor, and uneven development, which has done little to improve upon economic precariousness faced by many of its workers (see Freeman 2000).

Against this background, in which embedded in call center work is "a complex interplay of colonial histories, class relations, and national interests..." (Mirchandani 2012:3), scamming presents something of a reconfigured, or perhaps even mutated, variant of the practice, inverting and reversing the directional flows of commerce, creating new circuits of interaction. Mimi Sheller has suggested that tourism is perhaps best understood as an "embodied encounter between foreign travelers and local people that involves corporeal relations of unequal power," in which gender and racial inequalities are "brought into being with national boundaries of belonging and exclusion" (2012:210, 211; emphasis added). The affective performance of scamming and the technologies deployed in the practice, enables scammers to subvert the body politics of the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990), their virtuality neutralizing the "(post)colonial contact zone... in which the grammars of racial difference are crafted" (Sheller 2012:212). Through this interaction, the scammer receives an ethnographic exposure to an America far beyond any one-dimensional touristic stereotype, experiencing an interaction devoid of the familiar and uneven politics of the "tourist encounter" (Babb 2011).

When a call is successful and a client agrees to make a payment, more sophisticated crews have networks that spread from the lanes of their neighborhoods across to friends and relatives in the U.S., serving as the first point of transfer. After receipt, the funds are relayed as a new transfer to

Jamaica, effectively laundering the money by creating a remittance. This is a routine and anodyne occurrence of daily Jamaican life and makes detecting the scam transfer difficult. Apart from the laundering effect, this first point of transfer produces a sense of locality that supports the call's premise because the client is unaware that his transfer will go any further than the U.S. address of the initial recipient. The most profitable crews can usually credit a U.S. based network for their success. However, not many scam operations have the benefit of such an extended network since many friends and relatives are unwilling to take the risk. Buttressing the networks and phone performances so critical to the scam is the technology employed. Horst and Miller nearly a decade ago identified the increased facilitation of remittances through the joining of money transfer services with cell phone technology (2006:117).⁴⁵ For present day scammers, that relationship has developed into a much more lucrative pairing, in which technology does more than facilitate the transmission of capital across borders, and instead renders them socially and politically immaterial.

Scammer "Tricknologies"

The first, and still dominant, VoIP technology adopted by scammers is the American "magicJack" device. This allows free phone calls over the Internet to anywhere in the United States and Canada. It works by being connected by USB between a computer and a lined telephone (or cordless base) for the purchase price of US\$ 60 and annual subscription of US\$ 20. The device entered into the Jamaican mainstream as Jamaicans resident in the U.S. brought the device home for family members as a cheaper means of staying in touch.⁴⁶ The Internet requirement initially limited the device's use to the Jamaican middle class. However, as the now ubiquitous Caribbean

communications company, Digicel, and the more recent Flow Jamaica, provided more extensive Internet coverage at more affordable rates, magicJack use expanded and scammer access to the device increased.^{47 48} Scammers eventually began to buy the devices and pay for multi-year service subscriptions with stolen credit card information or with U.S. prepaid credit cards bought online and posted to Jamaica by acquaintances.

With a magicJack subscription users are given the option to choose an available phone number from any area code within the United States, validating their calls by way of a purported U.S. location. This capability enables scammers to target a particular city by opting for a number within its area code, creating a successful means of attracting "local" business. MagicJack's service policy permits a one time number change. This provides recourse if an area code proves fruitless or becomes associated with scamming, as occurred with Cincinnati area code 513.⁴⁹ For an additional cost, magicJack customers can purchase vanity numbers and 1-800 prefixes. This addition has provided a new means to more competently stave off the incredulity of their targets and more convincingly situate themselves within the imagined space of legitimacy by creating "business numbers."

Despite the predominance of VoIP and the magicJack, there are cases in which some scammers continue to make calls directly from their mobile phones with the local Jamaican 876 area code. The area code has over time become the marker of a foreign scam due to the publicity of money transfer and telecommunication companies, news outlets, and consumer protection organizations.⁵⁰ The use of a Jamaican mobile number is now characteristic of a novice scammer

or of an unsophisticated operation. These scammers are figured as both immobile and fixed within the confines of the Jamaican national and technological space, a space which has problematically become increasingly occupied by school-aged children who take up scamming by using cellular provider Digicel's international calling plan tariff.

An economy sprung up around the magicJack in St. James as the device developed into a commodity of both informal and formal exchange. Informally, the devices are brought into the country by scammers or their acquaintances and sold at twice their U.S. selling price in a market of referral. Formally, legitimate businesses within St. James have begun its sale ostensibly for lawful use, though that position remains dubious given the broad awareness of the device's use in scamming. The market space was recently diversified by the release of an updated magicJack known as the magicJack "Plus." The latest iteration no longer requires a computer, but is connected directly between an Internet modem and telephone. Obviating the need for a computer widens the availability of the technology among those unable to afford the hardware. The "plus" version, which has altogether replaced its predecessor on the U.S. market, selling there for US\$ 60, is highly sought among scammers. It sells on the Jamaican black market for the equivalent of US\$ 95.

Despite the effectiveness of the magicJack's ability to create what Marilyn Strathern has called the "spatially unmatched reach of efficacy" (Strathern 2005:95), it is betrayed by being in reality a stationary device. With the increasing discovery of the device in police raids on suspected scammers' homes ownership of a magicJack has become grounds for criminal implication of

those suspected of scamming. Therefore, actual mobility in the practice has become a primary objective among scammers. Though the magicJack maintains its prominence, smartphones and their VoIP applications represent the next wave of communication technologies employed in the practice of scamming.

One particular member of the crew owned an iPhone 4 before it became officially available in Jamaica a few months later. The device was acquired through a Canadian contact that bought, registered, and shipped down the phone for US\$ 700. Purchased initially for its value and status, the phone's functions were rapidly applied to the scam. Though magicJack's continued to be used, the iPhone became the crux of the crew's operation.⁵¹ The scam was now largely controlled from the phone, and in a marked departure from the structural immobility of the magicJack devices, calls could be made and received on the go through a selection of VoIP apps available through Apple's App Store. The app supplied by magicJack was preferred as it used the same phone number as the device. This feature enabled scammers to remain available in order to assuage any concerns and answer any questions from their clients, or address any complication that arose with a transfer. This fostered confidence in clients and plausibility for the scam overall, leading to greater revenue and profitability. The apps' required internet connectivity was affordably provided by the increased availability of 3G wireless service from Digicel and Lime, the second major cellular telecommunication company on the island, both offering internet tariffs for as little as JAM\$ 100 (US\$ 1.15) a day.

For the crew the iPhone not only symbolized the sophistication of their criminal operation, but their membership among a Jamaican elite that could not only afford the device, but do so before it officially became available in the country. For these reasons the increasingly popular song by American rapper Rick Ross, "9 Piece (Even Deeper)," which lauded "...selling dope, straight off the iPhone..." took on an anthemic quality as it spoke directly to the confluence of technology and criminality present in lottery scamming. But more salient was the persona that Ross portrayed across his oeuvre— that of a self-made "boss" who, by circumventing the law, made it out of poverty. The use of "foreign" technology, and increased riches from the scam seeded shifts in subjectivity and perspective within the crew. However, before addressing that at the end of this discussion, it is imperative to understand how scammers rationalize the scam, and its implications.

Dem Call it Scam, We Call it Reparation

Popular narratives of Jamaican scamming presented in the U.S. media reports are often portrayals of elderly Americans being preyed upon and conned out of hard-earned savings, as most recently demonstrated in Dan Rather's report on Jamaican scamming, titled "Just Hang Up."⁵² Highlighting the appalling inhumanity of scammers, the piece featured the story of an elderly white American man from the Midwest who lost his savings in hope of affording health care costs for his ailing spouse. In his report, Mr. Rather, having travelled to St. James, was compelled to confront a suspected scammer and declare, "You know what the scamming does? It takes money from hard working people, retired people...I can't respect taking money from

grandmothers, retired people..." The accosted scammer casually defended himself, deflected the accusations, and retorted the must have Mr. Rather's respect then, implying his innocence.

The U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging held a hearing to investigate Jamaican scamming in early 2013 and to call the Jamaican government to account. The result was the government updating its Proceeds of Crime Act to include provisions to prosecute for earnings made from victims who comply willingly or under duress. Until the revised legislation scammers in the main acted with impunity, with those suspected facing, at worst, the temporary seizure of property. The rhetoric of the senators on the committee emphasized the vulnerability of seniors, and their portrayal of defenseless and victimized grandparents was compellingly effective at emphasizing the ghoulishness of scammers. However, that the elderly are primary targets is not a given, as scammers' leads are often a variably sourced registry of random names, addresses, and phone numbers. Indeed, an increased occurrence of elderly victims says less about scammer targeting strategies and more about the precarious circumstances faced by American seniors and retirees. It is these that compel them to respond to the overtures of scammers , as illustrated by the victim in Rather's report trying to afford healthcare.

Irrespective of a victim's age, scammers often regard the gullibility and credulity of victims with derisive indifference. It is this position that many scammers maintain when considering the effect their scam will have on their targets. They justify their actions by reasoning that if the victims are so easily deceived then are they not deserving of the outcome? The presumption that most of these targets are guided by greed serves as further justification. The hypothesis of greed is

supported by victims' forfeiture of sums in the tens of thousands in some cases. Scammers mobilize this rationalization in the justified transmission of wealth. This was exhibited when one scammer chillingly referred to a collected transfer as a "retirement check," a double insinuation of the source and purpose of the funds. The fact that the monies being scammed came from the life savings of his "client" was justified by a redistributionist defense in that it helped to secure the economic freedom of the scammer.

The notion of redistribution prompts a larger historical argument maintained by scammers in which the practice is viewed as a form of reparations. Citing a history of racial inequity, scammers assert that they, as with all black Jamaicans, are owed for the crimes of slavery for which neither they nor their ancestors were recompensed. Slocum and Thomas have noted how in "globalization from below," people "mobilize local history and meanings to negotiate—and indeed shape—their available avenues within current configurations of global power"(2003:560). With the postcolonial reorientation of British-Jamaican trade and political relations to that of Jamaica and the United States by the 1960s, the U.S. has become a site of engagement in which notions of mobility, aspiration, and transgression are produced. Through the transference of proprietorship scammers pliantly reason that the U.S. has acquired the moral debts of Great Britain. This seemingly complex reading of race and reparations is more simply articulated by scammers through the rationale that both the U.K. and the U.S. are composed of "the same white people." This is a view that conflates race with a shift in geopolitical power relations in which "England used to, and now the U.S. runs Jamaica."

From this position, scamming returns are constructed as serving as individual contributions to the collective debt owed to blacks for past transgressions, but also for their current day implications. As Deborah Thomas explains, reparations "embodies a counter-discourse [that] provides the means by which contemporary inequalities are historicized" (2011:220). And for poor Jamaicans the long reach of that historical inequality is made evident in the "disjuncture between the misery and hardships of their lived experience on the island and the imagined experience of participating in the material well-being, consumer tastes and popular culture imported from [America]" (Gray 2004:100). Compensation could, thus, only come from the United States, as it was not only the reformulated site of transgression, but held the desired currencies for repayment.

Reparations as rhetoric for scammer justification became popularized with the release of reggae artist Vybz Kartel's scamming ballad aptly titled, "Reparation."⁵³ A psalmic extolling of the practice's merits and of the opportunities it provides for Jamaica's poor youth, the lyrics carefully emphasized scamming's positive attributes, including the lack of violence produced. The song in slightly abridged form follows:

Verse 1

Big up every scamma/ Weh [that] make U.S dolla/
Build up di [the] house fi [for] you mama
Western Union people fi [should] give we more honor
Every ghetto youth fi live like Tony Montana
Presidential like Barack Obama, pool inna house and plane inna hangar
Who say di scamma dem wrong? No, hungry, poverty that more wronger
Better them do it than take up the bomber
Memba the youth them nah [aren't] squeeze trigger, a just true them a nigger

You big mister you a the Prime Minister, college me want send mi sista
You say education a the key,
me a beg you no take weh me ting sah [don't take away my money]

Chorus

As long as them nah buy no gun, nah support no war
Big up [praise] di man dem star from near and far
Dem call it scam, me call it reparation, every ghetto youth is a star
So dem wah [want to] live like one

Verse 2

Me just want the youth them no rob Jamaican, don't buy gun fi [to] kill man
Foreign exchange is good fi di country, Franklin, USA; Sterling, England
Every Ghetto yute fi a live like di big man/ Mansion bigger than Hilton
A nuh every body can run like Bolt, and sing like me, or dance like Ding Dong...
(Reparation, Vybz Kartel featuring Gaza Slim)

The song, banned for fear that it would further encourage scamming, most effectively expresses a critique of the lack of available social and economic support in Jamaica. This argument is especially salient for the country's poor youth who are not, as Kartel recognizes, imbued with the sporting and entertaining talents that he himself, Usain Bolt, or popular Jamaican dancer, Ding Dong, possess— talents that seem to be the only registers of valued Jamaican capability, and mechanisms for advancement. The song is reminiscent of the Trinidadian kidnapping crisis noted by Rebecca Prentice (2012a) in which popular calypsos moralized the acts as means to repatriate money stolen from Trinidad's "big money people" and held in U.S. and European accounts. One of the songs choruses, "kidnapping go build back we economy" was a designation of the fiscally based moral justification of the abductions (Prentice 2012a:54-56). Likewise in Nigeria, Apter

tells of how 419 scamming was seen by some Nigerians as reparations for the slave trade and colonialism (2005:230).

Reparations discourses manifested by criminal acts serves as a "means of exercising claims to rights in a situation of dispossession and disempowerment," as Janet Roitman notes among smugglers and bandits in the Chad Basin, who "proceeded to exercise those demands through seizure, contraband, highway robbery, and smuggling" (2005:96-97). Likewise, Congolese international traders flout import regulations to largely find opportunities in the suffered consequences of political and economic crisis, but also as an act of postcolonial dissent (2000). For Roitman, the ability to seize corresponds to notions of power and agency that express a desire for the possibility of economic and social mobility (2005:97-98). Claiming reparations for slavery, colonialism, or for the repatriation of capital from corrupt elites, challenges the legitimacy of western wealth as claimants construct themselves as "exercising legitimate authority over access to possibilities for accumulation..." (Roitman 2005:152). Whether smuggler, bandit, kidnapper, or scammer, the line between "legitimate and illegitimate agency... is a frontier in the struggle to assert sovereignty or to disrupt it..." (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006:11). This is especially so when that sovereignty is inextricably linked to capital, and thus their claims, whether demanded or enacted, are so constructed.

Sufferation as experienced in Jamaican society, taken together with the reparations framework and the perceived greed of victims serve as comprehensive bases in which scamming is morally, socially, and historically justified. They work together to hold in place the scammer ethic.

However, the reparations rationale becomes increasingly untenable when one considers how little scammers participate in the redistribution of their seized wealth. The consequence of scammers accumulating wealth "without the reciprocal social obligations of redistribution" has been their generally poor reputation in St. James (Smith 2001:805). This disdain has persisted despite the absence of noted violence in the practice, and that those being scammed are not fellow Jamaicans.

Perhaps this is because scamming is widely criticized as being nothing more than "ginnalism"—Jamaican patois for chicanery— that has been historically represented by Anancy, the trickster spider of Akan and Jamaican folklore, who often employed duplicity in his endeavors. The response of the crowd brought to mind the similarity between behavioral accounts of scammers and Anancy. As Richard Burton explains, Anancy was known for his excess and individual greed and he represented slaves "whose ability to manipulate the system in their favor placed additional burdens, above all the threat of unmerited punishment, on those they seemed not to recognize as their brothers and sisters" (1997:63).

Scammers fail to enjoy the kind of popularity and endearment witnessed in the public's reception of Jamaican dons— inner city neighborhood leaders born out of the political gunmen of the 1970s, and criminal gunmen of the 1980s. These dons provide material services to their communities that the Jamaican state is perceived not to, whether it is welfare, employment, security, or justice. Dons take on functions that symbolically imbue them with authoritative value and meaning and an "elevated social status that combines religious, political, and celebrity

culture elements..." that neglects the abundance of drug and gang associated violence they create (Jaffe 2012b:80).

The poor perception of the scamming trade was vividly demonstrated when all Western Union branches in St. James were closed for two weeks while they underwent security upgrades to safeguard against the practice. The residents of St. James were forced to travel to the neighboring parishes of Hanover and Trelawney to send and receive their money transfers. At the nearest Western Union in Falmouth, Trelawney, the frustrated crowd, who had been queuing for hours, outwardly voiced their irritation to one another. One man gave public warning: "Make me find out say any scammers *deh yah* [are here], me a go throw them in the sea and make them swim fi [for] them scam money!" The crowd gestured in frustrated agreement, irritated by having been inconvenienced by the cost in both time and money spent traveling to the branch. The frustration appeared to run deeper than the acute inconvenience of the closed Western Unions, however. Perhaps for these locals scamming transgresses against the "moral hailings" that draws poor Jamaicans to "Africanist obligations" (Gray 2004:101). Scamming should instead be "...a modality not only of social mobility but also of social welfare..." as Roitman has suggested with seizure in the Chad Basin, and as evidenced by the patronage of Jamaica's dons (2005:180).

Smith's observations of violent public responses to 419 scammers in Nigeria showed how their wealth "exacerbated their differences with common people rather than re-inscribing social ties by sharing their wealth through customary networks of patronage" (2001:805). His findings are instructive for two reasons: firstly, it presents Africans declining to engage in "Africanist

obligations," which is also demonstrated by Newell working with young Ivorians engaged in "nefarious [economic] exchanges", or "bizness," (2012:80) as a means of avoiding social obligations to kin and friends (p. 84). Secondly, it shows that wealth gained in unprecedented volumes by means, which in large part lie outside the normal networks of assistance, engenders a particular liberal (and perhaps liberating) use of that wealth. Dons are obliged to their networks of patronage by necessity as their impoverished neighborhoods serve as the loci of their power. Alternatively scammers, freed from the course of reciprocity are able to become "actually" mobile, in some cases moving out of neighborhoods, but in every instance away from the community circuits of obligation. Scamming thus provides a view for what happens to poor Jamaicans who become rich outside of the arenas of music, sport, and education, all of which are imbued in relations of obligation.

"Old Money, Not New Money": Mobility and Citizenship Shifts

As stated at the beginning of this discussion, many scammers enter the practice citing the lack of legitimate opportunity in Jamaica and the negligible returns on any that are available. To scammers, Jamaica is full of potential, yet restricted, opportunity. They recognize that their poverty by design is meant to keep them in an unchanging state of sufferation. This sense of being socially and psychically stuck within an immutable economic precariousness, ontologically positioned as incapable of progress is paired by another sense that success is somehow just out of reach. Recall the epigram at the beginning of chapter three. It was the chorus of dancehall artist Popcaan's song, "System." The chorus demonstrated the breadth of sufferation, so much so that Indian, chiney, black and white people "ah bawl." However, within

the lyrics of the song Popcaan pointedly expresses the experiences of sufferation among ghetto youth:

None ah dem nah see me pain, further more dem neva ask yet
Silence ah di baddest weapon so yuh know weh [what] mi do, me talk less
Man ah work every day down ah wharf and a three grand [US\$ 33] a week dem ah accept
Dem nuh want me fi [to] build mama house, don't waan mi fi own no assets
Sufferation everywhere me turn so give thanks to Jah [god] when yuh pass it
So ghetto yute don't mek nuh silly plans
Believe in yourself be ah man
Dem want we fi dead pon di road
Dem don't want we fi mek millions

Popcaan's "system" is perhaps the embodiment of sufferation that maintains poor Jamaicans' poverty. As he says, "Dem nuh want me fi build mama house, don't waan mi fi own no assets... Dem don't want we fi mek millions." Scammers have decided to not accept those circumstances and have thus taken what they find as necessary, albeit illegal, steps to change them.⁵⁴ This approach is not dissimilar to that of the Cameroonian bandits facing an unstable economic environment caused by structural adjustment discussed by Roitman (2003). These individuals "refute the structure of exclusion and difference" and seize wealth as a means of "making claims to appropriate conditions for wealth creation" (Roitman 2003:230).

Many of the scammers emphasized the unbiased, even democratic opportunity that the practice provides. Even children, as I noted earlier, can scam whether to pay school fees, or to forgo formal education altogether, all one has to do is "take it." Returning to the earlier discussion of

Rick Ross' song "9 piece (even deeper)," the lyrics and their author present for the aspirant scammer an archetype of a black hustler who is admired and emulated not only for his street success, but more profoundly for having parlayed that success into valid forms of economic and social accomplishment. The best examples of this transformation come from the American hip-hop genre, such as with rappers like Jay-Z, whose biography provides a presentation of a street hustler metamorphosed into a media and fashion mogul. Slocum and Thomas have noted how large black American cultural production looms throughout the black diaspora (2007:9). Scammers recognize in these figures a form of "subaltern power" embodied in the narratives of "gangsta rap" employed in "the name of rescuing a racially impugned self," which Obika Gray recognizes as a form of "badness-honour" (2004:131). In step with this notion many Jamaican scammers seek to legitimate their place in society.

For scammers the financial opportunity that scamming provides has caused a shift in the ideals and trajectories of mobility and place within and without Jamaica. Rather than travel for opportunity scammers seek to build status and stake claim to that aspiration of the Jamaican middle class. Where before scamming most participants pursued various means of migration for opportunity, they now find that they have the wherewithal to create opportunities, and therefore a future of value, on the island. This supports a developing trend in which Jamaicans have become less inclined to aspire to migrate. However, where their reason may have a lot to do with decreasing prospects of opportunity in the US and elsewhere, there is not the sense that sufficient opportunity is available at home.⁵⁵

When I asked one informant if he would leave Jamaica if possible, he replied that he had tried before scamming, believing like most young Jamaicans, that getting a visa and going abroad was his only chance (see Thomas 2004, Ch. 6). He therefore resorted to a green card marriage to a Jamaican with U.S. citizenship living abroad. When that relationship failed, he unsuccessfully paid US\$ 2000 to obtain a counterfeit U.S. visa. With the resources from scamming, he only desired to travel to the U.S., preferably New York, for what he termed business opportunities that he insists are legit and legal, so much so that he declared that he would not even overstay the term limits of his visa. He attributes the diminished appeal of the U.S. to the availability in Jamaica of anything he would want there, but that in the past it was "only the dollars that held [him] back." Maurer noted similar results among Caribbean elites, who through involvement with offshore finance were able to reimagine visions of nationalism that was critical of relationships with the United States and Europe, which "redounded into Caribbean nationalist discourses and self- perceptions" (2004:310). When asked how he would be able to make it to the U.S., the scammer stated that from his scamming income he has purchased land and is in the process of building a house, which he hopes will be grounds for visa approval. Evidencing "the multiple and contingent affects" of documents like visas, it is a compelling irony that when the scammer was legitimately (under)employed he resorted to illegitimate and illegal methods of migration, whereas his now illegal income might eventually secure his lawful travel to the U.S. (Navaro-Yashin 2007:95).

Even more novel than the changing views toward migration are those of social mobility. Opportunities stemming from scamming have begun to reframe participants' relationship to

Jamaican society. Expressed were ambitions of legitimate wealth and legitimacy in wealth. At a neighborhood rum bar where the crew regularly met one scammer noted, in an un-ironic, affective tone, a desire that his wealth be viewed as "old money, not new money," a sentiment over which the entire crew were in accord. To this end many of the scammers were simultaneously scamming and starting secondary businesses. One planned on opening a liquor distribution business, another was in the processes of starting a taxi service, while another was investing in a party promotion company, all three proudly noting their purchase of vehicles and the beginning construction of homes. Their aspiration for legitimacy was genuinely cultural, as scammers sought to convert their monetary wealth into social influence and respectability.

In his essay on the ascent of the black middle class in Jamaica, Don Robotham noted that ownership of property, especially the key local and global symbols of status of house and car, "are at the core" of the narrative of that ascent. However, "Most essential of all..." he continued, "...is business ownership as the ultimate axis of personal identity" (2000:24). Expanded access to public education and the civil service did much to secure the black middle class' ascendance through the social hierarchy (Robotham 2000:12). Yet constriction of that access has meant diminished opportunity for Jamaica's poor, who have all but abandoned the long pervasive notion that upward mobility is achieved by the pursuit of education and a career in the public sector. This was noted by Deborah Thomas to have begun during the 1990s in Jamaica (2004:229), and has been observed more recently by Carla Freeman in Barbados (2012:93). So, within the growing socio-economic vacuum left by the likely poor prospects of education and an unpromising public jobs sector, to scammers their accomplishments were proof that scamming

was the best, if not only way for certain success and a future of fortune, opportunity and membership in Jamaica's middle class.

In Deborah Thomas' influential work *Modern Blackness* (2004), she argues that by the late 1990s in Jamaica, popular expressions of urban black culture had largely supplanted the theretofore hegemonic salience of creole multi-racial nationalism. The "brown" middle class had long asserted their ideals of respectable citizenship within the country's economic, political, and cultural spheres.⁵⁶ What Thomas notes among the ideologies and practices of the modern black citizenry was thus a momentous shift that marked the mobilization of the values of Jamaica's "poorer sets" —values which have been popularly, though as Thomas contends not necessarily, equated with Jamaican dancehall music and culture. Scammer discourses of legitimacy provide further insight into how contemporary renderings of Caribbean respectability are conceived and re-imagined as they pair popular black mores with Jamaican "middle class" values in a manner that creates a new iteration of urban blackness.

The independence era begot the "Rude boy" figure, which David Scott defined as, "[Y]oung, urban, black, and angry— that [had] come to haunt the middle-class imaginary of post-independence Jamaica, a figure signifying not merely a lack of the esteemed rationality and preferred values of respectable society but a positive contempt for an refusal of them" (1999:210). Scammers are similar products of their generation, of the time in which structural adjustment has in many ways brought Jamaican development not much further than it was at independence— yet left further retrogressed by the expending of independence era

optimism and hope. However, rather than haunt Jamaica's middle class, scammers endeavor to join it. Scammers invested in the process of legitimization employ, engage in, and seek to display various markers of success, which can often be read as supporting what is conceived as a middle class sensibility. Support for this assertion is evidenced by a resurgent (or perhaps emergent) patriarchy among the scammers interviewed. The challenges the long observed matrifocality of the poorer Jamaican family that occupied the interest of much of the earliest Caribbean anthropology and remains salient in contemporary studies.⁵⁷ This is illustrated by the informant who was starting his taxi service. His scamming proceeds went into establishing his business as well as engaging in some luxury expenditure. Yet his greatest investment was in his son, whom he proudly proclaimed was attending a good (and expensive) private primary school where he was learning Spanish and how to swim. It is not unfathomable to consider that increased resources would produce a commensurate increase in paternal and familial responsibility. Though scammers have not extended themselves to meet the obligations of their communities, the pace at which they are attending to those of the family is remarkable. Irrespective of whether scamming is leading scammers to reproduce middle class norms of success or ambition, the success they enjoy has created for them a new and self-validating sense of place in Jamaica through an ideology of legitimization.

Closed Circuits

Huon Wardle, has argued that "shaping the lives of individual Jamaicans..." is a "real/metaphorical ground of displacement...encapsulated in the idea of adventure" and located in visions and dreams of flight, and the everyday drama of migration (2000:84, 98). Just as young

Mozambican men employ mobile phone technology to address experiences of constrained mobility, and to shift the "interface between daydreams and reality" (Archambault 2012:408). I posit that scam technologies likewise enable a kind of virtual adventure, in which daydreams of riches become reality. Obika Gray describes an "urban exilic space" inside of which unemployed male youth in the Jamaican ghetto live a "hybrid cultural existence by juggling lived experiences and their simulacrum from elsewhere" (2004:101). This space, serving as both "a site of repression" and "a place where forms of social autonomy could be generated" (Gray 2004:102) forms what Jaffe (2012a) has noted as the projected immobility and marginality of the "ghetto imaginary." By scamming these young men expand beyond the (im)mobility afforded by the currencies of popular black urban culture and sport that delimit the outer boundaries of that space. Scamming make possible participation in local and global economic and cultural circuits in more meaningful ways than the sanctioned economy makes available (see Lukacs 2013:58). Scammers thus become more prominently situated along what Newell has noted as the social hierarchy framed within "the evaluative schema" of national identity (2012:71). Indeed, through telephonic practice and the seizure of capital scammers have returned the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) by offering a "counter-gaze," in which scammers, as Caribbean subjects, are able to "resist being objectified and animalized" (Sheller 2012:225). In fact, by innovative, though illicit mechanisms, scammers approach power directly and practice a kind of "freedom within the prevailing relationships of power" (Scott 1999:214) as they, emboldened by a real prospect of wealth, stand up to the pervasive global influence of U.S. economic hegemony.

However, though approaching power, and becoming situated along Jamaica's social hierarchy, scammers nonetheless defer to the same source and networks of power as all previous groups of this thesis. Though they take an alternative approach with enables a necessity to fall back on self-commoditized forms, scammers are nonetheless beholden to "foreign" circuits of wealth that stand as the only viable conduit for material progress. They are now able to access heretofore inaccessible goods available in Jamaica, but there remains something that still evades these young men. Their project of legitimation is obscured by the surreptitious means by which it is attained, and thereby remains perpetually tenuous. And so they, like vendors, JAMIA, Sindhis and RIV, persist in that odd space of an incomplete, and unrealizable ambition.

Better Must Come...One Day

I've been trying a long, long time
Still I didn't make it
Everything I try to do seems to go wrong
It seems I have done something wrong
But they're trying to keep me down
Who God bless, no one curse
Thank God I'm not the worst
Better must come one day
Better must come...

-Delroy Wilson, "Better Must Come"; 1971

In this thesis I have tried to provide a nuanced account of various structural positions in Jamaican society through offering sufferation as a historically generated framing of the market. This has been attempted by examining how the groups in the thesis have moved in and around the market through structuring notions of history, citizenship and race. For each group the market was navigated through respective sets of ethics, and those ethics informed the strategies employed as a way out of sufferation.

For JAMIA and the craft vendors the relevant ethic was one of cooperation. For the former it was based upon a subjectivity of organization, on which the aspirations for the acquisition of skill and

then the ideal of production resulting from the collective harnessing of that skill were based. For the latter, the ethic of cooperation was used to identify infractions against the ethic. It located disunity in the market, which itself brought out deeper, and more meaningful values of race and history. That ethic was influenced by a post-emancipation Baptist, "Christian black" sensibility, which re-presented itself in the nationalist and independence ethos of respectability. However, it was the extant African eudemonic of Jamaican Christianity, which helped rationalize cooperation's failure, and permitted the vendors to accept their circumstances.

The Rastafari Indigenous Village attempted to participate "in" the market without becoming "of" the market. There was an ethic of distance that aimed to remain true to the anti-Babylonian ideals of their culture, rooted in the revolutionary blackness of their Afro-Christian forebears. However, in spite of their radical seeking of intellectual property rights and sovereignty, what resulted, or rather is resulting, is an interesting "social project" (Povinelli 2011) where Rastafari and the market are aggregated into a novel form of market embeddedness.

The Sindhi merchants and the lottery scammers both "live" the market most fully through their ethic of accumulation. It is for this reason that of all of the groups they are the most financially successful, but also why their success is seen as most problematic by the other groups. They nonetheless still project particular values into their practice of the market. For the Sindhis there is an aspirant personhood of being businessmen. For scammers, there is influenced by the acknowledgment that everyday, Christian values will not work, and thus they must thrive by any

means. That means is through the ethic of seizure, which is based in the "radical consumerism" of the Jamaican era of "Modern Blackness" (Thomas 2004).

Examining the employed ethics of the groups in this thesis has demonstrated that the ways of becoming economic are not in fact arbitrary as Callon, et. al. (1998) have argued. The way the groups understand and act upon on the market as forms of ethical positions, strategies and tactics have supported the assertion I made in the introduction that the notion of agencements— the relationship between economic actors and the assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets— can be extended beyond their limitation to financial markets. Instead, the process is a broad and accumulative one, onto which the histories and enculturated experiences and expectations of life are brought to bear.

And so, as expected, this thesis has provided evidence that "economic abstraction," where market transactions are rendered formal and calculative, is little more than economist fiction. But this finding has been demonstrated by many ethnographic accounts throughout the history of the anthropology of economy, going back to the formalist-substantivist debate begun in *The Great Transformation* (Polanyi 1944). Thus this thesis has not simply advocated for market "embeddedness" as located in the state and social institutions. Instead it has argued for an understanding of the market, led not by abstraction, but rather abstractness, located in broader more nebulous ideations of race, history, politics, and culture.

Therefore, the controversy of what lies within and outside the market frame as rehearsed by Miller (2002) and Callon (1998) has been somewhat complicated by this ethnography. Where Callon has asserted that the market bears an isolating function, Miller has countered that that which Callon believes to be isolated exists within the frame and thus constructs notions of the market. I have argued that if such a frame exists, it is all encompassing. This is especially so when facing economic hardship and an overall stumbling economy. However, when considering the myriad of ethics used here to reconcile market practice and economic performance, it may be more productive to think of multiple frames. Elyachar's suggestion of considering a "multiplicity of markets" goes along way in supporting this (2005:24).

However, what the preceding chapters have shown is that there is a hegemonic sense of the market in Jamaica, which I have identified as sufferation. To be sure, suggesting that sufferation is hegemonic is by no means an assertion of it being monolithic. In fact, the ethics foregrounded in this thesis have shown sufferation's multiple dimensions. On one level sufferation has functioned as a historically produced ethic in itself; as a way of evaluating, or at least situating, the economy on the basis of a set of moral principles and cultural mores. It In this capacity sufferation is identifiable in both acute and chronic economic hardship. It is the disunity of the craft vendors, the inability to compete for JAMIA, the thwarted market identified by Sindhis, and the experience of cultural infringement by RIV. Only the scammers, it appears, are successfully mitigating sufferation's effect. But even for them, like for the other groups, sufferation is in large part a problem of the state and its inefficiencies and ineptness.

On another level, sufferation is a useful analytic for understanding the relationships between economic practices, ideologies, and ethical conceptualizations. Furthermore, it demonstrates to what extent those relationships serve to legitimize, console, or further frustrate one's economic position. and how they differently encompass the market in the social and the effects these different encompassments have on market practices. Through the enacted values of everyday life the market becomes a site for understanding life itself, which has been my argument for the use of sufferation— not as just a trope employed to identify the market, but also as a heuristic for ascertaining this broader understanding.

And so as a contributing to the anthropology of economy, and especially the anthropology of the market, I have tried to move beyond understanding the market, the economy, and economic practice as merely embedded processes. I would argue that we move more vigorously and deeper into the cultural and assert that the economy exists primarily in either the same or similar abstract notions that I have described here. Instead of practices or processes, the economy and ideations of the market should be thought of as a cosmology that comprises the entirety of ones social, historical, and cultural constitution.

This understanding also has a significant bearing on how the notion of precariousness is conceptualized in the global economy, which has been a major underlying theme of this research. Beyond sufferation's utility as both a historically produced ethic in, and an analytic frame for, the market, what its analysis has accomplished is provide a long term view into how disadvantaged

peoples understand and cope with structural precariousness. In short, this research has shown what happens when precariousness becomes normalized. I have argued that each of the ethics displayed throughout the ethnographic chapters of this thesis are in response to, and are thus aligned with, precarious conditions. Thus, in better understanding precariousness, we must look for its local arrangement (which may likely be based on global influences), as I have done with sufferation. Doing so will provide more than a notional sense of precariousness, but instead a lucid appreciation of it as an experience and a practice that simultaneously informs and is informed by particular, cosmological, or perhaps ontological ways of understanding one's position in economic and social life.

This particular view may be helpful in addressing what Jamaican political scientist, Obika Gray, asserts is the "conundrum" facing the Caribbean. He defines this problem as being how to understand the region's relationship "to capitalist civilization, to modernity and also how to address these issues in order to achieve an emancipated existence" (2004:355). All of the efforts of reform projects, which aimed to answer this problem, going back to the Creole nationalist agenda of the late 1930s, Gray argues that each has either been "in favour of Europeanist ontology, [or] they have pandered to Caribbean Africanisms in the most vulgar ways" (2004:358). Through an appreciation of the frame of sufferation, and a sincere study of the ethics employed in its response, this study contributes a sensitive approach to addressing this puzzle. It does so by appropriately establishing a view to how Jamaicans configure their perception of a capitalist economy, and how Jamaican "modernity" is comprised of reflexive accounts, narratives, and notions of the past.

Though explicitly concerned with Caribbean formations in Jamaica, the problems facing this thesis' subjects are likewise faced in other Black Atlantic societies (see Gray 2004:355). The frame of sufferation and all of the employed ethics have been fashioned in an African diasporic experience of blackness. And so this work, and especially the ethics emphasized within can contribute to questions of diaspora and race as they are related to collective ideas of the economy and inequality. Particularly salient to this broader context is this thesis' discussion on cooperation. The arguments made about the conflating of race and community through conventions of cooperation, I believe can help to shed light on the problematic of blackness.

There is one contribution that I believe this thesis has made that extends beyond disciplinary and racial boundaries, and is ultimately a human one. It is the appreciation of everyday processes of coping. It is, as one sage interlocutor put it, the basic quality of "laughing while crying." While likely taken for granted, I hope that this thesis has shown that quite a great deal goes into this most dexterous, yet uncelebrated of human capacities. With this in mind, this research has led me to consider whether the market-as-sufferation discourse can serve as a kind of ontology? I have already suggested that the Jamaican understanding of race can be considered something of a "plantation cosmology" (chapter one) where historical and raced experiences inform present and raced experiences. Therefore, in this thesis' conclusion a new horizon for inquiry has been established in the question: Can the notion of sufferation as a frame that defines the cultured negotiating of economic adversity be similarly extended to a construct for Caribbean being?

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Figure 1.

Photos by Jovan Scott Lewis © 2014

These photos are from the craft markets in Montego Bay and include images relevant to chapter one. The top right photo shows Big Mama at Bay Fort with her granddaughter during down time. The bottom right photo shows a typical craft stall at Bay Fort, fully stocked with Sindhi manufactured goods. The bottom left photo shows a family of tourists preparing their payment for goods purchased from the two vendors pictured. In this instance the vendors convinced the tourists to purchase goods from them both. The center bottom photo shows the wooden statue I discussed in chapter three that Sindhis had made in Indonesia to pass off as Jamaican made. The reason I show it here is that goods like this are frequently sold at the market. The top left and center photos show the differing promotional signage of Sindhis and Ms. Bev. The Sindhi sign is demonstrative of the multiple pricing that vendors assert Sindhis are capable of providing because of their unity.



Figure 2.

Photos by Jovan Scott Lewis © 2014

These photos show various scenes relevant to the chapter on Sindh. The top right photo shows the Jamaican workers outside a shop waiting to solicit tourists' custom. The bottom photo shows three adjacent Sindhi shops. The top left photo depicts the shop in direct competition to Ms. Bev. with the name "Jamaican Culture," which infuriated Ms. Bev. The bottom left photo shows a young sindworki helping two tourists from behind the counter. The center bottom photo shows the Sunkissed brand of t-shirts that trade on the Hollister aesthetic.



Figure 3.

Photos by Jovan Scott Lewis © 2014

This panel of photos is of JAMIA. The top left shows JAMIA's president Baldwin Dulston as he presides over a JAMIA meeting. The top right photo shows the vendor-members as they discuss a matter. The bottom left and center photos show the sign and front entrance to the Calabash hotel where JAMIA held their meetings. The bottom right photo is the JAMIA promotional banner, which they present at all functions they attend. It contains their motto, "Putting Able Hands To Work."



Figure 4.

Photos by Jovan Scott Lewis © 2014

These are photos taken at the Rastafari Indigenous Village. The top left are two adjacent banners at the inauguration/reopening of the village after renovations were completed. These renovations were made possible by JSIF funding, hence the banner on the right is from that organization. The top center photo shows one of the young brethren using the cameras provided by WIPO discussed in the chapter. The bottom right photo is promotional footage found of the village's website, inviting tourist to "explore our culture." The bottom left photo shows a tourist exploring that culture by taking a photo of one of the brethren as he demonstrated roasting a yam. The center bottom photo shows the Nyahbinghi preparing for a musical demonstration. The top right photo shows a village brethren in the burlap costume that is worn during visits. He sits with a mortar and pestle demonstrating "traditional" food preparation techniques.



Figure 5.

Illustrations by Clovis © 2012 Jamaica Observer

This panel shows various political satire cartoons illustrated by Clovis for the Jamaica Observer during fieldwork. The week of August 1st, scamming was a prominent feature in the news, with Western Union closing down all St. James branches for security upgrades due to the practice. The top left and right photos intimate the ineffectiveness of the Jamaican state at tackling the scamming problem. While the bottom photo criticizes the practice's effect on Montego Bay's brand image.

¹ It is estimated that approximately 7,280 are employed as agents, while 1,092 are employed as IT support and 728 persons fulfilling various managerial roles.

² Bay Fort Craft Market is a pseudonym, as are the names of all individuals interviewed with the exception of the leaders of the Rastafari Indigenous Village (Ch. 4) and JAMIA (Ch. 2) and the owner of Bev's Boutique (Ch. 2).

³ "Gated tourism" is analogous to the much-theorized gated community phenomenon see Low (2003).

⁴ These studies often demonstrated that family structure in the region tended toward matrifocality and the marginalization of the role of men, and, therefore, mothers, through working and assistance from her kin networks, would often be the primary provider.

⁵ The second phase of the rehabilitation with funding provided by the Tourism Product Development Company (TPDCo) with funds received through the Tourism Enhancement Fund.

⁶ In August of 2013, the St James Parish Council took 32 shops out of operation for non-payment of rent. Thirty-one were reopened after the fees were paid up. By October, the vendors once again found themselves in arrears, owing the parish council a reported JAM\$ 500,500. Bay Fort Craft Vendors Default on Rent. Published 12, December 2013. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20131221/western/western2.html>, accessed January 25, 2014.

⁷ Online review of field site craft market by Tim K. "Sadly this is not a great market." *Tripadvisor.co.uk*, December 3, 2012, http://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Attraction_Review-g147311-d208022-Reviews-Crafts_Market-Montego_Bay_Saint_James_Parish_Jamaica.html#REVIEWS. (Accessed January, 17 2013).

⁸ What Miller does not evidence, however, is animosity in competition (which is not to say that it doesn't exist). One could argue that the tension between the equally numbered races in Trinidad has led to a much greater in-group racial unity, whereas black Jamaicans being in such an overwhelming majority, there is an increased chance for in-group loathing.

⁹ Personality and Conflict in Jamaica (1952).

¹⁰ Indians in this sense refers to Jamaica's population of East Indians descended from indentured workers who came to Jamaica beginning in 1838.

¹¹ This racial monopolization was challenged by the ascent to power of P.J. Patterson's PNP in the early 1990s (Robotham 2000).

¹² Bay Fort Craft Vendors Default on Rent. Published 12, December 2013. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20131221/western/western2.html>, accessed January 25, 2014.

¹³ Higglering, believed to be a derivation of the term "haggle" dates back to slavery, where excess produce from slave provision grounds were taken to the market to sell or trade on Sundays by female slaves.

¹⁴ Examples include the Meditations 1974 song, *Tricked*, and Barrington Levy's 1979 *Don't Fuss Nor Fight*, both of which note that neither the Chinese, Syrians, whites, nor Indians were fighting, but "only we [blacks] who have been fighting." Also, Hugh Mundell's 1978 title asked pointedly, "Why do black men fuss and fight?"

¹⁵ See Look Lai (2005) for an extended example of Chinese integration into the Caribbean.

¹⁶ Miller's (2008) account of things is a useful discussion of the "thing" in the general affective sense of things in Jamaica. But the "Jamaican thing" is closer to the Comaroff's "ethno-commodity" (2009).

¹⁷ The acceptance by the craft vendors of Sindhis selling luxury items indicates two things. One it shows how long the Sindhis have been involved in the luxury industry, and how recent their involvement in souvenirs is. Two, it presents a kind of separation of 'domains of quality' between the two groups.

¹⁸ <http://www.ilejamaica.org.jm>.

¹⁹ That response was interesting as it indicated that TPDCo. was aware of the issue of vendor aggressiveness.

²⁰ "Better must come" was a popular slogan of Michael Manley's 1972 campaign which communicated its populist ideology of democratic socialism. It was adapted from the 1971 song of the same title by reggae musician, Delroy Wilson.

²¹ "What violence-torn St James, nay all Jamaica, can learn from Flanker."
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/What-violence-torn-St-James--nay-all-Jamaica--can-learn-from-Flanker_14299652, Accessed 21 November 2013.

²² <http://dcfsjamaica.org/site/factsfriendly.html>

²³ See Crewe 2005 for a more evolved example.

²⁴ "Jamaicans shy away from cheaper burial method" <http://jamaica-star.com/thestar/20101106/news/news3.html>. Accessed May 15, 2012.

²⁵ <http://dcfsjamaica.org/site/dcfshistory.html>

²⁶ Comment made by Dr. Gene Leon, IMF Resident Representative to Jamaica (2011) "Imagine a New Brand Jamaica! Strategies to achieve economic growth." Presentation to the Jamaica Exporters' Association

²⁷ http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Gov-t-seals-sugar-deal-with-COMPLANT_9457372, Accessed July 5th, 2012.

²⁸ The latest figures from the bauxite-alumina industry reveal that in January 2014 crude bauxite production fell by 15% compared to January 2013. <http://digjamaica.com/blog/2014/02/28/industry-update-bauxite-alumina-declines-jan14/>, accessed March 29, 2014

²⁹ When pressed, this is the argument by which many Sindhi retailers defend their place in the souvenir industry.

³⁰ The original vending of indigenous goods from Sind, has led some scholars to term the Sindhi trade "sindwork" and Sindhi traders as "sindworki(e)s" (Falzon 2004:6; Markovits 200:8). However, no Sindhis in my field site identified, or were familiar, with either term. This is likely due to the term having been used among Sindhis who traveled for trade before partition, whereas the Sindhis concerned with in this thesis would have entered the trade thereafter. For the sake of continuity with previous literature, I will maintain use of the term, but use it exclusively when referencing Sindhi souvenir shop workers. For shop owners I will use the more generic terms "traders" or "merchants."

³¹ The majority of the Indians on the Hip Strip are Sindhis, but there are a few South Indians in business too, who came to Jamaica alongside relatives recruited to Jamaica to serve as doctors in Montego Bay's hospitals. Sindhis are also often recruited outside of kin networks, via the Internet <http://www.timesjobs.com/job-detail/Sales-Business-Development-job-in-Interscope-INTERNATIONAL-jobid-nICuhWx3fR1zpSvf+uAgZw==> 8/29/13.

³² Prohibition of employment of women in night work except in certain circumstances.

3.(1) No woman shall be employed in night work except where the night work is -

(a) for the purpose of completing work commenced by day and interrupted by some unforeseeable cause which could not be prevented by reasonable care; or

(b) necessary to preserve raw materials, subject to rapid deterioration, from certain loss; or

(c) that of a responsible position of management held by a woman who is not ordinarily engaged in manual work; or

(d) carried on in connection with the preparation, treatment, packing, transportation or shipment of fresh fruit; or

(e) that of nursing and of caring for the sick; or

(f) carried on in a cinematograph or other theatre while such theatre is open to the public;

(g) carried on in connection with a hotel or guest-house, or with a bar, restaurant or club; or

(h) carried on by a Pharmacist registered under the Pharmacy Act

³³ Working in more profitable shops enabled Sindhis to earn more by the end of their contracts, giving them, as in Nish's case, sufficient capital to open their own shop after just one term.

³⁴ It was noted by my informants, as well as by Sindhis interviewed by Falzon (2004) that younger generations of Sindhis are turning away from business, opting instead to enter into the "professions" of medicine and law.

³⁵ "Harley-Davidson rolls into Jamaica - To open 3-4 stores starting April." February 23, 2007. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20070223/business/business1.html>. Accessed September 5 2012 .

³⁶ "Harley-Davidson rolls into Jamaica - To open 3-4 stores starting April." February 23, 2007. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20070223/business/business1.html>. Accessed September 5 2012 .

³⁷ <http://jis.gov.jm/jamaica-leads-caribbean-out-of-tourism-recession/>. Accessed October 5th, 2012

³⁸ <http://www.jamaica-no-problem.com/villages-as-businesses.html>

³⁹ Juggling serves to example the "occupational multiplicity" noted by Lambros Comitas as being "systematically engaged in a number of gainful activities, which for him form an integrated economic complex" (1973:157).

⁴⁰ Peter Wilson has noted that crews in the Caribbean, comprised of friends, serve as networks that can be considered as a grass-roots structure of information dissemination and economic mobilization (1973).

⁴¹ In Jamaica, residents who share common facilities and yard space at the back of an apartment lot are considered to live in a yard. Yards serve as a central site of Jamaican social life that "elicit a certain camaraderie inevitably punctuated by tensions and suspicion" (Austin 1984:43; see chapters 3 and 8 for in-depth discussions on yard life).

⁴² VistaPrint has recently begun building an 11-acre customer service center. They were formally located at Montego Bay Free Zone.

⁴³ See Freeman (2000) and Mullings (1999), for further discussion on gender in the data processing industry.

⁴⁴ At the time of fieldwork, one call center worker for ACS in St. James, through personal communication, quoted her salary at US\$ 55 per week.

⁴⁵ This advance enabled confirmation numbers to be shared between senders and receivers, expediting the receipt process.

⁴⁶ Miller and Slater noted how at the turn of the millennium in Trinidad, the introduction of 'Voice over IP' technology potentially reduced *all* long-distance calls to local ones, disrupting traditional telephony (2000,125).

⁴⁷ Digicel has operations in 31 markets with over 13 million subscribers across the Caribbean, Central America and Pacific regions. <http://www.digicelgroup.com/en/about/board-of-directors>. Accessed January, 13, 2014.

⁴⁸ Horst and Miller (2006:162) note Digicel's success in the proliferation of the cell phone in Jamaica since 2000. It achieved 1 million subscribers within five years on the basis of highly competitive pricing and highly aggressive marketing.

⁴⁹ 513 is the magicJack's default for new subscribers who do not specify an area code. <http://www.fox19.com/story/20485913/scammers-call-from-513-587-4417-fox19-investigates>. Accessed June 19, 2013.

⁵⁰ This awareness has resulted in the creation of a Jamaican scam-baiting phenomenon on YouTube where American users upload video of their misleading, taunting, and accosting Jamaican scammers who try to solicit them.

⁵¹ The crew would later expand their smartphone hardware to include other brands and models, like the Samsung Galaxy.

⁵² <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geell5Q5EPY>

⁵³ Despite Vybz Kartel's promotion of scamming's lack of violence, at the time of his song's release he was imprisoned awaiting trial on murder charges. In fact, the song was recorded in prison. He would be found guilty in April 2014 and sentenced to life in prison.

⁵⁴ For an example from within the U.S. see Bourgois (2003) especially chapters 3 and 4.

⁵⁵ Jamaica For Us! Majority Of Jamaicans Would Turn Down The Chance To Migrate. Jamaica Glean 24, January 2014. Accessed 5, May 2014. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20140112/lead/lead1.html>

⁵⁶ While the term "brown middle class" connotes a homogenous race-class conflation, in fact there are multiple categories which differ in ethnic background— some of mixed race, and others of Lebanese origin; and political orientation—holding membership in both Jamaica's opposing political parties. However, I contend that despite the political or ethnic differences of members of the "brown" middle class, they are nonetheless consonant with regard to cultural values.

⁵⁷ For examples of the continued study of matrifocal Caribbean kinship, see Barrow (1999) Besson (2002, esp. ch. 8); Chevannes (2001); Clarke (1999 [1957]); Henriques (1968); Smith (1962); Smith (1995); and Quinlan (2006).